Adieu au Professeur Piet Tommissen (1925-2011)

 

Adieu au Professeur Piet Tommissen (1925-2011)

 

Quelques jours après avoir lu l’hommage publié par “Junge Freiheit” suite au décès du Professeur Helmut Quaritsch, l’ancien éditeur de la revue “Der Staat” (Berlin), j’apprenais, jeudi 1 septembre, en feuilletant sur le comptoir même du marchand de journaux mon “’t Pallieterke” hebdomadaire, dont je venais de prendre livraison, la mort du Professeur Piet Tommissen, qu’évoque avec une belle émotion le journal satirique anversois. Deux géants mondiaux des sciences politiques viennent donc de disparaître cet été, nous laissant encore plus orphelins depuis les disparitions successives de Panayotis Kondylis, de Julien Freund, de Gianfranco Miglio ou d’Armin Mohler.

 

A la recherche de Pareto et Schmitt

 

J’avais appris, tout au début de mon itinéraire personnel, où, forcément, les tâtonnements dominaient, qu’un certain Professeur Tommissen avait publié des ouvrages sur Vilfredo Pareto et Carl Schmitt. Nous savions confusément que ces auteurs étaient extrêmement importants pour tous ceux qui, comme nous, refusaient la pente de la décadence que l’Occident avait empruntée dès les années 60, immédiatement après les “technomanies” et les américanismes des années 50. Nous voulions une sociologie et, partant, une politologie offensives, contructrices de sociétés ayant réagi vigoureusement, “quiritairement” contre l’éventail d’injustices, de dysfonctionnements, d’enlisements, de déliquescences que le complexe bourgeoisisme/économicisme/libéralisme/parlementarisme avait induit depuis la moitié du 19ème siècle. Pareto démontrait (et Roberto Michels plus sûrement encore après lui...) quelles étaient les étapes de l’ascension et du déclin des élites politiques, destinées au bout de trois ou quatre générations à vasouiller ou à se “bonzifier” (Michels). Nous voulions être une nouvelle élite ascendante. Nous voulions bousculer les “bonzes”, leur indiquer la porte de sortie. Naïveté de jeunesse: ils sont toujours là; pire, ils ont coopté les laquais de leur laquais. Nous connaissions moins bien Schmitt à l’époque mais nous devinions que sa définition du “politique” impliquait d’aller à l’essentiel et permettait de trier le bon grain de l’ivraie dans le kaléidoscope des agitations politiques et politiciennes du 20ème siècle: que ce soit sous la république de Weimar, dans le marais politicard de la pauvre Belgique de l’entre-deux-guerres (le “gâchis des années 30” dira le Prof. Jean Vanwelkenhuyzen), dans les turpitudes des Troisième et Quatrième Républiques en France auxquelles De Gaulle, formé par René Capitant, disciple de Carl Schmitt, tentera de mettre un terme à partir de 1958.

 

Première rencontre avec Piet Tommissen dans la rue du Marais à Bruxelles

 

Il y avait donc sur la place de Bruxelles, un professeur d’université qui s’occupait assidûment de ces deux géants de la pensée politique européenne du 20ème siècle. Il fallait donc se procurer ses ouvrages et les lire. J’avais vu une photo du Professeur Tommissen dans un numéro d’ “Eléments” ou dans une autre publication du “Groupe de Recherches et d’Etudes sur la Civilisation Européenne”. Ce visage rond et serein m’avait frappé. J’avais retenu ces traits lisses et doux et voilà qu’en février ou en mars 1975, en sortant des bâtiments réservés aux romanistes et germanistes des Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, rue du Marais à Bruxelles, je vois tout à coup le Prof. Piet Tommissen, campé devant l’entrée du 113, à l’époque occupé par la “Sint-Aloysius Handelhogeschool”, où il dispensait ses cours. Il était impressionnant, non seulement par la taille mais aussi, faut-il le dire, par le joyeux embonpoint qu’il affichait, lui qui fut aussi un très fin gourmet et un bon amateur de ripailles estudiantines, ponctuées de force hanaps de blonde cervoise. Je suis allé vers lui et lui ai demandé, sans doute un peu emprunté: “Bent u Prof. Tommissen?”. Une certaine appréhension me tourmentait: allait-il envoyer sur les roses le freluquet que j’étais? Que nenni! Le visage rond et lisse de la photo, ancrée dans le recoin d’une de mes circonvolutions cérébrales, s’est aussitôt illuminé d’un sourire inoubliable, effet d’une sérénité intérieure, d’une modestie et d’une bonté naturelles (et sans pareilles...). Cette amabilité contrastait avec l’arrogance qu’affichaient jadis trop d’universitaires, souvent à fort mauvais escient. Le Prof. Tommissen était à l’évidence heureux qu’un quidam cherchait à se procurer ses ouvrages sur Pareto et Schmitt. Il m’a indiqué comment les obtenir et je les ai achetés.

 

Piet Tommissen et Marc. Eemans

 

Ensuite, plus aucune nouvelle de Tommissen pendant au moins trois longues années. Je le retrouve plus tard dans le sillage de son ami Marc. Eemans, avec qui il avait édité de 1973 à 1976 la revue “Espaces”. Je rencontre Eemans, comme j’ai déjà eu plusieurs fois l’occasion de le rappeler, à l’automne 1978, sans imaginer que le peintre surréaliste et évolien était lié d’une amitié étroite avec le spécialiste insigne de Pareto et Schmitt. L’histoire de cette belle amitié, ancienne, profonde, intense, n’a pas encore été explorée, n’a pas (encore) fait l’objet d’une étude systématique. De tous les numéros d’ “Espaces”, je n’en possède qu’un seul, depuis quelques semaines seulement, trouvé chez l’excellent bouquiniste ixellois “La Borgne Agasse”: ce numéro, c’est celui qui a été consacré par le binôme Tommissen/Eemans à l’avant-gardiste flamand Paul Van Ostaijen, dont on connait l’influence déterminante sur l’évolution future de Marc. Eemans, celui-là même qui deviendra, comme l’a souligné Tommissen lui-même, “un surréaliste pas comme les autres”. A signaler aussi dans les colonnes d’ “Espaces”: une étude de Tommissen sur la figure littéraire et politique que fut l’étonnant Pierre Hubermont (auquel un étudiant de l’UCL a consacré naguère plusieurs pages d’analyses, surtout sur son itinéraire de communiste dissident et sur son socialisme particulier dans un mémoire de licence centré sur l’histoire du “Nouveau Journal”; cf. Maximilien Piérard, “Le Nouveau Journal 1940-1944 - Conservation révolutionnaire et historisme politique – Grandeur et décadence d’une métapolitique quotidienne”; promoteur: Prof. Michel Dumoulin; Louvain-la-Neuve, 2002).

 

“De Tafelronde” et “Kultuurleven”

 

Tommissen, comme Schmitt d’ailleurs, n’était pas exclusivement cantonné dans les sciences politiques ou l’économie: il était un fin connaisseur des avant-gardes littéraires et artistiques, s’intéressait avec passion et acribie aux figures les plus originales qui ont animé les marges enivrantes de notre paysage intellectuel, des années 30 aux années 70. On devine aussi la présence de Tommissen en coulisses dans l’aventure de la fascinante petite revue d’Eemans et de Gaillard, “Fantasmagie”. “Espaces” fut une aventure francophone de notre professeur flamand, par ailleurs très soucieux de maintenir et d’embellir la langue de Vondel. Mais ses initiatives et ses activités dans les milieux d’avant-gardes ne se sont pas limitées au seul aréopage réduit (par les circonstances de notre après-guerre) qui entourait Marc. Eemans. En Flandre, Tommissen fut l’une des chevilles ouvrières d’une revue du même type qu’ “Espaces”: “De Tafelronde”, à laquelle il a donné des articles sur Ernst Jünger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Stefan George, Apollinaire, Edgard Tijtgat, Alfred Kubin, etc. Parallèlement à “Espaces” et à “De Tafelronde”, Piet Tommissen collaborait à “Kultuurleven”, qui a accueilli bon nombre de ses articles de sciences politiques, avec des contributions consacrées à Henri De Man, Carl Schmitt, Vilfredo Pareto et des notules pertinentes sur Thom et sa théorie des catastrophes, sur René Girard, Rawls et Baudrillard, sans oublier Heidegger, Theodor Lessing et Otto Weininger.

 

“Dietsland Europa”

 

Tommissen n’avait pas peur de “se mouiller” dans des entreprises plus audacieuses sur le plan politique comme “Dietsland-Europa”, la revue du “flamingant de choc”, un coeur d’or sous une carapace bourrue, je veux parler du regretté Bert Van Boghout qui, souvent, par ses aboiements cinglants, ramenait les ouailles égarées vers le centre du village. On sait le rôle joué par des personnalités comme Karel Dillen, futur fondateur du “Vlaams Blok”, et par le Dr. Roeland Raes, dans le devenir de cette publication qui a tenu le coup pendant plus de quarante années sans faiblir. Tommissen et moi, nous nous sommes ainsi retrouvés un jour, en l’an de grâce 1985, au sein de la rédaction d’un numéro spécial de la revue de Van Boghout sur Julius Evola, dossier qui sera repris partiellement par la revue évolienne française “Totalité” de Georges Gondinet. C’était au temps béni du meilleur adjoint que Van Boghout ait jamais eu: l’étonnant, l’inoubliable Frank Goovaerts, qui pratiquait les arts martiaux japonais jusque dans l’archipel nippon, traversait chaque été la France en moto, jouait au bridge comme un lord anglais et était ouvrier sur les docks d’Anvers; il fut assassiné dans la rue par un dément en 1991. Dans les colonnes de “Dietsland-Europa”, Tommissen a évoqué son cher Carl Schmitt, qui le méritait bien, le livre de Bertram sur Nietzsche, Hans Freyer (dont on ne connait que trop peu de choses dans l’espace linguistique francophone), Pareto, les courants de droite sous la République de Weimar, la théorie schmittienne des grands espaces et la notion évolienne de décadence.

 

L’appel de Carl Schmitt: devenir des “Gardiens des Sources”

 

Au cours de cette période —j’ai alors entre 18 et 24 ans— j’apprends, sans doute de la bouche d’Eemans, que la Flandre, et plus particulièrement l’Université de Louvain, avait connu pendant l’entre-deux-guerres, à l’initiative du Prof. Victor Leemans, une “Politieke Academie”, dynamique think tank focalisé sur tous les thèmes de la sociologie et de la politologie qui nous intéressaient. Tommissen s’est toujours voulu incarnation de l’héritage, réduit à sa seule personne s’il le fallait et s’il n’y avait pas d’autres volontaires, de cette “Politieke Academie”. Il a oeuvré dans ce sens, en laissant un maximum de traces écrites car, on le sait, “les paroles s’envolent, les écrits restent”. C’est la raison pour laquelle il est resté un “octogénaire hyperactif”, comme le soulignait très récemment Peter Wim Logghe, rédacteur en chef de “Teksten , Kommentaren en Studies”. Pourquoi? Parce que, dans ses “Verfassungsrechtlichen Aufsätze” et plus particulièrement dans la 5ème subdivision de la 17ème partie de ce recueil, intitulée “Savigny als Paradigma der ersten Abstandnahme von der gesetzesstaatlichen Legalität”, Carl Schmitt a réclamé, non pas expressis verbis mais indirectement, l’avènement d’une sorte de centrale intellectuelle et spirituelle, qu’il évoquait sous le nom poétique de “Hüter der Quellen”, “les Gardiens des Sources”. Voilà ce que Tommissen a voulu être: un “Gardien des Sources”, dût-il se maintenir à son poste comme le soldat de Pompéi ou d’Herculanum, en dépit des flots de lave qui s’avançaient avec fureur face à lui. Quand la lave refroidit et se durcit, on peut en faire de bons pavés de porphyre, comme celui de Quenast. Avec la boue “enchimiquifiée” et les eaux résiduaires de la société de consommation, on tuera jusqu’à la plus indécrottable des chienlits. Petite méditation spenglerienne et pessimiste...

 

La “Politieke Academie”

 

Nous aussi, nous interprétions, sans encore connaître ce texte fondamental de Schmitt, notre démarche métapolitique, au dedans ou en dehors de la “nouvelle droite”, peu importait, comme une démarche de “gardien des sources”. Alors qu’avons nous fait? Nous avons entamé une recherche de textes émanant de cette “Politieke Academie” et de ce fascinant Prof. Leemans. Nous avons trouvé son Sombart, son Marx, son Kierkegaard, que nous comparions aux textes sombartiens édités par Claudio Mutti et Giorgio Freda en Italie, aux rares livres de Sombart encore édités en Allemagne, notamment chez DTV; nous cherchions à redéfinir les textes marxiens à la lumière des dissidents de la IIème et de la IIIème Internationales (Lassalle, Dühring, De Man,...). Mais la “Politieke Academie” avait des successeurs indirects: nous plongions dans les trois volumes de monographies didactiques sur la vie et l’oeuvre des grands sociologues contemporains que la célèbre collection “Aula” offrait à la curiosité des étudiants néerlandais et flamands (“Hoofdfiguren uit de sociologie”); seul germaniste dans le groupe, j’ajoutais les magnifiques ouvrages de Helmut Schoeck (dont: “Geschichte der Soziologie – Ursprung und Aufstieg der Wissenschaft von der menschlichen Gesellschaft”). Tout cela constituait un complexe de sociologie et de sciences politiques tonifiant; avec cela, nous étions à des années-lumière des petits exercices insipides de statistiques étriquées et de meccano “organisationnel” à l’américaine, nappé de la sauce vomitive du “politiquement correct”, qu’on propose aujourd’hui aux étudiants, en empêchant du même coup l’avènement d’une nouvelle élite, prête à amorcer un nouveau cycle sociologique parétien, en coupant l’herbe sous les pieds d’avant-gardistes qui sont tout à la fois révolutionnaires et “gardiens des sources”.

 

A cette époque de grande effervescence intellectuelle et de maturation, nous avons rencontré le Professeur Tommissen à la tribune du “Centro Studi Evoliani” de Marc. Eemans, où il a animé une causerie sur Pareto et une autre sur Schmitt. Nous connaissions mieux Pareto grâce à l’excellent ouvrage de Julien Freund sur le sociologue et économiste italien, paru à l’époque chez Seghers. Notre rapport à Schmitt, à l’époque, était indirect: il passait invariablement par l’ouvrage de Freund: “Qu’est-ce que le politique?”. De Carl Schmitt lui-même, nous ne disposions que de “La notion du politique”, publié chez Calmann-Lévy, grâce à l’entremise de Julien Freund, sans que nous ne connaissions véritablement le contexte de l’oeuvre schmittienne. Celle-ci n’était accessible que via des travaux académiques allemands, difficilement trouvables à Bruxelles. Finalement, j’ai obtenu les références nécessaires pour aller commander les ouvrages-clefs du “solitaire de Plettenberg” chez ce cher librairie de la rue des Comédiens, au coeur de la vieille ville de Bruxelles. Résultat: une ardoise, alors considérable, de 5000 francs belges, que mon père est allé apurer, tout à la fois catastrophé et amusé. Une bêtise d’étudiant, à ses yeux... Nous étions au printemps de l’année 1980 et une partie de l’ardoise (il n’y avait pas seulement les 5000 francs résiduaires payés par mon géniteur...) avait été généreusement offerte par le Bureau de traduction de Mr. Singer, chez qui j’avais effectué mon stage pratique obligatoire de fin d’études. Singer, germanophone issu de la communauté israélite berlinoise, aimait les étudiants qui avaient choisi la langue allemande: il voulait toujours leur offrir des livres qui exprimaient la pensée nationale allemande, sinon des ouvrages qui communiquaient à leurs lecteurs l’esprit prussien de discipline. Quand je lui ai suggéré de me financer du Carl Schmitt, Singer, déjà octogénaire et toujours sur la brèche, était enchanté. Et voilà comment, de Tommissen à Singer, et de “Over en in zake Carl Schmitt” jusqu’à la pharamineuse commande au libraire de la rue des Comédiens, a commencé mon itinéraire personnel de schmittien en herbe. Inutile de préciser, que cet itinéraire est loin d’être achevé...

 

“Nouvelle école”: Tommissen à mon secours

 

En 1981, très exactement à la date du 15 mars, je débarque avec mes parents et mes bagages à Paris, où me reçoivent les amis Gibelin et Garrabos. J’étais devenu le secrétaire de rédaction de “Nouvelle école”, la très belle revue de l’inénarrable et fantasque de Benoist. Celui-ci, avec l’insouciance et l’impéritie de l’autodidacte parisien prétentieux, avait décidé de me faire fabriquer des numéros de “Nouvelle école” sur Pareto et sur Heidegger. C’est évidemment de la candeur de journaliste. Comment peut-on demander à un galopin de tout juste 25 ans, qui n’a pas étudié les sciences politiques ou la philosophie, de fabriquer de tels dossiers en un tourne-main? Tout simplement parce qu’on est un farfelu. Mais, moi, on ne m’a jamais appris à discuter, d’ailleurs Schmitt abhorrait la discussion à l’instar de Donoso Cortès. Il fallait obéir aux ordres et aux consignes: il fallait agir et produire ce qu’il fallait produire. Donc il a bien fallu que je m’exécute, sans trop gaffer. Comment? Eh bien, en m’adressant aux deux seules personnes, que je connaissais, qui avaient pratiqué Pareto à niveau universitaire: Bernard Marchand et Piet Tommissen! Bernard Marchand avait rédigé un mémoire à l’UCL sur les néo-machiavéliens, tels que James Burnham les avait présentés. Il nous a livré, à titre d’introduction, une version adaptée et complétée de son mémoire. Tommissen est ensuite venu à mon secours et m’a confié des textes de lui-même et d’un certain Torrisi. Guillaume Faye, plus branché sur les sciences politiques, a commis un excellent texte sur la notion de doxanalyse qu’il avait tiré de sa lecture très attentive des oeuvres de Jules Monnerot. D’où: première mission accomplie! Réaction grognone de de Benoist, dans l’affreux bouge dégueulasse de restaurant, qui se trouvait à côté des bureaux du GRECE, rue Charles-Lecocq dans le 15ème, et où il avait l’habitude de se “restaurer”: “C’est la colonisation belge... Je vais finir par m’appeler Van Benoist et, toi, Guillaume, tu t’appeleras Van Faye...”. Il ne manquait plus que “Van Vial” et “Van Valla” au tableau... Après cette parenthèse parisienne, où les anecdotes truculentes et burlesques ne manquent pas, il fallait que j’accomplisse mon service militaire et que je mette la  dernière main à mon mémoire de fin d’études, commencé en 1980.

 

La défense orale de mon mémoire: encore Tommissen à mon secours!

 

Vu la maladie puis le départ à la retraite de mon promoteur de mémoire, Albert Defrance, je ne présente mon pensum au jury qu’en septembre 1983. Ce n’est pas un mémoire transcendant. Ecole de traduction oblige, il s’agit d’une modeste traduction, annotée, justifiée et explicitée dans son contexte. Mais elle entrait dans le cadre des sciences politiques, telles que nous les concevions. Au début, j’avais souhaité traduire un des ouvrages de Helmut Schoeck mais ceux-ci étaient tous trop volumineux pour un simple mémoire dit de “licence” (selon le vocabulaire belge, avant l’introduction du vocabulaire de Bologne). Finalement, le seul ouvrage court brossant un tableau intéressant des pistes sociologiques et politologiques que nous aimions explorer était celui d’Ernst Topitsch et de Kurt Salamun sur la notion d’idéologie. Mais problème: Defrance s’intéressait à la question mais il n’était plus là. Mon cher professeur de grammaire allemande, Robert Potelle, reprend le flambeau mais avoue, avec la trop grande modestie qui le caractérise, qu’il n’est pas habitué à manier le vocabulaire propre à ces disciplines. Frau Costa, notre professeur d’histoire allemande, fait preuve de la même modestie exagérée (“Wie haben Sie einen solchen Wortschatz meistern können?”), alors que son cours sur le passage de Weimar au national-socialisme, avec la fameuse “Ermächtigungsgesetz” fut une excellente introduction à une problématique abordée par Schmitt. Que faire? Comment trouver un universitaire germanophone spécialisé dans la thématique? C’est simple: appeler Tommissen pour qu’il soit l’un de mes lecteurs extérieurs. Rendez-vous est pris à Grimbergen, dans le foyer, antre et bibliothèque de notre professeur. Tommissen accepte: il aime la clarté et la concision de Topitsch et Salamun. Lors de la défense orale, Tommissen aiguille le débat sur une note, que j’avais ajoutée, sur la notion wébérienne de “Wertfreiheit”. Ce terme est intraduisible en français. Seul Julien Freund avait forgé une traduction acceptable: “neutralité axiologique”. En effet, si je suis “libre”, donc “frei” donc en état de “liberté”, de “Freiheit”, et si je suis dépourvu de tout “jugement impromptu de valeur”, donc si je suis “neutre”, quand j’observe une réalité sociologique ou politique, qui, elle, véhicule des valeurs, je suis en bout de course “libre de toute valeur”, donc “axiologiquement neutre”, chaque fois que je pose un regard scientifique sur un phénomène social ou politique. Weber plaçait aussi cette notion de “Wertfreiheit” dans le contexte de sa distinction entre “éthique de la responsabilité” (“Verantwortungsethik”) et “éthique de la conviction” (“Gesinnungsethik”). Ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont dépourvues de “valeur” mais la responsabilité implique un recul, un usage parcimonieux et raisonnable des ressources axiologiques tandis que la conviction peut, le cas échéant, déboucher sur des confrontations et des blocages, des paralysies ou des déchaînements, justement par absence de recul et de parcimonie comportementale.

 

Voilà ce que j’ai pu répondre, en bon allemand, et ainsi obtenir une distinction. Je la dois indubitablement à l’ascendant de Tommissen et à sa manière habile de poser effectivement la question principale qu’il convenait de poser face à ce mémoire, modeste traduction.

 

La bibliothèque de Grimbergen

 

L’un des premiers textes de Piet Tommissen fut un récit de son voyage, avec son épouse Agnès, chez Carl Schmitt, à Plettenberg en Westphalie. Avec grande tendresse, Tommissen a décrit ce voyage, la réception profondément amicale que lui avait prodiguée Carl Schmitt. A mon tour de raconter aussi deux ou trois impressions de ma visite à Grimbergen, pendant l’été 1983: accueil chaleureux d’Agnès et Piet Tommissen, visite de la bibliothèque. Dans la pièce de séjour, il y avait ce fauteuil du maître des lieux, tout entouré d’étagères construites sur mesure, croulant sous le poids des livres du mois, potassés pour écrire le prochain article ou essai. Tout, dans la maison, était agencé pour faciliter la lecture. La bibliothèque de Grimbergen était fabuleuse: elle mérite bien la comparaison avec les autres grandes bibliothèques privées que j’ai eu l’occasion de visiter: celle d’Alain de Benoist évidemment; celle de Mohler, vue à Munich en plein été torride de 1984; celle, luxuriante et chaotique de Pierre-André Taguieff, véritable labyrinthe où évoluait un gros chat teigneux et espiègle; celle, somptueuse, dans la villa de Miglio, vue en mai 1995 à Côme et celle de Peter Bossdorf, la plus magnifiquement agencée, vue en automne 2010. Cette évocation des grandes bibliothèques est évidemment un clin d’oeil à Tommisen: celui-ci s’enquerrait toujours des livres achetés par ses hôtes et leur demandait d’évoquer leurs bibliothèques...

 

Pierre-André Taguieff à Bruxelles

 

Plus tard, début des années 90, quand Pierre-André Taguieff préparait son ouvrage “Sur la nouvelle droite”, paru en 1994 chez Descartes & Cie, il avait sollicité un rendez-vous avec Tommissen et avec moi-même: le soir de cette journée, nous avons dîné dans un restaurant minuscule, uniquement destiné aux gourmets, en compagnie de mon camarade Frédéric Beerens et d’un majestueux ami de Tommissen, affublé d’une énorme barbe rousse qui lui couvrait un poitrail de taureau. Discussion à bâtons rompus, surtout entre Taguieff et Tommissen sur la personnalité de Julien Freund. On reproche à Taguieff certains travaux jugés inquisitoriaux sur la “nouvelle droite” ou sur les mouvements populistes (l’ouvrage de Taguieff sur “L’illusion populiste” est d’ailleurs le plus faible de ses ouvrages: les chapitres concernant la Flandre et l’Autriche ne comportent aucune référence en langue néerlandaise ou allemande!). Mais il faut rendre hommage au philosophe qui a critiqué le “bougisme” contemporain et a assorti cette critique d’un appel à la résistance de toutes les forces politiques qui n’entendent pas s’aligner sur les poncifs dominants. Ensuite, l’oeuvre majeure de Pierre-André Taguieff, “L’effacement de l’avenir” deviendra indubitablement un grand classique: on y découvre un excellent constat de faillite du “progrès”, une critique extrêmement pointue du présentisme ainsi qu’une critique fort pertinente des nouvelles formes de fausse démocratie qui ne sont, explique Taguieff, que des “expertocraties”. On peut évoquer ici le “double langage” de Taguieff, non pas au sens orwellien du terme, où la “liberté” serait l’ “esclavage”, mais dans le sens où nous avons affaire à un théoricien en vue de la gauche mitterrandienne et post-mitterrandienne, obsédé par le joujou “racisme” comme il y avait un “joujou nationalisme” du temps de Rémy de Gourmont, un intellectuel post-mitterrandien qui a pondu une triclée de travaux sur cette notion-joujou qui n’a pas d’autre existence ou de statut que ceux de “bricolages médiatiques”; au fond: s’il existe à l’évidence des préjugés raciaux, cela n’empêchera nullement le pire des racistes de trouver un jour son bon “nègre”, son “bon arbi” ou son juif favori. Même le Troisième Reich recrutait Blancs, Blacks et Beurs, et Indiens bouddhistes, hindouistes, musulmans ou sikhs, pourvu qu’il s’agissait de lutter contre la ploutocratie britannique. Et le plus acharné des anti-racistes fulminera un jour contre un représentant quelconque d’une autre race que la sienne ou sera agité par un prurit antisémite; dans la vie quotidienne les exemples sont légion. Quant aux Blancs, ils sont tout aussi victimes de préjugés raciaux que les autres.

 

Taguieff situe ses propres travaux sur le racisme et l’anti-racisme dans le cadre d’un axe de recherches inauguré par l’Américain Gordon W. Allport (“The Nature of Prejudice”, 1ère éd., 1954): le danger que recèle ce genre de démarche, qui est propre à un certain libéralisme totalitaire, est d’amorcer une critique des “préjugés” qui amènera à un rejet puis à un arasement des “valeurs”, posées derechef comme des “irrationalités” à gommer, des  valeurs sans lesquelles aucune société ne peut toutefois fonctionner, sans lesquelles toute société devient, pour reprendre la terminologie du Prof. Marcel De Corte, principal collaborateur d’Eemans au temps de la revue “Hermès” (1933-1939), une “dissociété”. Taguieff est conscient de ce danger car son idéologie “républicaine” (certes plus nuancée que les insupportables vulgates que l’on entend ânonner à longueur de journées) n’est pas dépourvue de “valeurs”, notamment de “valeurs citoyennes”, qui risquent l’arasement au même titre que les valeurs catholiques, conservatrices ou “raciques” (dans la mesure où elles sont vernaculaires), pour le plus grand bénéfice de l’idéologie présentiste qui conçoit la société non pas comme une communauté de destin mais comme un supermarché. Taguieff est donc ce penseur post-mitterrandien, qui a partagé l’illusion de la grande foire multiraciale annoncée par les “saturnales de touche-pas-à-mon-pote” (dixit Louis Pauwels), et, simultanément, le penseur d’une “nouvelle révolution conservatrice” à la française, une “révolution conservatrice” qui critique de fond en comble la notion fétiche de progrès. C’est en ce sens que j’ai voulu présenter ses ouvrages lors d’une université d’été de “Synergies Européennes” en Basse-Saxe. Taguieff mérite maintenant plus que jamais ce titre de “théoricien révolutionnaire-conservateur” car il a oeuvré d’arrache-pied pour poursuivre, défendre et illustrer l’oeuvre de Julien Freund. Quant à la critique des préjugés, mieux vaut se plonger dans les écrits et les pamphlets de ceux qui luttent contre le festivisme (Philippe Muray), facteur d’un impolitisme total, ou contre les vrais préjugés et débilités du “politiquement correct” comme Elizabeth Lévy, Emmanuelle Duverger ou Robert Ménard. Ce sont là critiques bien plus tonifiantes.

 

Après le dîner avec Tommissen et son ami barbu, Beerens et moi avons ramené notre bon Taguieff à son hôtel: n’ayant pas le coffre et l’estomac breugheliens comme les nôtres, il est revenu de nos agapes en état de franche ébriété; sur la banquette arrière de la petite Volkswagen de Beerens, il émettait de joyeuses remarques: “je suis un être dédoublé, ha ha ha, un bon joueur d’échecs, hi hi hi, je parle avec tout le monde, hu hu hu, et je roule tout le monde, ha ha ha!”. Enfin un intellectuel parisien qui se comportait comme nos joyeux professeurs qui manient allègrement la chope de bière, comme Tommissen ou l’angliciste Heiderscheidt, ou comme l’heideggerien Gadamer, qui participait, presque centenaire, aux canti de ses étudiants et tenait à respecter les règles des festivités estudiantines. Dommage que Taguieff ne soit pas resté longtemps ou ne soit jamais revenu: on en aurait fait un bon disciple de Bacchus et du Roi Gambrinus! En réalité, c’est vrai, il est un “être dédoublé”, in vino veritas, mais il ne “roule” pas tout le monde, il séduit tout le monde, tant les tenants de la gôôôche de toujours que les innovateurs qui puisent dans le vrai corpus de la “révolution conservatrice”!

 

La Foire du Livre à Francfort

 

Mais où Tommissen était le plus présent, sans y être physiquement, c’était à la Foire du Livre de Francfort, que j’ai visitée de 1984 à 1999, ainsi qu’en 2003. Pour moi, la Foire du Livre de la métropole hessoise a toujours été “maschkinocentrée”, c’est-à-dire centrée autour de la truculente personnalité de Günter Maschke, cet ancien révolutionnaire de mai 68, devenu schmittien, un des plus grands schmittiens de la Planète Terre au fil du temps. Et qui dit Günter Maschke, dit Carl Schmitt et tout l’univers des schmittiens. Après avoir arpenté pendant toute la journée les énormes halls de la Foire, nous nous retrouvions fourbus le soir chez Maschke, pour discuter de tout, mais pas dans une ambiance compassée, faite de sérieux papal: nous avons sorti les pires énormités, en riant comme des collégiens ou des soudards qui venaient d’achever une bataille. A la table, outre le grand expert militaire suisse Jean-Jacques Langendorf, et le Dr. Peter Weiss, directeur de la maison d’édition “Karolinger Verlag”, nous avions très souvent le bonheur d’accueillir le grand philosophe grec Panayotis Kondylis et l’écrivain allemand Martin Mosebach. Dans ces joyeuses retrouvailles annuelles, Maschke évoquait toujours Tommissen avec le plus grand respect. En effet, de 1988 à 2003, Piet Tommissen a publié ses miniatures sur Carl Schmitt dans la série “Schmittiana”, chez le prestigieux éditeur berlinois Duncker & Humblot, acquerrant la célébrité dans l’univers restreint des bons politologues, qui sont tous, évidemment, des schmittiens, où qu’ils vivent sur le globe! Le système Tommissen, celui de la note pertinente, y a fait merveille: en quoi consiste l’excellence de ce système? Eh bien, il aiguille le train de la recherche vers des voies souvent insoupçonnées. Schmitt a rencontré telle personnalité, lu tel livre, participé à tel colloque: Tommissen explicitait en peu de mots l’intérêt de cette rencontre, de cette lecture ou de cette participation pour le reste ou la suite de l’oeuvre et ouvrait simultanément des perspectives nouvelles et inédites sur la personnalité rencontrée, l’auteur du livre lu par Schmitt ou les organisateurs du colloque qui avait bénéficié de sa participation. La même méthode vaut bien entendu pour Eemans et le champs énorme que celui-ci a couvert en tant que peintre avant-gardiste, éditeur de revues originales, historien de l’art. On a pu se moquer de cette méthode: à première vue et pour un esprit borné, elle peut paraître désuète mais, à l’analyse, elle porte des fruits insoupçonnés. Enfin, en 1997, nous avons pu célébrer la parution de “In Sachen Carl Schmitt” auprès de “Karolinger Verlag”, avec une analyse des textes satiriques de Carl Schmitt et une autre sur la correspondance Schmitt/Michels.

 

Alberto Buela et Horacio Cagni à Bruxelles

 

J’ai eu aussi le bonheur de recevoir un jour à Bruxelles le Dr. Alberto Buela et le Dr. Horacio Cagni du CNRS argentin. Ils voulaient voir trois personnes: Tommissen, dont ils n’avaient pas l’adresse, Christopher Gérard, l’éditeur de la revue “Antaios”, et moi-même. Ce ne furent que joie et libations. D’abord en l’estaminet aujourd’hui disparu que fut “Le Père Faro” à Uccle, ensuite sur la terrasse de “chez Karim”, Place de l’Altitude Cent, où la faconde de Buela, philosophe, professeur d’université, sénateur et rancher argentin, fascinait les autres clients et même les passants qui s’arrêtaient et commandaient un verre de vin, pour avoir l’insigne plaisir de l’entendre discourir! Bref, comme me disait en juin dernier un animateur de la radio “Méridien Zéro” (Paris): la métapolitique par la joie ! “Metapolitik durch Freude”! Le lendemain: à quatre, Buela, Cagni, Gérard et moi, nous prenions le train vers Vilvorde, où nous attendait Tommissen pour nous véhiculer jusqu’à Grimbergen. Nouvelle visite de la bibliothèque où le maître des lieux me montre une collection complète de mes “Orientations”, magnifiquement reliée et placée dans la bibliothèque aux côtés d’autres revues du même acabit. Et toujours le fauteuil, entouré d’étagères sur mesure... Ensuite, libations dans une salle jouxtant l’Abbaye et la Collégiale Saint Servais de Grimbergen: les bières de l’Abbaye, généreusement offertes par Tommissen, ont coulé dans nos gosiers. Thème du fructueux débat entre Tommissen et Buela: Carl Schmitt et l’Amérique latine. On sait que Buela écrit inlassablement des articles philosophiques à dimensions véritablement politiques (au sens de Schmitt et de Freund),  et qui gardent une mesure grecque, au départ d’auteurs hispaniques, marqués par la tradition espagnole et par l’antilibéralisme de Donoso Cortès, qui ont tant fasciné Carl Schmitt.

 

Visite à Uccle

 

Après la mort prématurée de son épouse Agnès, Tommissen, au fond, était inconsolable. La grande maison de Grimbergen était devenue bien vide, sans la bonne fée du foyer. Notre professeur a pris alors la décision de s’établir à Uccle, dans un complexe résidentiel pour seniors, où il s’est acheté un studio, dans lequel il a empilé la quintessence de sa bibliothèque. Là il rédigera ses “Buitenissigheden”, ses “Extravagances”, et sans doute les dernières livraisons de ses “Schmittiana”. Je lui ai rendu visite deux fois, d’abord avec ma future épouse Ana, ensuite avec mon fils. Lors de notre première visite, il m’a offert ses “Nieuwe Buitenissigheden”, avec de la matière à traiter fort bientôt car, en effet, ce petit volume aux apparences fort modestes, contient trois thématiques qui m’intéressent: Wies Moens comme avant-gardiste et “révolutionnaire conservateur” flamand et nationaliste. Un auteur qui fascinait également Eemans et a sans doute contribué à déterminer ses choix, quand il entra en dissidence définitive et orageuse par rapport au groupe surréaliste bruxellois, autour de Magritte, Mariën, Scutenaire et les autres. Il me reste à travailler cette matière “Moens” et à l’exposer un jour au public francophone. Deuxième thématique: la “Politieke Academie”, dont il s’agira de réactiver les projets jusqu’à la consommation des siècles. Troisième thématique: la théorie de Brück, qui fascinait les rois Albert I et Léopold III, et qui sous-tend une variante du “suprématisme” anglo-saxon. Mais, infatigable, et porté par la ferme volonté d’écrire jusqu’à son dernier souffle, pour témoigner, révéler, arracher à l’oubli ce que ne méritait pas de l’être, Tommissen avait également sorti en 2005, “Driemaal Spengler”, un recueil de trois maîtres articles sur Oswald Spengler, parmi lesquels une étude sur la réception de l’auteur du “Déclin de l’Occident” en Flandre. La réception, lors de cette première visite à l’appartement d’Uccle, fut joviale. Notre professeur était au mieux de sa forme.

 

Juillet 2011: ultime visite

 

Notre dernière visite, début juillet 2011, cinq semaines avant sa disparition et sous une chaleur caniculaire, avait pour objet premier de lui communiquer, entre autres documents, une copie d’un entretien que l’on m’avait demandé sur Marc. Eemans et le “Centro Studi Evoliani”. Cet entretien se référait souvent à la monographie que Tommissen avait consacrée au “surréaliste pas comme les autres”. Cet entretien a plu à beaucoup de monde, y compris au nationaliste révolutionnaire évolien Christian Bouchet et à l’inclassable post-communiste Alain Soral qui l’ont immédiatement affiché sur leurs sites respectifs. Pour définir les positions d’Eemans dans cet univers avant-gardiste et surréaliste, je ne pouvais pas trouver de meilleur inspirateur que Tommissen. J’ai trouvé notre Professeur assez fatigué mais il faut dire aussi que l’après-midi de notre visite était particulièrement chaud, lourd et malsain. La conversation s’est déroulée en trois volets: Eemans et les cercles politico-littéraires ou politico-philosophiques des années 30 en Belgique, avec surtout la présence à Pontigny de Raymond De Becker qui y évoqua le néo-socialisme de De Man et Déat, un thème récurrent dans les recherches de Tommissen; le cercle “Communauté” fondé par Henry Bauchau et De Becker; leur “académie” à laquelle participait Marcel De Corte, également collaborateur de la revue “Hermès” d’Eemans; l’évolution de Bauchau et De Becker vers la psychanalyse jungienne (et les retombées de cet engouement sur Hergé) et la participation de De Becker à la revue “Planète” de Louis Pauwels. Sans compter l’impasse dans laquelle s’est retrouvée l’intelligentsia “conservatrice” ou “révolutionnaire-conservatrice” ou “non-conformiste des années 30” en Belgique, à partir du moment où l’Action Française de Maurras est condamnée par le Vatican en 1926; pour remplacer l’idole Maurras, désormais à l’index, une partie de cette intelligentsia va changer de gourou et adopter Jacques Maritain. Les vicissitudes de cette transition, que n’a pas vécu l’intelligentsia flamande, expliquent sans doute le peu de rapports entre les intellectuels des deux communautés linguistiques, ou le caractère très ténu de leurs références communes. Enfin, l’étude de Tommissen sur le rapport entre Francis Parker Yockey et la chorégraphe flamande Elsa Darciel (cf. euro-synergies.hautetfort.com/ ). Au cours de l ‘entretien, mon fiston et moi-même fûmes gâtés: deux volumes autobiographiques de Tommissen (“Een leven vol buitenissigheden”) et un volume avec la bibliographie complète des oeuvres de notre professeur. Deuxième volet: Tommissen n’a cessé d’interroger mon fils sur les innovations à la KUL, sur l’état d’esprit qui y règne, sur les matières qui y sont enseignées, etc. Troisième volet, avec mon épouse; Tommissen n’importunait jamais les dames avec ses engouements politiques ou philosophiques, il passait aux thèmes de la vie quotidienne et de la famille. Il nous a dit: “Aimez-vous et profitez des bons côtés de la vie”. Ce fut notre dernière rencontre.

 

Nous avions promis de nous revoir en septembre pour poursuivre nos conversations: cette année les voies du dépaysement estival nous ont menés tour à tour en Zélande, dans l’Eifel et les Fagnes, au Cap Blanc-Nez et sur la côte d’Opale, dans la Baie de la Somme, à Oslo, dans les Vosges et en Franche-Comté, sur le Chasseral suisse et sur les bords du Lac de Neuchâtel. Le 21 août, deux jours après notre retour de cette escapade dans le Jura, Piet Tommissen s’éteignait à Uccle. Une magnifique et émouvante cérémonie a eu lieu à Grimbergen le 26 août, ponctuée par le “Gebed aan ’t Vaderland”.

 

Avec la disparition de Piet Tommissen, ce sont des pans entiers de souvenirs, de la mémoire intellectuelle de la Flandre, qui disparaissent. Mais, avec lui, une chose est sûre: nous savons ce que nous devons faire jusqu’à notre dernier souffle de vie. Nous devons témoigner, lire, recenser, repérer des anecdotes en apparence futiles mais qui expliquent les transitions, notamment les transitions qui partent de la gauche officielle pour aboutir à des gauches non conformistes comme celles que parcoururent Pierre Hubermont ou Walter Dauge en Wallonie, celles qu’empruntèrent Eemans ou Moens qui, tous deux, mêlent étroitement avant-gardes, militantisme flamand et engouements philosophiques traditionnels. Nous devons aussi rester des schmittiens, attentifs à tous les aspects de l’oeuvre du “catholique prussien du Sauerland”. Car il s’agit de demeurer, envers et contre toutes les déchéances, tous les impolitismes et tous les festivismes, des “Gardiens des sources”.

 

En attendant, nous devons encore dire “Merci! Mille mercis!” à Piet Tommissen, pour sa gentillesse et pour son érudition.

 

Robert STEUCKERS.

Rédigé, grande tristesse au coeur, à Forest-Flotzenberg, le 4 septembre 2011.

La légende de Friedrich Hielscher

 

La légende de Friedrich Hielscher

Dr. Peter BAHN

La fondation d’une “Église” panenthéiste au XXe siècle et ses fausses interprétations ultérieures

Pendant des décennies, la vie et l’œuvre de l’auteur, philosophe religieux et érudit, le Dr. Friedrich Hielscher (1902-1990) a donné lieu à toutes sortes de fausses interprétations spéculatives. Cela est particulièrement vrai avec le genre de littérature “ésotérique” populaire, dans laquelle Hielscher a sans cesse été le sujet des plus folles spéculations et assertions. Au début des années 60, une “légende Hielscher” extrêmement négative était déjà née, à laquelle des embellissements encore plus hardis ont été régulièrement ajoutés jusqu’à aujourd’hui. Cette légende est, cependant, pratiquement à des années-lumière des véritables actions et intentions de Hielscher, et est dépourvue de toute référence à la réalité.

Pour pouvoir aller au fond de ces spéculations, et pour déterminer leurs sources d’origine, il est d’abord nécessaire d’examiner le cours de la vie de Hielscher. Concernant les années jusqu’en 1954, cela peut être assuré avant tout au moyen de son autobiographie (1). Concernant la période de temps ultérieure, il existe — dans la littérature, du moins — seulement des morceaux fragmentaires et dispersés d’information dont l’accès est difficile (2). Par contre, les archives existantes relatives à Hielscher sont beaucoup plus riches, en particulier sa production littéraire (3) et sa correspondance avec Ernst Jünger, qui dura de 1926 à 1986 (4).

Fils d’un marchand de textiles, Friedrich Hielscher était né le 31 mai 1902 à Plauen, dans le Vogtland, et grandit à Guben, en Niedersaulitz. À l’âge de 17 ans, il sortit diplômé du Lycée Humaniste de Plauen. Immédiatement après ses examens finaux, il rejoignit une unité des Corps Francs qui prit part aux combats de résistance contre les groupes polonais en Haute Silésie (5). Son unité fut plus tard incorporée dans l’armée allemande. En mars 1920, Hielscher refusa de participer au putsch de Kapp, et quitta l’armée (6). Il commença ensuite à étudier le droit à l’Université de Berlin et suivit aussi des cours à la Faculté des Sciences Politiques (7). Ces études de sciences politiques l’amenèrent en étroit contact avec Theodor Heuss, avec qui il se lia d’amitié pour la vie (8). À Berlin, Hielscher rejoignit le corps de duellistes étudiant “Normannia”, et jusqu’aux années 70 il fut une autorité active pour l’histoire du groupe, ainsi qu’un conférencier recherché concernant l’Assemblée de Kosen (9).

Alors que la courte période dans les Corps Francs fut marquée beaucoup plus par des aspirations à l’indépendance et à l’aventure que par des visions politiques concrètes (10), pendant le cours de ses études à Berlin Hielscher devint graduellement plus politisé. Après une affiliation temporaire au Reichsclub du Parti du peuple allemand national-libéral (11), il gravita vers les cercles des “gauchistes de la droite” et des “nouveaux nationalistes”. Ces petits cercles, qui tournaient autour de certains journaux et de projets de publications, cherchaient à combler le fossé entre l’arrière-plan intellectuel du mouvement des travailleurs socialistes et celui du nationalisme traditionnel (12). En même temps, il croisa le chemin de personnalités comme le philosophe culturel Oswald Spengler (13) et la sœur de Nietzsche, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche, cette dernière rencontre étant due aux nombreuses visites de Hielscher aux archives de Nietzsche à Weimar du fait de son travail promotionnel (14). En 1926, Hielscher termina son cursus par une thèse intitulée Die Selbstherrlichkeit : Versuch einer Darstellung des deutschen Rechtsgrundbegriffes (La souveraineté : un essai de présentation de la base de la loi allemande), pour laquelle il se vit décerner un double doctorat, summa cum laude, en philosophie du droit et en histoire du droit (15). Mais il trouva que son travail ultérieur, bureaucratique et réglementé, en tant que clerc juridique, était un tel supplice qu’en novembre 1927 il fut déchargé de la fonction publique à sa propre requête (16). Pendant le reste de sa vie, il vécut comme un universitaire — tant bien que mal — avec les bénéfices de publications, de cours et de commissions de recherche occasionnelles.

Hielscher, qui avait entre-temps développé un étroit contact personnel avec Ernst Jünger, fut à partir de 1926 un collaborateur actif aux divers journaux liés au « nouveau nationalisme » national-révolutionnaire. Son premier essai parut à la fin de 1926 dans le magazine Neue Standarte-Arminius : Kampfschrift für deutsche Nationalisten. Avec son titre, Innerlichkeit und Staatskunst (Intériorité et art étatique), il indiqua dès le début qu’il ne se préoccupait pas d’activité politique superficielle, car les choses n’en étaient pas « au commencement d’un nouveau départ, mais plutôt à la fin du vieil effondrement » (17). Cet effondrement ne pouvait être surmonté que par une nouvelle « foi (...) qui portera l’avenir allemand et sans laquelle le nouveau travail ne sera pas commencé » (18).

Avec l’accent mis par ce premier texte sur l’importance fondamentale d’une nouvelle foi, un trait avait déjà émergé dans l’œuvre de Hielscher qui allait rapidement s’intensifier, et qui resterait prédominant jusqu’à la fin de sa vie. Hielscher ne pensait “politiquement” que d’une manière secondaire et transitoire ; il se préoccupait beaucoup plus de tirer un nouvel “art étatique” des concepts religieux. Cela était déjà clair à la fin des années 20 au vu de sa correspondance avec Ernst Jünger. En conséquence, en novembre 1929 il envoya à Jünger une “déclaration de foi” (Bekenntnis) idéologico-religieuse, et dans une autre lettre quelques semaines plus tard il parla de la nécessité de la naissance d’une « Église invisible » qui serait efficace en termes de foi tout comme de politique (19). Vivant à l’époque dans la solitude d’un presbytère de la région de Lausitz, où un ancien ami d’école servait comme pasteur protestant, Hielscher travaillait sur son livre Das Reich, qui fut publié en 1931 (20). Celui-ci fut précédé par les premiers numéros d’un périodique du même titre que Hielscher avait édité depuis septembre 1930. Un cercle d’adeptes, loyal à Hielscher en tant que spiritus rector, se forma progressivement autour du journal et à partir des lecteurs du livre, qui avait provoqué un débat considérable. Jusqu’en 1933 ce cercle fut essentiellement tiré des rangs du Mouvement de la Jeunesse et des groupes de jeunesse nationaux-révolutionnaires (21).

L’unité de foi et de politique postulée par Hielscher, d’« intériorité et art étatique », ne fut pas sans conséquence sur la structure et l’activité de son cercle. Dans les années entre 1932 et 1935, l’association grandit, selon les mots de Hielscher, à la foi « comme une résistance contre la populace, et comme une Église » (22). Hielscher considéra toujours le mouvement national-socialiste comme une « populace », contre qui il se trouvait en opposition diamétrale pour des raisons idéologico-religieuses. En fait, le cercle autour de Hielscher se voyait à la fois comme une « Église embryonnaire » avec les activités rituelles correspondantes, et comme un « État embryonnaire » avec la tâche de résister au national-socialisme (23), bien qu’il soit peu probable que tous les membres politiquement actifs du cercle aient participé avec la même intensité aux aspects religieux du groupe. En tout, le groupe était formé d’environ cinquante personnes, dont les noms peuvent être déterminés à partir des archives relatives à Hielscher (24).

Les activités du cercle, à la fois comme « Église » et comme groupe de résistance, étaient menées sur la base d’un système idéologico-religieux extraordinairement complexe. Ceci n’avait pas été emprunté par Hielscher à d’autres sources sous une forme finie, mais fut développé successivement à partir d’axiomes fondamentaux spécifiques. D’importance centrale était l’idée de la foi comme « base de l’action » incontestable, et donc de leitmotiv essentiel pour toute action humaine (25). À un niveau subordonné à cette signification de la foi en général (c’est-à-dire, d’une foi en tant que telle), Hielscher plaçait sa propre théologie concrète avec sa vision particulière sur Dieu, les dieux, et l’homme — une vision qu’il définissait comme « païenne ».

Le point de départ était la perception panenthéiste de Dieu comme « l’Éternel, en qui tout est contenu » (26). Ainsi, Dieu n’était pas extérieur au monde, mais au contraire le monde était en Lui ; il n’était pas le Créateur, mais plutôt celui qui (à partir de lui-même) crée continuellement. Hielscher reliait cela à diverses notions. De la compréhension du monde par Nietzsche comme “volonté de puissance”, il extrapolait l’idée de devenir un « avec le monde éternellement en devenir » (27). De cela pouvait « être perçue … une conscience de Dieu » (28). En même temps, il revenait spécifiquement à la pensée de l’hérétique et érudit du début du IXe siècle, Jean Scot Erigène, d’après qui, « Dieu est tout ce qui est éternel et tout ce qui est advenu » (29). Erigène décrivait aussi Dieu comme une « unité multiple à l’intérieur de lui-même » (30). Cette idée domina exclusivement et complètement les convictions religieuses de Hielscher et de son cercle jusqu’à la fin des années 30, avant d’être élargie (avec des conceptions qui étaient systématiquement dérivées du penseur susmentionné) pour inclure des « dieux » ou des « messagers célestes », qui en tant que « particularités » (Besonderungen) personnelles du « tout-puissant et seul vrai Dieu » apparaissaient comme médiateurs entre ce dernier et les êtres humains. À cet égard, des éléments polythéistes trouvés dans la pensée classiciste allemande (en particulier dans les œuvres de Gœthe et de Hölderlin) — mais habillés par Hielscher en dieux de la mythologie germanique (« Wode », « Thor », « Loki », « Freya », « Sigyn », etc.) — furent repris et incorporés structurellement (31). En tant qu’« âme », l’être humain aussi n’était rien d’autre que l’une des « particularités » émanant de la plénitude du seul vrai Dieu. Pour Hielscher, cela conduisait en conséquence à un rejet des conceptions occidentales modernes de l’individu autonome : chaque « âme » (c’est-à-dire chaque être humain) reçoit « sa propre essence à tout moment de Dieu » (32).

De ces conceptions de base, à partir du début des années 30 le cercle Hielscher développa un système de croyance qui se différenciait continuellement par de nouvelles manifestations, ainsi que par une pratique liturgique avec des cérémonies pour le cycle de l’année et le cours de la vie. Avec l’inauguration du nouvel appartement de Hielscher à Falkenhain près de Berlin le 27 août 1933 vint la première « observance » (Andacht) officielle de l’« Église ». Celle-ci fut dès lors considérée comme la véritable date de fondation de l’Église, que Hielscher nomma la Unabhängige Freikirche (UFK), l’Église Libre Indépendante (33). Cela fut suivi par des élaborations liturgiques, orientées exclusivement d’après les études folkloriques, mythologiques et historico-religieuses faites par les membres du groupe ; ces études étaient presque exclusivement à diffusion interne. En 1941, ils réussirent à terminer une série annuelle de rituels païens constituée de 24 cérémonies (34). Chaque cérémonie était consacrée à l’un des 12 dieux germaniques, et était combinée (comme Ernst Jünger le laissa entendre dans une entrée de son Journal de Paris en octobre 1943, écrite après une rencontre avec Hielscher) avec diverses correspondances symboliques — signes, arbres, fleurs, animaux, aliments, boissons, « couleurs inhérentes » et « couleurs apparentes » (Wesensfarben und Erscheinungsfarben) (35). En même temps, en tant que chef de l’UFK, Hielscher accomplit aussi des cérémonies de baptême et de mariage pour des membres de son cercle, suivies plus tard par les premières funérailles du groupe (36).

 

Structurellement, la liturgie des services religieux spécifiques de l’UFK — avec leurs invocations, prières, chants, et lectures — contenait aussi des éléments qui pouvaient clairement être trouvés, de cette manière ou d’une manière similaire, parmi les communautés de la foi chrétienne. Les différences sont essentiellement en termes de contenu, qui dans l’UFK se distinguait par le panthéon des dieux germaniques avec le « seul vrai Dieu » au-dessus de lui. Mais il y avait quelque chose d’autre. Dans son autobiographie, Hielscher se décrivit expressément — traçant une distinction explicite avec Ernst Jünger — comme un « mystique » (37). La signification imprégnant les cérémonies à l’intérieur de l’UFK se trouvait donc dans un contexte très spécifique. Hielscher soulignait en conséquence qu’avec ces cérémonies, « l’Église célébrerait la domination du céleste dans cet espace et dans ce temps » (38) et parlait de « revenir de la cérémonie pour [faire] nos devoirs quotidiens avec une énergie et un pouvoir nouveaux » (39). Cela faisait penser à une compréhension mystique de la religion, voyant l’expérience contemplative intérieure du numineux comme une source d’énergie, particulièrement pour le croyant individuel prenant part aux cérémonies.

Pour Hielscher et son cercle, la résistance contre le national-socialisme se nourrissait à des sources religieuses. C’était beaucoup moins une critique des mesures politiques individuelles prises par le régime NS — bien qu’ici aussi, Hielscher développa diverses positions dissidentes, dont la discussion sort du cadre de cet essai — qu’un rejet de principe. À cause de son manque de connexion transcendantale, le règne NS était vu par le cercle Hielscher comme un niveau décadent d’État, une forme de règne de la populace qui — en particulier à cause de son idéologie raciale biologique — était devenue asservie à la « matière » et à ce qui est purement matériel. Pour Hielscher, l’infiltration et la subversion depuis l’intérieur semblait être un chemin praticable de résistance, bien qu’à la lumière de la faiblesse numérique de son cercle cette stratégie se heurta rapidement à des facteurs limitants. Si des membres du cercle Hielscher parvinrent à occuper des positions de niveau intermédiaire dans l’armée, dans le contre-espionnage, et dans les SA et les SS, très peu de choses — en plus de rassembler des informations et d’offrir occasionnellement une aide à des victimes individuelles de la persécution politique — purent être faites.

Une exception fut l’influence exercée sur l’Ahnenerbe, l’organisation de recherche SS fondée le 31 juillet 1935, et dont Wolfram Sievers, un jeune ami de Hielscher et aussi un membre de l’UFK, parvint à devenir l’administrateur (40). Au-delà de son but originel de faire progresser l’étude de la « préhistoire spirituelle » (Geistesurgeschichte) (41), l’Ahnenerbe, un objet de prestige pour Heinrich Himmler, se subdivisa graduellement en de nouveaux départements de recherche consacrés à l’histoire de l’art, aux sciences naturelles, à la médecine, et même à la technologie (42). En résultat de l’implication ultérieure des départements médicaux dans les expériences humaines barbares conduites par les SS, Sievers, qui en dépit de sa désapprobation religieusement motivée de ces incidents s’était trouvé incapable d’agir ouvertement contre eux, fut condamné à mort au procès de Nuremberg et pendu (43). Hielscher — qui avait même reçu, sous la protection de son ami (44), des commissions de recherche temporaires de l’Ahnenerbe concernant des matières folkloriques et historico-culturelles — tenta sans succès jusqu’à la fin d’obtenir une grâce pour Sievers. Immédiatement avant l’exécution, il rendit visite à Sievers en prison et célébra une cérémonie d’adieu religieuse avec lui, en accord avec les observances de son Église païenne (45). C’est cet événement en particulier qui donna lieu plus tard à un grand nombre de spéculations extravagantes.

Quand c’était faisable, Hielscher tira avantage de ses activités pour l’Ahnenerbe, qui étaient occasionnellement combinées avec des voyages de recherche, pour aider des gens qui étaient politiquement ou racialement persécutés (46), et pour cultiver des contacts avec divers groupes de la résistance antinazie (47). En septembre 1944, il fut arrêté par la Gestapo en liaison avec l’assassinat manqué de Hitler par le comte von Stauffenberg, emprisonné pendant quelques mois, et torturé. Ce fut l’intervention de Sievers à cette époque qui conduisit à sa libération sous « condition de servir au front », et qui lui sauva finalement la vie (48).

Après 1945, le cercle Hielscher cessa toute activité politique et se concentra exclusivement sur des recherches religieuses cadrant avec les paramètres de l’UFK. Basant sa perspective sur une vision cyclique de l’histoire et employant une terminologie saisonnière, Hielscher pensait que l’humanité se trouvait dans un « hiver » historique (qui avait commencé vers 1800 avec la Révolution française et la montée de l’industrialisation) au milieu duquel on devait procéder d’une « impossibilité de l’État » fondamentale, nécessitant une construction conceptuellement nouvelle de l’État. En contraste, « l’Église dans l’hiver » était vue comme la « racine du printemps, et la première étape du Reich » (49), et le nouveau centre de ses recherches apparaissait comme la prochaine étape logique. Pendant des décennies, cela resta le travail de l’UFK. Et tout comme elle l’avait fait durant le Troisième Reich, sous la République Fédérale d’Allemagne l’UFK maintint une isolation presque complète vis-à-vis de l’extérieur. Des années 50 jusqu’aux années 80, l’activité de l’UFK fut caractérisée par des « journées de l’Église » annuelles, des célébrations internes, et l’accumulation d’une masse de compositions internes qui existent sous forme hectographique ; celles-ci traitent surtout de questions de théologie et de philosophie de l’histoire (50). L’âge avancé de ses membres (car des membres nouveaux et plus jeunes pouvaient difficilement être introduits) et 2 crises de l’« Église », en 1969-70 et 1983-84 (51), affaiblirent finalement un cercle qui n’avait jamais été particulièrement fort — à tel point que dans les années précédant la mort de Hielscher en mars 1990, l’UFK était principalement composée de lui-même et de son épouse Gertrud.

En conclusion, on peut souligner que Hielscher, qui sortit du courant national-révolutionnaire politiquement motivé de la période de Weimar, s’était déjà tourné à la fin des années 20 vers des thèmes religieux d’une manière intensifiée, et qu’en résultat de cette tendance il avait créé sa propre Église « païenne ». À première vue, l’UFK semble comparable à de nombreuses autres initiatives religieuses völkisch contemporaines, mais elle différait de celles-ci par sa formulation d’un système théologique strictement axiomatique et par un rejet consécutif de toutes les conceptions raciales-biologiques, et donc matérialistes. Hielscher et son cercle désapprouvèrent le système NS depuis le début, mais tentèrent de faire usage de leurs positions par l’infiltration d’institutions spécifiques (l’Ahnenerbe en particulier), dans le cadre d’un effort de résistance. En faisant cela, Hielscher entra en conflit mortel avec la Gestapo. Après 1945, il se retira presque complètement de la vue du public, et à part ses activités avec la société de duellistes étudiants et la publication de son autobiographie, il s’employa seulement à cultiver les pratiques mystiques-contemplatives de son Église.

À la place de cette histoire exacte, qui peut être vérifiée complètement par les preuves et les archives littéraires, à partir de 1960 une toile de fausses interprétations, de spéculations et de formulations légendaires commença à se développer, qui n’avait plus aucun rapport avec la vie et l’œuvre réelles de Hielscher. Cependant, il est nécessaire d’aborder la question, car une grande partie de ce que le grand public, à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur de l’Allemagne, connut sur Hielscher dans les dernières décennies a été influencée et embrouillée par ces formulations légendaires. Une analyse impartiale de Hielscher — et particulièrement de son système théologique, qui contient quelques éléments très remarquables — peut difficilement avoir lieu tant qu’un roncier de mythes négatifs obstrue l’accès nécessaire.

À l’origine de la formulation légendaire se trouvait le livre Le matin des magiciens, par Louis Pauwels et Jacques Bergier, publié en France en 1960 et bientôt traduit dans diverses langues. L’intention de base des auteurs était de souligner certains aspects de la réalité terrestre qui restent en-dehors de l’actuel modèle d’explication rationaliste et positiviste. Sur cette toile de fond, ils soulignaient — et pas d’une manière détaillée, finalement — divers cotés "obscurs" et "bizarres" de l’histoire intellectuelle du XXe siècle et suggéraient des références historiques (réelles ou spéculatives). L’arrière-plan supposément ésotérique ou « occulte » du national-socialisme était d’un intérêt particulier. Il était inévitable que dans ce contexte, les prédilections de Heinrich Himmler pour la mythologie germanique et pour les rituels des Männerbünde traditionnels, l’histoire des Châteaux de l’Ordre du NS, et les activités de recherche appropriées de l’Ahnenerbe aient aussi été mentionnées (52).

À cause de la cérémonie d’adieu maintenant bien connue avant l’exécution de Wolfram Sievers — absolument pas mentionnée par Hielscher dans son autobiographie —, Hielscher se trouva lui-même dans les vues de Pauwels et Bergier. Ils le présentèrent d’emblée comme le « maître spirituel » de Sievers (53), ce qui avait bien sûr une certaine plausibilité du fait de l’appartenance de Sievers au cercle de résistance à motivation religieuse de Hielscher. Mais devant l’histoire organisationnelle suffisamment documentée de l’Ahnenerbe (54), beaucoup plus aventurée était l’assertion factuelle dans le même paragraphe que la création de son organisation aurait pu en fait procéder d’une « initiative privée » de Hielscher (55), qui avait de plus noué une « amitié mystique » avec l’explorateur suédois Sven Hedin. Ce que nous devons faire de cette « amitié mystique » — qui n’est mentionnée ni dans l’autobiographie de Hielscher (où il parle souvent volontiers et abondamment de ses rencontres et amitiés avec diverses personnalités) ni dans sa production littéraire — est une question que Pauwels et Bergier laissent sans réponse. Néanmoins le détour imaginatif vers les premières explorations de Hedin en Asie Centrale cadrait opportunément avec l’élaboration d’une « doctrine secrète » nationale-socialiste, apparemment influencée par l’Extrême-Orient, dont la genèse et l’établissement étaient supposés avoir été substantiellement influencés par Sven Hedin – et par Hielscher (56).

En fait, Pauwels et Bergier concédaient quelques phrases plus tard que Hielscher ne fut jamais un national-socialiste, mais affirmaient qu’un lien existait à travers sa communauté « avec les doctrines ‘magiques’ des grands maîtres du national-socialisme » (57). Mais c’est précisément par cette attribution d’idées « magiques » à Hielscher que Pauwels et Bergier révélaient en fait combien ils en connaissaient peu sur son système religieux-cosmologique, car Hielscher s’était toujours fermement opposé au concept et à la pratique de la « magie ». Il insistait particulièrement là-dessus dans son autobiographie, qui fut disponible dès 1954 (et qui était donc parfaitement accessible à Pauwels et Bergier). Dans celle-ci, dénotant une différence caractéristique entre sa vision du monde et celle de Ernst Jünger, il qualifiait sa perspective personnelle de mystique, alors que celle de Jünger était magique (58). Et il y avait encore une autre source pour ce rejet de la magie qui était rigoureusement déduit du système religieux-cosmologique de Hielscher, d’après lequel il n’est pas possible pour l’être humain « d’approcher les dieux, de s’attribuer leur bénédiction, de s’élever jusqu’à eux » (59). Le 11 décembre 1956, Hielscher écrivit à Friedrich Georg Jünger, le frère d’Ernst Jünger, que la magie était la « tentative inadaptée, mais toujours coupable, d’utiliser des moyens terrestres, à savoir ceux de la sorcellerie, pour mettre le Céleste à son service ». La magie blanche était encore plus répréhensible que la magie noire, car le magicien « blanc » était coupable de « désirer soumettre un bon esprit », au lieu d’un mauvais esprit, « à sa propre volonté » (60).

Mais Pauwels et Bergier ne s’intéressaient pas à tout cela. Bien éloignés de toute source concernant la vie et l’œuvre de Hielscher, ils lui attribuaient finalement « un rôle important dans l’élaboration de la doctrine secrète [nationale-socialiste] » (61), cette froide et cruelle doctrine supposément transmise par Sven Hedin à partir de l’Asie, qui se trouve derrière les événements politiques et qui selon les auteurs pourrait aussi expliquer les actions des protagonistes du national-socialisme et en particulier des SS. Une conjecture grandiose de ce genre, tirée du néant et diffusée internationalement à travers le livre de Pauwels et Bergier en grandes éditions, établit un sol fertile idéal dans les années suivantes pour des spéculations encore plus hardies et des affirmations de plus en plus téméraires concernant le rôle de Hielscher pendant l’ère NS.

Un exemple typique à cet égard est le livre The Spear of Destiny (La lance du destin) de l’auteur britannique Trevor Ravenscroft, dans lequel Hielscher — bien sûr à nouveau sans l’ombre d’une preuve et en résultat de la « méthode » des racontars sans mesure — est une fois de plus décrit comme ayant été le chef spirituel de l’Ahnenerbe, et « la plus importante figure en Allemagne après Adolf Hitler lui-même » (62). « Le Führer », d’après Ravenscroft, demanda à Hielscher de le conseiller « dans toutes les matières occultes », et dans l’éventualité d’une victoire allemande dans la seconde guerre mondiale, Hielscher « aurait bien pu devenir le Grand Prêtre d’une nouvelle religion mondiale qui aurait remplacé la Croix par le Svastika » (63). Finalement, Ravenscrof imaginait aussi que Hielscher lui-même était celui qui avait développé un mystérieux « rituel de l’air suffoquant » par lequel des membres sélectionnés des SS « prêtaient serment d’allégeance irrévocable aux puissances sataniques » (64). Le fait que même dans la seconde édition révisée de son livre (65), Ravenscroft écrivait encore « Heilscher » au lieu de « Hielscher » est probablement indicatif de la connaissance des faits et des sources par cet auteur et quelques autres de ce genre.

Un autre auteur de langue anglaise, Gerald Suster, approcha le sujet d’une manière similaire. Dans un livre portant le titre sensationnel : Hitler : Black Magician, il se sentit obligé d’écrire que Hielscher avait déjà fondé l’Ahnenerbe en 1933, après quoi elle reçut une reconnaissance « officielle » en 1935 (66). D’après Suster, Hielscher influença les SS en particulier, et à un degré beaucoup plus élevé que ce qu’on en savait généralement » (67). Suster aussi n’avait pas l’ombre d’une preuve pour ces affirmations, sans même parler de sources pouvant être vérifiées par une bibliographie ou par des archives. La bibliographie de son livre de 222 pages tient en moins de 2 pages. Bien que la bibliographie ne contenait ni l’autobiographie de Hielscher ni la littérature spécialisée sur l’Ahnenerbe, l’édition britannique du Matin des magiciens de Pauwels et Bergier, publiée en 1964, se trouve être une fois encore l’une des sources principales (68).

Les mêmes associations spéculatives, faisant pour la plupart des références directes et explicites à Pauwels/Bergier et Ravenscroft, peuvent aussi être trouvées dans le volumineux livre Das Schwarze Reich, signé de l’auteur « E.R. Carmin », manifestement un pseudonyme, ce dernier affirmant révéler l’influence considérable de toutes sortes de sociétés secrètes sur la politique du XXe siècle. Le livre parut en 1994 chez un petit éditeur de Rhénanie, passa d’abord relativement inaperçu, mais connut une large diffusion 3 ans plus tard lorsqu’il fut publié en édition de poche par la célèbre Heyne Verlag de Munich. « Carmin » non seulement reprit les habituelles formulations légendaires de ses antécédents littéraires, comme l’« amitié mystique » entre Hielscher et Sven Hedin, mais prit soin de concocter — comme ingrédient original et additionnel à la florissante légende Hielscher — des liens entre l’Église clandestine de Hielscher (dont, cependant, il ne connaissait pas le nom) et le désir d’Alfred Rosenberg de créer une Église nationale du Reich (69). En passant, « Carmin » décrit aussi le principal ouvrage historico-philosophique de Hielscher, Das Reich, comme un « roman » (70), jetant une lumière révélatrice à tous égards sur ce genre de recherche « historique » contemporaine.

Une contribution complètement unique à la « légende Hielscher » qui non seulement s’inspira de spéculations antérieures mais aussi contribua fortement à celles-ci fut faite par l’auteur chilien et ardent admirateur de Hitler, Miguel Serrano, avec son livre El cordon dorado : Hitlerismo esoterico. Ce dernier parut en espagnol en 1978 et fut publié dans une traduction allemande en 1987. Dans ce livre, Serrano expose en détail une ligne complète de tradition spirituelle, incluant les doctrines de l’hindouisme, de l’alchimie médiévale, des Templiers, des Cathares et des Rosicruciens, qui conduit directement à un national-socialisme interprété d’une manière « ésotérique » dans lequel un Adolf Hitler survivant continue à vivre au Pôle Sud. Au milieu de tout cela, Hielscher, parmi tous les gens respectueusement appelés « les initiés » par Serrano, était placé à la même hauteur que les « chefs supérieurs et inconnus de l’Hitlérisme » et même élevé au niveau d’un « chef spirituel des SS » (71).

L’appendice bibliographique de Serrano manquait lui aussi de toute trace de l’autobiographie de Hielscher, des autres textes publiés par Hielscher, et du matériel approprié qui se trouve dans les archives. Mais le Matin des magiciens se trouve encore une fois parmi les sources données, cette fois-ci dans sa traduction espagnole de 1963 (72). Cela souligne à nouveau le rôle joué par Pauwels et Bergier pendant des décennies comme fournisseurs de slogans pour un genre complet de littérature. Les diverses tentatives de diaboliser la vie et l’œuvre de Hielscher en termes d’un bizarre ésotérisme « noir » (comme dans les ouvrages de Pauwels et Bergier, Ravenscroft, Suster et « Carmin ») recoupent ici la tentative de Serrano de l’utiliser dans le contexte d’un hitlérisme « ésotérique » et « tantrique ».

Complètement négligé était par contre tout examen des positions réelles de Hielscher, et particulièrement des éléments fondamentaux de son système religieux-cosmologique. Au mieux, des fragments et des lambeaux conceptuels furent extraits, volontairement mal interprétés et insérés dans des contextes historiques contemporains auxquels ils étaient en fait diamétralement opposés. Cela est particulièrement vrai dans le cas du peu qui était connu (comme ce qui venait du journal de Ernst Jünger) concernant l’Église libre païenne de Hielscher, et qui fut plus tard interprété avec empressement comme une indication de « rites » satanistes et de « doctrines secrètes ». Le refus strict et permanent de Hielscher de permettre un plus large accès aux dogmes et à la liturgie de son Église était — de son point de vue — logique et bien-fondé. Il était basé sur la supposition que c’était précisément à la lumière des expériences négatives avec le Troisième Reich que le petit cercle de ses fidèles devait être protégé, et qu’en général seules quelques personnes étaient assez mûres en esprit et en caractère pour saisir le système de croyance axiomatiquement construit de l’UFK, intuitivement aussi bien que mentalement.

Involontairement, cependant, cette position clandestine encouragea la croissance illimitée de légendes et se révéla finalement comme contre-productive. C’est seulement après un examen minutieux, basé sur les sources existantes, sur les motivations, les fondements spirituels et les pratiques réelles du cercle de Hielscher — qui existait encore dans les années 80 — que ces formulations légendaires seront écartées et permettront l’étude d’un aspect fertile et très intéressant de l’histoire intellectuelle du XXe siècle.

♦ Peter Bahn (traduit d’allemand en anglais par Michael Moynihan et Gerhard)

• Cet essai est originellement paru sous le titre « Die Hielscher-Legende : Eine panentheistische ‘Kirchen’-Gründung des 20. Jahrhunderts und ihre Fehldeutungen » dans le journal allemand Gnostika, N° 19 (octobre 2001), pp. 63-76. Cette nouvelle version, traduite en anglais et avec des références bibliographiques élargies, est publiée par TYR avec l’aimable autorisation de l’auteur.

NOTES

[1] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre unter Deutschen [Cinquante ans parmi les Allemands], Hambourg, Rowolt 1954.

[2] Ici les articles suivants doivent être mentionnés en particulier : Marcus Beckmann, « Dem anderen Gesetz gehorschen : Zum Tode Friedrich Hielschers », in Fragmente 6 (1990), pp. 4-13 ; Werner Barthold, « Die geistige Leistung Friedrich Hielschers für das Kösener Corpsstudentum », in Einst und Jetzt : Jahrbuch des Vereins für corpsstudentische Geschichtsforschung, vol. 36 (1991), pp. 279-82 ; Karlheinz Weissmann, « Friedrich Hielscher : Eine Art Nachruf », in Criticon 123 (janvier/février 1991), pp. 25-28 ; Peter Bahn, « Glaube–Reich–Widerstand : Zum 10. Todestag Friedrich Hielschers », in Wir selbst : Zeitschrift für nationale Identität, Nos 1-2 (2000), pp. 21-33; Peter Bahn, « Ernst Jünger und Friedrich Hielscher : Eine Freudschaft auf Distanz », in Les Carnets Ernst Jünger, N° 6 (2001), pp. 127-45.

[3] C’est le Dépôt Friedrich Hielscher dans les Archives du District de Schwarzwald-Baar (Willingen-Schwenningen) ; un index électronique des archives est actuellement en préparation. Abrégé SBDA à partir de maintenant.

[4] Celle-ci se trouve parmi les documents Ernst Jünger aux Archives de Littérature Allemande à Marbach ; il y a aussi d’autres lettres de Hielscher dans d’autres collections de papiers non-publiés, comme ceux concernant Friedrich Georg Jünger.

[5] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 21-29.

[6] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 31.

[7] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 33-35.

[8] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 45-47.

[9] Friedrich Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 35-38, et Barthold, 1991. Concernant les activités de Hielscher dans la société de duellistes, voir aussi Hermann Rink, « Friedrich Hielscher » in Thomas Raveaux et Marcus Beckmann, eds., Veritati : Festschrift für Friedrich Hielscher zum 85. Geburtstag (Würzburg: auto-édition, 1987), pp. 19-22.

[10] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 21-22.

[11] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 41-44.

[12] Concernant ce courant en général, et le rôle – partiel et marginal – de Hielscher, Cf. entre autres : Karl O. Paetel, Versuchung oder Chance ? Zur Geschichte des deutschen Nationalbolchewismus (Göttingen, Musterschmidt, 1965 ; new ed., Koblenz, Bublies, 2000) ; Otto-Ernst Schüddekopf, Nationalbolchewismus in Deutschland 1918-1933 (Frankfurt/Berlin/ Vienna : Ullstein, 1972) ; Louis Dupeux, Nationalbolchewismus in Deutschland 1918-1933 : Kommunistische Strategie und konservative Dynamik (Munich, Büchergilde Gutenberg, 1985) ; Suzanne Meinl, Nationalsozialisten gegen Hitler : Die nationalrevolutionäre Opposition um Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz (Berlin, Siedler, 2000). Le texte standard biographique/bibliographique sur ce sujet est Armin Mohler, Die Konservative Revolution 1918-1932 : Ein Handbuch, 3ème éd., élargie avec un volume supplémentaire contenant aussi des corrections (Darmstadt : Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989). Hielscher, que Möhler décrit correctement comme « bâtisseur de système » typique parmi les nationaux-révolutionnaires, est détaillé à la p. 450.

[13] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 82-83.

[14] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 84.

[15] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 105. Sa thèse, qui contenait beaucoup de références à la pensée de Nietzsche et de Spengler, parut sous forme de livre en 1930, publiée par Frundsberg-Verlag, Berlin.

[16] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 111.

[17] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Innerlichkeit und Staatskunst », in Neue Standarte-Arminius: Kampfschrift für deutsche Nationalisten, numéro du 26 décembre 1926, pp. 6-8. Cité ici et plus bas d’après la réimpression aux pp. 335-38 de Jahrbuch zur Konservative Revolution 1994 (Cologne : Anneliese Thomas, 1994), p. 335.

[18] Cf. Hielscher, 1926 (1994), p. 337.

[19] Cf. les lettres de Hielscher datées du 28 novembre 1929 et du 12 janvier 1930, dans les documents Ernst Jünger aux Archives de Littérature Allemande.

[20] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, Das Reich (Berlin, Das Reich, 1931).

[21] Sur la formation du cercle Hielscher et ses efforts pendant la dictature NS, Cf. Rolf Kluth, « Die Widerstandgruppe Hielscher » in Pusl : Dokumentationschrift zur Jugendbewegung, N° 7 (déc. 1980), pp. 22-27.

[22] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 237.

[23] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Die Entwicklung unserer Kirche » [Le développement de notre Église], texte aux SBDA, documents Hielscher, N° 73, p. 1-2.

[24] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Bericht über die unterirdische Arbeit gegen den Nationalismus » [Rapport sur le travail souterrain contre le national-socialisme], texte aux SBDA, documents Hielscher, N° 140 (avec index des personnes appartenant au cercle).

[25] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, Die Selbstherrlichkeit : Versuch einer Darstellung des deutschen Rechtsgrundbegriffes (Berlin, Frundsberg, 1930), pp. 63-64.

[26] Cf. lettre de Hielscher datée du 28 novembre 1929, dans les documents Ernst Jünger aux Archives de Littérature Allemande.

[27] Cf. Hielscher, Die Selbstherrlichkeit, 1930, p. 83.

[28] Cf. Hielscher, Die Selbstherrlichkeit, p. 81.

[29] Cf. Johannes Scotus Eriugena, Über die Einteilung der Natur, trad. Par Ludwig Noak (Hambourg, Felix Meiner 1994), p. 325.

[30] Cf. Eriugena, Über die Einteilung der Natur, p. 324.

[31] Cf. « Die 1. Klasse des heidnischen Glaubensunterrichts während der Schule » [La première classe de l’enseignement religieux païen à l’école], texte aux SBDA, documents Hielscher, N° 15 (probablement écrit par Hielscher).

[32] Cf. la lettre de Hielscher à Alfred Schäffer datée du 23 janvier 1931, dans la collection Walter Ehlers aux Archives de Littérature Allemande.

[33] Cf. SBDA, documents Hielscher, N° 81, et le document public du notaire de Triberg daté du 6 juillet 1966 concernant une déclaration sous serment de Hielscher sur la fondation de la « Unabhängige Freikirche » en 1933 (copie en possession de l’auteur).

[34] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Die Entwicklung unserer Kirche », p. 2.

[35] Cf. Ernst Jünger, Strahlungen II : Das zweite Pariser Tagebuch, „Kirchhorster Blätter : Die Hütte im Weinberg“, édition de poche (Munich, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag 1988), pp. 172-73 (entrée du 16 octobre 1943). Ernst Jünger lui-même ne fut jamais membre de l’Église de Hielscher, mais fut l’une des quelques personnes extérieures informées de son existence et de son développement par son vieil ami Hielscher. Les diverses lettres et pièces jointes de Hielscher à Jünger jusqu’aux années 1980 doivent être notées à cet égard (Cf. la correspondance Ernst Jünger-Friedrich Hielscher dans les documents Ernst Jünger aux Archives de Littérature Allemande).

[36] Cf. Hielscher, « Die Entwicklung », p. 2.

[37] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 117.

[38] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Der Aufbau der Kirche » [La construction de l’Église], texte N° 16 dans les documents Hielscher aux SBDA, p. 18.

[39] Cf. Hielscher, « Der Aufbau », p. 18.

[40] Cf. Michael H. Kater, Das Ahnenerbe der SS 1935-1945 (Stuttgart : Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1974), p. 38.

[41] Cf. Kater, 1974, p. 27. Sur les connotations originelles du nom de l’institution, voir l’article de Joscelyn Godwin sur Hermann Wirth dans ce numéro de TYR.

[42] Cf. Kater, Das Ahnenerbe, p. 215.

[43] Pour une évaluation critique du rôle de Sievers, Cf. Kater, Das Ahnenerbe, pp. 317-19, et la description antérieure plus positive de Sievers dans Alfred Kantorowicz, Deutsches Tagebuch, Pt. 1 (Munich, Kindler, 1959), pp. 496-507.

[44] Cf. Kater, Das Ahnenerbe, p. 323.

[45] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 453-54.

[46] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 444-47.

[47] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Die Hielscher-Gruppe 1933-1945: Bericht über die unterirdische Arbeit gegen den Nationalsozialismus », dans Jahrbuch zur Konservative Revolution 1994 (Cologne : Anneliese Thomas, 1994), p. 329-34, ainsi que la description par Kluth (1980).

[48] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 402-26.

[49] Cf. Friedrich Hielscher, « Die Entwicklung », p. 3.

[50] Les textes se trouvent dans les documents Hielscher aux SBDA.

[51] Le matériel sur la cause et le cours des « crises de l’Église » qui furent liées à la scission peut être trouvé en grande quantité sous les mots-clés « 1. Kirchenkrise » et « 2. Kirchenkrise » dans les documents Hielscher aux SBDA. L’« Église Libre », qui fut dissoute dans les années 90, émergea de la « première crise » sous la direction du Dr. Rolf Kluth, directeur temporaire des Bibliothèques d’État et Universitaire de Brême et membre du cercle Hielscher depuis les années 30 ; en comparaison, la « seconde crise » ne conduisit pas à la formation d’un nouveau groupe, mais plutôt à l’implosion de l’UFK.

[52] Louis Pauwels et Jacques Bergier, Aufbruch ins dritte Jahrtausend : Von der Zukunft der phantastischen Vernunft, édition de poche (Munich, Heyne 1982), pp. 379-90. Ce matériel apparaît aux pp. 200-10 de l’édition américaine, publiée sous le titre de The Morning of the Magicians (New York, Stein & Day, 1963).

[53] Cf. Pauwels et Bergier, Aufbruch..., p. 389. Apparaît à la p. 206 de l’édition américaine.

[54] Ici le travail classique de Kater (1974) doit être cité en particulier. Cette histoire bien documentée de l’Ahnenerbe, cependant, est limitée par la large omission d’une analyse des projets de recherche spécifiques menés par l’Ahnenerbe, que ce soit dans le domaine de l’histoire intellectuelle ou dans celui des développements technologiques spécifiques.

[55] Cf. Pauwels et Bergier, Aufbruch , p. 389. Apparaît à la p. 206 de l’édition américaine.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, pp. 115-17.

[59] Cf. Hielscher, Fünfzig Jahre, p. 115.

[60] Lettre dans les documents Friedrich Georg Jünger aux Archives de Littérature Allemande.

[61] Cf. Pauwels et Bergier, Aufbruch..., p. 390. Apparaît à la p. 207 de l’édition américaine.

[62] Cf. Trevor Ravenscroft, Die heilige Lanze : Der Speer von Golgotha, 2° éd. (Munich, Universitas 1996), p. 265. Apparaît à la p. 259 de l’édition américaine de The Spear of Destiny (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1973).

[63] Ibid.

[64] Ibid.

[65] The Spear of Destiny parut originellement en Grande-Bretagne en 1972 et ne fut pas traduit en allemand avant 1988 !

[66] Cf. Gerald Suster, Hitler : Black Magician, 2° éd. (Londres, Skoob, 1996), p. 182.

[67] Cf. Suster, Hitler, p. 184.

[68] Cf. Suster, Hitler, pp. 211-12.

[69] Cf. E.R. Carmin, Das Schwarze Reich : Geheimgesellschaften und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert, édition de poche (Munich, Heyne 1997), pp. 143, 701.

[70] Cf. Carmin, Das Schwarze Reich, p. 700.

[71] Cf. Miguel Serrano, Das Goldene Band: Esoterischer Hitlerismus, German edition (Wetter, Teut-Verlag 1987), p. 245.

[72] Cf. Serrano, Das Goldene Band, p. 373-98.

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NOUS APPELONS TES LOUPS

Nous appelons tes loups
Et appelons ta lance
Nous appelons les Douze
A descendre du ciel jusqu’à nous.
Avant tout nous t’appelons Toi.
Maintenant vient la chasse sauvage,
Maintenant que la corne retentisse,
Pour que les morts ne se lamentent pas.
L’ennemi est tombé
Avant le lever du jour.

La proie n’a pas de nom,
L’ennemi n’a pas de visage,
La carcasse pas de descendance,
Juste est le tribunal.
La moisson est passée,
La paille est vendue chaque jour,
Les corbeaux maintenant réclament
La part qui leur est due.
La chasse a commencé :
Maintenant, Seigneur, ton salut
Nous soutient !

- Friedrich Hielscher

(traduit de l’allemand en anglais par Gerhard et Michael Moynihan)

Article paru dans la revue américaine « TYR », volume 2, 2003-2004 (publiée par Joshua Buckley et Michael Moynihan ; un numéro par an).

 

Armin Mohler, l'homme qui nous désignait l'ennemi!

Thorsten HINZ:

Armin Mohler, l’homme qui nous désignait l’ennemi

 

Le Dr. Karlheinz Weissmann vient de sortir de presse une biographie d’Armin Mohler, publiciste de la droite allemande et historien de la “révolution conservatrice”

 

Armin Mohler ne fut jamais l’homme des demies-teintes!

 

Qui donc Armin Mohler détestait-il? Les libéraux et les tièdes, les petits jardiniers amateurs qui gratouillent le bois mort qui encombre l’humus, c’est-à-dire les nouilles de droite, inoffensives parce que dépouvues de pertinence! Il détestait aussi tous ceux qui s’agrippaient aux concepts et aux tabous que définissait leur propre ennemi. Il considérait que les libéraux étaient bien plus subtils et plus dangereux que les communistes: pour reprendre un bon mot de son ami Robert Hepp: ils nous vantaient l’existence de cent portes de verre qu’ils nous définissaient comme l’Accès, le seul Accès, à la liberté, tout en taisant soigneusement le fait que 99 de ces portes demeuraient toujours fermées. La victoire totale des libéraux a hissé l’hypocrisie en principe ubiquitaire. Les gens sont désormais jugés selon les déclarations de principe qu’ils énoncent sans nécessairement y croire et non pas sur leurs actes et sur les idées qu’ils sont prêts à défendre.

 

Mohler était était un type “agonal”, un gars qui aimait la lutte: sa bouille carrée de Bâlois l’attestait. Avec la subtilité d’un pluvier qui capte les moindres variations du climat, Mohler repérait les courants souterrains de la politique et de la société. C’était un homme de forte sensibilité mais certainement pas un sentimental. Mohler pensait et écrivait clair quand il abordait la politique: ses mots étaient durs, tranchants, de véritables armes. Il était déjà un “conservateur moderne” ou un “néo-droitiste” avant que la notion n’apparaisse dans les médiats. En 1995, il s’était défini comme un “fasciste au sens où l’entendait José Antonio Primo de Rivera”. Mohler se référait ainsi —mais peu nombreux étaient ceux qui le savaient— au jeune fondateur de la Phalange espagnole, un homme intelligent et cultivé, assassiné par les gauches ibériques et récupéré ensuite par Franco.

 

Il manquait donc une biographie de ce doyen du conservatisme allemand d’après guerre, mort en 2003. Karlheinz Weissmann était l’homme appelé à combler cette lacune: il connait la personnalité de Mohler et son oeuvre; il est celui qui a actualisé l’ouvrage de référence de Mohler sur la révolution conservatrice.

 

Pour Mohler seuls comptaient le concret et le réel

 

La sensibilité toute particulière d’Armin Mohler s’est déployée dans le décor de la ville-frontière suisse de Bâle. Mohler en était natif. Il y avait vu le jour en 1920. En 1938, la lecture d’un livre le marque à jamais: c’est celui de Christoph Steding, “Das Reich und die Krankheit der europäischen Kultur” (“Le Reich et la pathologie de la culture européenne”). Pour Steding, l’Allemagne, jusqu’en 1933, avait couru le risque de subir une “neutralisation politique et spirituelle”, c’est-à-dire une “helvétisation de la pensée allemande”, ce qui aurait conduit à la perte de la souveraineté intérieure et extérieure; l’Allemagne aurait dérogé pour adopter le statut d’un “intermédiaire éclectique”. Les peuples qui tombent dans une telle déchéance sont “privés de destin” et tendent à ne plus produire que des “pharisiens nés”. On voit tout de suite que Steding était intellectuellement proche de Carl Schmitt. Quant à ce dernier, il a pris la peine de recenser personnellement le livre, publié à titre posthume, de cet auteur mort prématurément. Dans ce livre apparaissent certains des traits de pensée qui animeront Mohler, le caractériseront, tout au long de son existence.

 

L’Allemagne est devenue pour le jeune Mohler “la grande tentation”, tant et si bien qu’il franchit illégalement le frontière suisse en février 1942 “pour aider les Allemands à gagner la guerre”. Cet intermède allemand ne durera toutefois qu’une petite année. Mohler passa quelques mois à Berlin, avec le statut d’étudiant, et s’y occupa des auteurs de la “révolution conservatrice”, à propos desquels il rédigera sa célèbre thèse de doctorat, sous la houlette de Karl Jaspers. Mohler était un rebelle qui s’insurgeait contre la croyance au progrès et à la raison, une croyance qui estime que le monde doit à terme être tout compénétré de raison et que les éléments, qui constituent ce monde, peuvent être combinés les uns aux autres ou isolés les uns des autres à loisir, selon une logique purement arbitraire. Contre cette croyance et cette vision, Mohler voulait opposer les forces élémentaires de l’art et de la culture, de la nationalité et de l’histoire. Ce contre-mouvement, disait-il, et cela le distinguait des tenants de la “vieille droite”, ne visait pas la restauration d’un monde ancré dans le 19ème siècle, mais tenait expressément compte des nouvelles réalités.

 

Dans un chapitre, intitulé “Du nominalisme”, le Dr. Karlheinz Weissmann explicite les tentatives de Mohler, qui ne furent pas toujours probantes, de systématiser ses idées et ses vues. Il est clair que Mohler rejette toute forme d’universalisme car tout universalisme déduit le particulier d’un ordre spirituel sous-jacent et identitque pour tous, et noie les réalités dans une “mer morte d’abstractions”. Pour le nominaliste Mohler, les concepts avancés par les universalismes ne sont que des dénominations abstraites et arbitraires, inventées a poteriori, et qui n’ont pour effets que de répandre la confusion. Pour Mohler, seuls le concret et le particulier avaient de l’importance, soit le “réel”, qu’il cherchait à saisir par le biais d’images fortes, puissantes et organiques. Par conséquent, ses sympathies personnelles n’étaient pas déterminées par les idées politiques dont se réclamaient ses interlocuteurs mais tenaient d’abord compte de la valeur de l’esprit et du caractère qu’il percevait chez l’autre.

 

En 1950, Mohler devint le secrétaire d’Ernst Jünger. Ce ne fut pas une époque dépourvue de conflits. Après l’intermède de ce secrétariat, vinrent les années françaises de notre théoricien: il devint en effet le correspondant à Paris du “Tat” suisse et de l’hebdomadaire allemand “Die Zeit”. A partir de 1961, il fut le secrétaire, puis le directeur, de la “Fondation Siemens”. Dans le cadre de cette éminente fonction, il a essayé de contrer la dérive gauchisante de la République fédérale, en organisant des colloques de très haut niveau et en éditant des livres ou des publications remarquables. Parmi les nombreux livres que nous a laissés Mohler, “Nasenring” (= “L’anneau nasal”) est certainement le plus célèbre: il constitue une attaque en règle, qui vise à fustiger l’attitude que les Allemands ont prise vis-à-vis de leur propre histoire (la fameuse “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”). En 1969, Mohler écrivait dans l’hebdomadaire suisse “Weltwoche”: “Le ‘Républiquefédéralien’ est tout occupé, à la meilleure manière des méthodes ‘do-it-yourself’, à se faire la guerre à lui-même. Il n’y a pas que lui: tout le monde occidental semble avoir honte de descendre d’hommes de bonne trempe; tout un chacun voudrait devenir un névrosé car seul cet état, désormais, est considéré comme ‘humain’”.

 

En France, Mohler était un adepte critique de Charles de Gaulle. Il estimait que l’Europe des patries, proposée par le Général, aurait été capable de faire du Vieux Continent une “Troisième Force” entre les Etats-Unis et l’Union Soviétique. Dans les années 60, certaines ouvertures semblaient possibles pour Mohler: peut-être pourrait-il gagner en influence politique via le Président de la CSU bavaroise, Franz-Josef Strauss? Il entra à son service comme “nègre”. Ce fut un échec: Strauss, systématiquement, modifiait les ébauches de discours que Mohler avait truffées de références gaulliennes et les traduisait en un langage “atlantiste”. De la part de Strauss, était-ce de la faiblesse ou était-ce le regard sans illusions du pragmatique qui ne jure que par le “réalisable”? Quoi qu’il en soit, on perçoit ici l’un des conflits fondamentaux qui ont divisé les conservateurs après la guerre: la plupart des hommes de droite se contentaient d’une République fédérale sous protectorat américain (sans s’apercevoir qu’à long terme, ils provoquaient leur propre disparition), tandis que Mohler voulait une Allemagne européenne et libre.

 

Le conflit entre européistes et atlantistes provoqua également l’échec de la revue “Die Republik”, que l’éditeur Axel Springer voulait publier pour en faire le forum des hommes de droite hors partis et autres ancrages politiciens: Mohler décrit très bien cette péripétie dans “Nasenring”.

 

Il semble donc bien que ce soit sa qualité de Suisse qui l’ait sauvé de cette terrible affliction que constitue la perte d’imagination chez la plupart des conservateurs allemands de l’après-guerre. Par ailleurs, le camp de la droite établie a fini par le houspiller dans l’isolement. Caspar von Schrenck-Notzing lui a certes ouvert les colonnes de “Criticon”, qui furent pour lui une bonne tribune, mais les autres éditeurs de revues lui claquèrent successivement la porte au nez; malgré son titre de doctorat, il n’a pas davantage pu mener une carrière universitaire. La réunification n’a pas changé grand chose à sa situation: les avantages pour lui furent superficiels et éphémères.

 

La cadre historique, dans lequel nous nous débattions du temps de Mohler, et dans lequel s’est déployée sa carrière étonnante, freinée uniquement par des forces extérieures, aurait pu gagner quelques contours tranchés et précis. On peut discerner aujourd’hui la grandeur de Mohler. On devrait aussi pouvoir mesurer la tragédie qu’il a incarnée. Weissmann constate qu’il existait encore jusqu’au milieu des années 80 une certaine marge de manoeuvre pour la droite intellectuelle en Allemagne mais que cet espace potentiel s’est rétréci parce que la gauche n’a jamais accepté le dialogue ou n’a jamais rien voulu apprendre du réel. Le lecteur se demande alors spontanément: pourquoi la gauche aurait-elle donc dialogué puisque le rapport de force objectif était en sa faveur?

 

Weissmann a donc résussi un tour de force: il a écrit une véritable “biographie politique” d’Armin Mohler. Son livre deviendra un classique.

 

Thorsten HINZ.

(article paru dans “Junge Freiheit”, Berlin, n°31/32-2011; http://www.jugefreiheit.de/ ).

Articles de R. Steuckers sur "centrostudilaruna.it"

Articles de Robert Steuckers sur http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

 La décision dans l’œuvre de Carl Schmitt

Les thèmes de la géopolitique et de l’espace russe dans la vie culturelle berlinoise de 1918 à 1945

L’œuvre de Herman Wirth (1885-1981)

Evola and Spengler

Atlantis, Kush, and Turan: Prehistoric Matrices of Ancient Civilizations in the Posthumous Work of Spengler

La lecture évolienne des thèses de H.F.K. Günther

L’itinéraire d’Edgar Julius Jung

L’utopie conservatrice de Knut Hamsun

Les mentions de l’œuvre de Christoph Steding dans les écrits d’Evola

La contribution à Il Regime Fascista de Wilhelm Stapel

La “Révolution Conservatrice” en Allemagne (1918-1932)

Religiosité indo-européenne

L’influence d’Oswald Spengler sur Julius Evola

Paganisme et philosophie de la vie chez Knut Hamsun et David Herbert Lawrence

L’itinéraire de Knut Hamsun

Introduction à l’œuvre de Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss (1892-1974)

La Perfección de la Técnica. Friedrich-Georg Jünger (1898-1977)

Géopolitique et spiritualité du principe “Reich”

Espionnage par satellites, guerre cognitive, manipulation par les mafias: les embûches extérieures à la construction européenne

Geopolitica e spiritualità del principio “Reich”

Annulation magique de la crise et “méthode physiognomique” chez Ernst Jünger

Révolution Conservatrice, forme catholique et ordo æternus romain

L’itinerario di Knut Hamsun

Knut Hamsun

Knut Hamsun

Kerry Bolton

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

Editor’s Note:

This much-expanded version of a previously-published essay on Knut Hamsun is chapter 6 of Kerry Bolton’s Artists of the Right: Resisting Decadence, forthcoming from Counter-Currents.

Knut Hamsun, 1859–1952, has had a decisive impact on the course of twentieth century literature, both in Europe and America, yet was for decades little discussed let alone honored even in his native Norway.

Ernest Hemingway tried to emulate him as did Henry Miller, who called Hamsun “the Dickens of my generation.” Thomas Mann wrote, “never has the Nobel Prize been awarded to one so worthy of it.” Herman Hesse called Hamsun his favorite author. Admired by H. G. Wells, Kafka, and Brecht,[1] Hamsun always enjoyed a great following not only in Germany but particularly in Russia, where he was lauded especially by Maxim Gorky. Even inside the Communist State Hamsun continued to be published despite his politics, and he remained an influence on such Bolshevik luminaries as Aleksandr Kollontai and Illya Ehrenburg.[2]

Origins

Hamsun was born Knut Pedersen of an impoverished peasant family of seven children on August 4th, 1859. His father was a farmer and a tailor; his mother’s lineage was of Viking nobility. Knut had a hard upbringing on his uncle’s farm where he was sent when he was nine. But his uncle also ran the local library, which gave  him the chance to begin his self-education.[3]

He left his uncle’s farm in 1873, and over the next few years worked at a variety of jobs, laboring, teaching, and clerical, as he widely journeyed about.[4]

America

At 18 he had published his first novel called The Enigmatic One, a love story.[5] He then paid for the publication of another novel Bjorger.[6] But acknowledgment as a writer was a decade away, as there was then little interest in his peasant tales.

In 1882 Knut traveled to the USA, joining the great Norwegian emigration to that country. Between numerous jobs he was able to get some newspaper articles published and began a series of lectures on authors among the Norwegian community.[7] From this early start, Hamsun wrote as an observer of life. He was the first to develop the novel based on the psychology of characters. Hamsun wrote of what he saw and felt particularly identifying with the workers and the tramps. But he was soon disillusioned with America, despite his initial wonder, and he expressed his disgust for American life in articles for Norwegian newspapers[8] upon his return.[9]

In the first sentence of his first article on America[10] Hamsun described the country as “the Millionaires’ Republic,” a reference to the manner by which elections are based on money,[11] and where the “diseased an degenerate human raw material stream every day from all over the world.” Alluding to principles that are today familiarly called “the American Dream,” Hamsun states that the immigrant is soon disappointed when “the principles do not deliver what they promise.”

He was skeptical about the liberty fetish upon which the American ethos is proclaimed, stating that it is in practice not so much a matter of having “liberty” as “taking liberties.”[12] The purpose of being American is to fulfill a “carnivorous, satiating existence, with the ability to afford intense sensual pleasures . . .”[13]

What now seems particularly prescient, Hamsun, in criticizing the “machinelust” of Americans alludes with a mixture of amazement and abhorrence to having eaten even an egg “from a Brooklyn egg factory” (Hamsun’s emphasis),[14] perhaps something that might have seemed pathological for a youthful Scandinavian of country stock.

Hamsun’s next article for Aftenpost centered on New York, and focused on what can be considered the vulgarity of American city-dwellers in comparison to those in Europe; their loudness and their lack of etiquette.[15] “New Yorkers know little about literature or art.”[16] The theater is popular but the “level of dramatic art is so low.”[17]

Hamsun’s first major literary work came in 1888 when he succeeded in getting published a short story in a magazine, which was to form part of his novel, Hunger. The story gained him access to the literary scene in Copenhagen. Hamsun became a celebrity among the young intellectuals. He was invited to lecture before university audiences.[18]

He was commissioned to write a book on America in 1889 setting aside the completion of Hunger. The result was The Cultural Life of Modern America,[19] based on his second trip to the USA in 1886, which had been prompted by his desire to make a literary mark for himself there.[20]

By 1888 he was so repelled by the USA, that he took to wearing a black ribbon in sympathy with four German anarchist immigrants[21] who had been sentenced to death for the Haymarket bombing in Chicago, 1886.

He left a departing message, giving a two-hour lecture on the cultural vacuity of America.[22]

Despite his destitution upon settling in Copenhagen, he wrote to a friend: “How pleased I am with this country. This is Europe, and I am European—thank God!”[23]

It was two lectures on America at the University of Copenhagen that formed the basis of the aforementioned Cultural Life of Modern America. Nelson remarks of Hamsun’s particular disgust, which might to many readers seem completely relevant to the present time: “In particular he was offended by the exaggerated patriotism of Americans, their continual boasting of themslevs as the freest, most advanced, most intelligent people anywhere–boasting from which the foreigner could not escape.”[24]

Hamsun attacked the crass materialism of the  USA. He despised democracy as a form of despotism, abhorring its leveling nature and mob politics. America is a land where the highest morality is money, where the meaning of art is reduced to its cash value. He also expresses his misgivings about the presence of Africans in the USA. The Civil War is described as a war against the aristocracy by northern capitalists. He writes: “Instead of founding an intellectual elite, America has established a mulatto stud farm.”

Literary Eminence

Resuming the writing of Hunger after his musings on America, this appeared in 1890. It has been described as one of the great novels of urban alienation. Like much of his writing it is partly autobiographical. It centers on a young budding writer trying to fend off poverty, wandering the streets in rags, but in some odd way enjoying the experiences despite the hardship. Through an act of will the character maintains his identity.

This was perhaps the first novel to make the workings of the mind the central theme. It was a genre he was to continue experimenting with over the next ten years. Contra orthodox psychological theories, Hamsun held that a diversity of separate personality types within the individual is a desirable state of being. He wrote of this in regard to his aim for literature: “I will therefore have contradictions in the inner man considered as a quite natural phenomenon, and I dream of a literature with characters in which their very lack of consistency is their basic characteristic.”[25]

Hamsun’s next great novel was Mysteries,[26] virtually a self-portrait. One reviewer described Hamsun as expressing “the wildest paradoxes,” a hatred of bourgeois academics and of the masses. The principal character, Nagel, is presented in the form of free flowing thought associations and a stream of consciousness.[27]

Here Hamsun identifies himself as “a radical who belongs to no party, but is an individual in the extreme.”[28] The book caused an uproar among literary circles, but it sold well.

Having outraged the literary establishment, Hamsun next set about critiquing the younger coterie of writers as arrogant and talentless wastrels, whom he represents in Shallow Soil[29] as “a festering sore on the social organism of the Norwegian capital,” in the words of Prof. Wiehr.[30]

Here Hanka Tidemand, a liberated and modern woman of the type detested by Hamsun, finds her true nature back with her hard working husband and children, after an affair with an artist. She realizes her mistaken course, on the verge of divorce, when she sees her children. Here Hamsun sets out his constant theme of rediscovering one’s roots in the simple life, in family and, in children. The well-meaning Mr Tidemand has his wife Hanka leave after she is seduced by one of the bohemian parasites.

[Tideman’s] regard for the individual liberty of his wife amounts really to a fault. He fails to see, however, the grave danger which is threatening Hanka and believes to be promoting her true happiness in according her perfect freedom. His devotion to her never ceases, and when she at last repents, he makes reconciliation easy for her. . . .

Hanka is evidently the product of a misdirected striving for emancipation; she seems to acknowledge no duty except the duty to herself. [31]

The Kareno trilogy of plays (At the Gates of the Kingdom, Evening Glow, and The Game of Life)[32] focuses Hamsun’s growing anti-democratic sentiment in the character of Ivar Kareno, a young philosopher who states:

I believe in the born leader, the natural despot, not the man who is chosen but the man who elects himself to be ruler over the masses. I believe in and hope for one thing, and that is the return of the great terrorist, the living essence of human power, the Caesar.[33]

By now, Hamsun had become a celebrity, cheered in the streets by crowds although he despised the attention, but several decades away from being honored with a Nobel Prize

The Growth of the Soil

The Growth of the Soil is a remarkable book for those who have a yearning for the timeless in a world of the superficial and the transient. Published in 1917, it was the work that was cited when Hamsun was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1920.

This is the world of a rough, coarsely-featured farmer Isak, and a woman, Inger, who happened to come by from across the valley, stay with him to sire a children and help Isak work the land, raise goats, potatoes, corn, milk the cows and goats, make cheese, and subsist at one with nature.

Isak and Inger are archetypes of the peasant; the antithesis of the New Yorker and the archetypical “American” described in Hamsun’s essays on the USA.

The sense of a day-by-day part of eternity lived by Isak and Inger is captured, juxtaposing their lives with the grain they sow and the earth they till, as part of a single rhythm that has existed for centuries:

For generations back, into forgotten time, his fathers before him had sowed corn, solemnly, on a still, calm evening, bets with a fall of warm and gentle rain, soon after the grey goose flight. . . .

Isak walked bare headed, in Jesus’ name, a sower. Like a tree stump to look at, but in his heart like a child. Every cast was made with care, in a spirit of kindly resignation. Look! The tiny grains that are to take life and to grow, shoot up into ears, and give more corn again; so it is throughout the earth where corn is sown. Palestine, America, the valleys of Norway itself—a great wide world, and here is Isak, a tiny speck in the midst of it all, a sower. Little showers of corn flung out fanwise form his hand; a kindly clouded sky, with a promise of the faintest little misty rain.[34]

The woman as mother is the highest of peasant values, and indeed of the fulfillment of women, in antithesis to the “liberated woman” that was becoming evident in Hamsun’s time as a symptom of a culture’s decay, a type already described by Hamsun in Shallow Soil and elsewhere.

The rearing of children is the purpose of Being of the wife and mother, as much as that might be sneered at now, but as Spengler noted, there is nothing more important than the continuation of a family lineage, generation-after-generation, and one might add—interestingly—the same values hold as true for the aristocrat as for the peasant; there is no more dread than being the last of a family’s line. Hence, we see something of this feeling described by Hamsun:

She was in full flower, and constantly with child. Isak, himself, her lord and master, was earnest and stolid as ever, but he had got on well, and was content. How he had managed to live until Inger came was a mystery . . . now, he had all that a man can think of in his place in the world.[35]

The feeling is described by Oswald Spengler in The Hour of Decision, which captures the same intent that Hamsun was expressing in drama:

A woman of race[36] does not desire to be a “companion” or a “lover,” but a mother; and not the mother of one child, to serve as a toy and a distraction, but of many; the instinct of a strong race speaks in the pride that large families inspire, in the feeling that barrenness is the hardest curse that can befall a woman and through her the race . . .[37]

This is precisely the type of woman that Inger represents: “She was in full flower, and constantly with child . . .”

A man wants stout sons who will perpetuate his name and his deeds beyond his death into the future and enhance them, just as he has done himself through feeling himself heir to the calling and works of his ancestors.[38]

This organic conception of family, an instinct during the “Spring” and “Summer” epochs of a civilization, becomes atrophied during the “Autumn” and “Winter” epochs, as Spengler aptly terms the morphological cycles of a culture; which is of course the situation today, and was becoming apparent during Hamsun’s time. The culture-problem addressed by Hamsun in Shallow Soil, etc., where the “emancipated woman” leaves her family, is described by Spengler:

The meaning of man and wife, the will to perpetuity, is being lost. People live for themselves alone, not for future generations. The nation as society, once the organic web of families, threatens to dissolve, from the city outwards, into a sum of private atoms, of which each is intent on extracting form his own and other lives the maximum of amusement–panem et cicenses. The women’s emancipation of Ibsen’s time wanted, not freedom from the husband, but freedom from the child, from the burden of children, just as men’s emancipation in the same period signified freedom from the duties of family, nation, and State.[39]

Hamsun addressed a matter of land ownership and purchase, as it had been the habit of the tillers to simply stake out a plot of land and work it, without thought as to how and where to purchase it. Amidst the cycles of struggle, drought, crop failures, births of children, and crop recovery, and the contentedness of Isak and Inger and their family amidst it all, an official calls upon them one day to enquire as to why Isak never bought the land.

Buy? What should he buy for? The ground was there, the forest was there; he had cleared and tilled, built up a homestead in the midst of a natural wilderness, winning bread for himself and his, asking nothing of any man, but working, and working alone.[40]

The district sheriff’s officer finally calls by, looking at the vast tracts of tilled land, and asking why Isak had never come to him to purchase it. Soon after a bit of verbal sophistry, Isak begins to see how the official must be correct. Asking about “boundaries,” Isak had only thought in terms of how far he could see and what he could work. But the State required “definite boundaries,” “and the greater the extent, the more you will have to pay.” To all of this, Isak, could only acknowledge with “Ay.”[41]

From there, the simple life of Isak and Inger is confronted with a bureaucratic muddle, with questions on the money-value of the land, its waters, the potential for fishing, and the possibility of ores and metals.

Then civilization reaches Isak and Inger in the form of the telegraph (which becomes a metaphor for “civilization”) which is to go through his land, and for which he would be paid to upkeep the lines. [42] Furthermore, there was a copper mine in the hills that was to be bought from Isak.[43] Despite the money that now comes to Isak, he remains always a peasant, still toiling, knowing that is who he is and not wanting to be anything else:

Isak understood his work, his calling. He was a rich man now, with a big farm, but the heavy cash payments that had come to him by a lucky chance he used but poorly; he put the money aside. The land saved him. If he had lived down in the village, maybe the great world would have affected even him; so much gaiety, so many elegant manners and ways; he would have been buying useless trifles, and wearing a red Sunday shirt on weekdays. Here in the wilds he was sheltered from all immoderation; he lived in clear air, washed himself on Sunday mornings, and took a bath when he went up to the lake. Those thousand Daler—well, ’twas a gift from Heaven, to be kept intact. What else should he do? His ordinary outgoings were more than covered by the produce of his fields and stock.[44]

The copper mining, which went to Swedish ownership, began encroached increasingly, much to the distress of the villagers. Elesuesu, Isak and Inger’s eldest son, having spent much time away had returned ruined by civilization, improvident,

Poor Eleseus, all set on end and frittered away. Better, maybe, if he’d worked on the land all the time, but now he’s a man that has learned to write and use letters; no grip in him, no depth. For all that, no pitch-black devil of a man, not in Jove, not ambitious, hardly nothing at all is Eleseus, not even a bad thing of any great dimensions.

Something unfortunate, ill-fated about this young man, as if something were rotting him from within. . . . the child had lost his roothold, and suffered thereby. All that he turns to now leads back to something wanting in him, something dark against the light.[45]

Eleseus represents that type which becomes predominate in the “Winter” cycle of a civilization, when the City and money form the axis of living; where the peasant and the artisan emigrant from the country to the city and become either part of the rootless, alienated proletarian mass or a part of the equally rootless bourgeois. The same contrast that Hamsun dramatized was examined several years later by Spengler in his seminal study of cultural morphology, The Decline of The West:

Beginning and end, a peasant cottage and a tenement block are related to one another[46] as soul and intellect, as blood and stone . . . now the giant city sucks the country dry, insatiably and incessantly demanding and devouring fresh streams of men, till it dies in the midst in the midst of an almost uninhibited waste of country.[47]

Hamsun concludes with Geissler, the district official who had once come on behalf of the State to measure the worth and boundaries of Isak’s land, and then to buy the copper mine from Isak, regretting the impact the mining had had upon the village, offering this observation to Isak’s younger son Sivert who had stayed with the land, which encapsulates Hamsun’s world-view and moral of the story:

Look at you folk at Sellanraa,[48] now; looking up at blue peaks every day of your lives; no new-fangled inventions about that, but fjeld and rocky peaks, rooted deep in the past—but you’ve them for companionship. There you are, living in touch with heaven and earth, one with them, one with all these wide, deep-rooted things. No need of a sword in your hands, you go through life bareheaded, barehanded, in the midst of a great kindliness. Look, Nature’s there, for you and yours to have and enjoy. Man and Nature don’t bombard each other, but agree; they don’t compete, race one against the other, but go together. There’s you Sellanraa folk, in all this, living there. Fjeld and forest, moors and meadow, and sky and stars—oh, ’tis not poor and sparingly counted out, but without measure. Listen to me, Sivert: you be content! You’ve everything to live on, everything to live for, everything to believe in; being born and bringing forth, you are the needful on earth. ’Tis not all that are so, but you are so; needful on earth. ’Tis you that maintain life. Generation to generation, breeding ever anew; and when you die, the new stock goes on. That’s the meaning of eternal life. What do you get out of it? An existence innocently and properly set towards all. What you get out of it? Nothing can put you under orders and lord it over you Sellanraa folk, you’ve peace and authority and this great kindliness all round. That’s what you get for it. You lie at a mother’s breast and suck, and play with a mother’s warm hand. There’s your father now, he’s one of the two-and-thirty thousand. What’s to be said of many another? I’m something, I’m the fog, as it were, here and there, floating around, sometimes coming like rain on dry ground. But the others? There’s my son, the lightning that’s nothing in itself, a flash of barrenness; he can act. My son, ay, he’s the modern type, a man of our time; he believes honestly enough all the age has taught him, all the Jew and the Yankee have taught him; I shake my head at it all. But there’s nothing mythical about me; ’tis only in the family, so to speak, that I’m like a fog. Sit there shaking my head. Tell the truth–I’ve not the power of doing things and not regretting it. If I had, I could be lightning myself. Now I’m a fog.[49]

Hamsun explicitly identified the peasantry as the well-spring of a healthy culture, the embodiment of those ever-relevant values that contrast the values of decay represented by the city, the bourgeois, proletarianization, urbanization and industrialization:

A tiller of the ground, body and soul; a worker on the land without respite. A ghost risen out of the past to point the future, a man from the earliest days of cultivation, a settler in the wilds, nine hundred years old, and, withal, a man of the day.[50]

In the August Trilogy,[51] as in The Growth of the Soil and elsewhere, Hamsun had taken up the concerns of encroaching mechanization and cosmopolitanism, epitomized by the USA, and instead championed traditional values, such as those of localism and the rural. Nelson remarks that Hamsun was espousing an agrarian, anti-capitalist conservatism that was becoming popular among the literati in both Europe and America.

Quisling and Hitler

With such views forming over the course of decades, and achieving wide acclaim, Hamsun’s support for Quisling and for the German occupation of Norway during World War II, is consistent and principled within his historical and cultural context.

Hamsun disliked the British as much as the “Yankees” and the Bolsheviks. He had been appalled by the British war against the Boers, which he would surely have regarded as a war by a plutocratic power against an entire folk who epitomized a living remnant of the type portrayed by Isak in The Growth of The Soil.[52] He had also alluded to the “Jews”[53] as harbingers of modernism and cosmopolitanism.

In contrast to Britain, the USA and the USSR, National Socialist Germany claimed to champion the peasantry as the eternal well-spring of a healthy culture, very much in keeping with Hamsun’s views in The Growth of The Soil and elsewhere. This is why the National Socialists saw Hamsun as a fellow-traveler.

In 1933 Walther Darré, a widely recognized agricultural expert, had been appointed Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture, and also had the title “National Peasant Leader.” Goslar was named the “National Peasant City,” and pageants were held to honor the peasantry. Practical measures to deal with the crisis on the land were enacted immediately, including the Hereditary Farm Law, which protected the peasantry from foreclosure and ensured the family inheritance. [54]

Alfred Rosenberg, the primary National Socialist philosopher in Germany, had already paid tribute to Hamsun in his seminal Myth of the Twentieth Century (1930), with specific reference to The Growth of the Soil, as expressing the “mystical-natural will” of the peasant better than any other living artist:

No one knows why, with great effort, the farmer Isak cultivates one piece of land after another in god-forsaken regions, or why his wife has joined him and gives birth to his children. But Isak follows an inexplicable law. He carries on a fruitful quest out of a mystical primal will. At the end of his existence he will certainly look back in astonishment at the harvest of his activity. The Growth of the Soil is the great present day epic of the Nordic will in its eternal primordial form. Nordic man can be heroic even behind the wooden plow.[55]

Such was the background when in 1934 Hamsun wrote an article, “Wait and See,” in which he attacked the opponents of National Socialist Germany and asked if a return of Communists, Jews, and Bruning to Germany were preferable. In 1935 he sent a greeting to Der Norden, the organ of the Nordic Society, supporting the return of the League of Nations mandate, Saarland, to Germany, and from the start supported Germany privately and publicly wherever he felt able.[56] Hamsun and his wife Marie remained particularly close to the Nordic Society, which was avid in promoting Hamsun’s works.[57]

In April 1940 the Germans occupied Norway to secure the sea route, after the British had on several occasions breached Norwegian neutrality, included mining of Norway’s territorial waters, about which the Norwegian Government impotently protested. [58]

In 1933, former Defense Minister Vidkun Quisling had established his own party Nasjonal Samling (National Unification). Hamsun had formed a good impression of Quisling since 1932, and wrote in support of Nasjonal Samling’s electoral appeal in 1936 in the party newspaper Fritt Folk. His wife Marie was the local representative of the party.[59]

Ironically, Quisling, his very name becoming synonymous with “traitor,”[60] was the only politician who had campaigned before the war for a strong defense capability, and was particularly pro-British, having been honored by the British Government for looking after British interests in Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution, where he had been the principal aide to the celebrated Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who was directing the European Famine Relief to Russia in 1921, with Quisling serving as Secretary for the Relief Organization.[61]

Quisling sought an alliance of Nordic nations including Germany and Britain, in what he called a “Northern Coalition,” against Communism.[62]

The only strong resistance against the German invasion came from a garrison commanded by an officer who belonged to Quisling’s party. The King and Government quickly fled, leaving Norway without an administration or any voice to negotiate with the Germans.[63] Quisling, like Petain in France, and many other figures throughout Europe who were to be branded and usually executed as “traitors,” stepped in to fill the void as the only political figure willing to try and look after Norwegian interests under the occupation. He declared himself Minister President, but because he was not a pliant tool he did not enjoy the confidence of the German military authorities. He was soon forced to resign in favor of an administrative council under German control, but eventually regained a measure of authority.[64]

Meanwhile, Hamsun urged Norwegians to rally behind Quisling so that some form of sovereignty could be restored. He described Quisling as “more than a politician, he is a thinker, a constructive spirit.”[65]

Hamsun’s longest wartime article appeared in the German language Berlin-Tokyo-Rome periodical in February 1942, where he  wrote: “Europe does not want either the Jew or their gold, neither the Americans nor their country.”[66]

Despite Hamsun’s pro-German sentiment, he championed the rights of his countrymen, including those who resisted the German occupation. He attempted in intercede for the writer Ronald Fangen, and many others, who had been arrested by the Gestapo.[67]

In 1943 Hamsun and his wife accepted the invitation of Goebbels to visit Germany. Goebbels wrote of Hamsun as being “the embodiment of what an epic writer should be.” Hamsun was equally impressed with the Reich Minister and sent Goebbels the Nobel medal he had been awarded, which Goebbels accepted as Hamsun’s “expression of solidarity with our battle for a new Europe, and a happy society.”[68]

Whilst en route to Norway from Germany, Hamsun met Hitler, a meeting which did not go well, as Hamsun took the opportunity to condemn the military administration of Norway which had rendered Quisling powerless, and they parted in an unfriendly manner[69]

However, Hamsun continued to support Germany, and expressed his pride when a son, Arild,  joined the Norwegian Legion of the Waffen SS.[70]

In 1945  several strokes forced Hamsun to quiet his activities. But with Hitler’s death Hamsun defiantly wrote a tribute for the press:

I am not worthy to speak his name out loud. Nor do his life and his deeds warrant any kind of sentimental discussion. He was a warrior, a warrior of mankind, and a prophet of the gospel of justice for all nations. He was a reforming nature of the highest order, and his fate was to arise in a time of unparalleled barbarism, which finally failed him. Thus might the average western European regard Hitler? We, his closest supporters, now bow our heads at his death.[71]

Post-War Persecution

Membership of Quisling’s party was declared a criminal offense and Hamsun’s sons Tore and Arild[72] were among the first of  50,000 Norwegians to be arrested as “Nazis” (sic) or as “collaborators.”[73] Marie and Knut were arrested a few weeks later. Due to his age, at 86, Hamsun was sent to a hospital rather than to a prison, although the stress and treatment struck considerably at his still quite good health. He was defiant and stated to the authorities that he would have assisted the Germans more if he could.[74]

He was sent to an old folks home where he was a popular guest. However, prosecuting Norway’s leading cultural figure, like America’s dealings with Ezra Pound, was an  awkward matter. Consequently, Hamsun spent 119 days in a psychiatric clinic. The psychiatrists found in him, as in the characters of his novel’s, a complex interplay of traits, but the most prominent of all they described was his “absolute honesty.” The conclusion was that Hamsun was not insane but that he was mentally impaired. Hence, what Ferguson calls “an embarrassing situation,” given that Hamsun was “first and foremost [Norway’s] great writer, their national pride, a loved and admired and never quite respectable ancient child,” was dealt with by concluding that his support for Germany could be put down to “senility.” This was the party-line taken up by the press throughout the world.[75]

Reading  Hamsun’s post-war autobiographical On Overgrown Paths, written amidst the threats of prosecution and the interrogations, shows him to be perfectly lucid. Hamsun, as this last writing shows, although deaf and going blind, retained his mental faculties impressively, along with a certain fatalism and humor.[76]

Although the Attorney General opted not to proceed against Hamsun, the Crown wished to try him as a member of Nasjonal  Samling. To Hamsun the action at least meant that he was being officially acknowledged as of sound mind. He was fined 425,000 kroner.[77]

With ruinous fines hanging over them, the Hamsuns returned to their farm Norholm.[78] On appeal the fine was reduced to 325,000 kroner,[79] his persistence and courage in speaking on behalf of imprisoned Norwegians under the German Occupation being a mitigating factor. Tore was also fined, and his brother Arild was jailed until 1949 for his membership of the Norwegian Legion. Marie Hamsun was released from jail in 1948.[80]

On Overgrown Paths was published in 1949 and became an immediate best seller,[81] although Hamsun ended his days in poverty on his farm. He died in his sleep on February 19, 1952.

When the Robert Ferguson’s biography appeared in 1987, he wrote that while Norway is especially keen to honor its writers, “Hamsun’s life remains largely uncommemorated by officialdom.” [82] However, two decades later, in 2009:

In Norway, the 150th birthday of Knut Hamsun will be celebrated by theatrical exhibitions, productions, and an international conference. One of the main squares of Oslo, located just beside the national Opera, will henceforth bear his name. A monument will finally be erected in his honor. One might say that the Norwegians have just discovered the name of their very famous compatriot. Recently, a large number of towns and villages have named squares and streets for him. At the place where he resided, in Hamaroy, a “Knut Hamsun Center” will officially open on August 4th, the day of his birth. On that day, a special postage stamp will be issued. Yet Knut Hamsun was denounced and vilified for decades by the Norwegian establishment.[83]

Hamsun’s defiant commitment to Quisling and to Germany during the war was a logical conclusion to ideas that had been fermenting and widely read and applauded over a period of half a century. Yet when it came time to act on those ideals, of fighting materialism, plutocracy, and communism, for the restoration of rural and peasant values against the encroaching tide of industrialism and money, Hamsun’s fellow-countryman reacted with outrage. Hamsun, unlike some of the pre-war supporters of National Socialism or Fascism, for better or for worse, never did compromise his values.

Notes

[1] Robert Ferguson, Enigma: The Life of Knut Hamsun (London: Hutchinson, 1987), p. 300.

[2] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 301.

[3] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 13.

[4] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 21.

[5] Hamsun, The Enigmatic One, 1877.

[6] Hamsun, Bjorger, 1878.

[7] Richard C. Nelson, Knut Hamsun Remembers America: Essays and Stories: 1885–1949 (Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 2003), pp. 4–5.

[8] Knut Hamsun, “Letters from America,” Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 7.

[9] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 68.

[10] Hamsun, “The American Character,” Aftenposten, Christiania, Norway, January 21, 1885; Knut Hamsun Remembers America, pp. 17–18.

[11] Hamsun, “The American Character,” p. 19.

[12] Hamsun, “The American Character,” p. 14.

[13] Hamusn, “The American Character,” p. 20.

[14] Hamsun, “The American Character,” p. 21.

[15] Hamsun, “New York,” Aftenposten, February 12, 14, 1895; Knut Hamsun Remembers America, pp. 28–29.

[16] Hamsun, “New York,” p. 29.

[17] Hamsun, “New York,” p. 30.

[18] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 101.

[19] Hamsun, The Cultural Life of Modern America, 1889.

[20] Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 7.

[21] Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 9.

[22] Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 9.

[23] Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 10.

[24] Knut Hamsun Remembers America, p. 10.

[25] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 124.

[26] Hamsun, Mysteries, 1892.

[27] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 133.

[28] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 138.

[29] Hamsun, Shallow Soil, 1893.

[30] Josef Wiehr, Knut Hamsun: His personality and his outlook upon life (Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, 1922), p. 23.

[31] Wiehr, Knut Hamsun, p. 24.

[32] Hamsun, 1895–1896.

[33] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 164.

[34] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil (1920), Book I, Chapter 3. http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hamsun/knut/h23g/index.html

[35] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 4.

[36] It needs to be pointed out that by “race” Spengler did not a biological, or “Darwinistic” conception, but an instinct. “Race” means “duration of character,” including “an urge to permanence.” Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision, p. 220.

[37] Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision, p. 220.

[38] Oswald Spengler, The Hour of Decision, pp. 220–21.

[39]

[40] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 5.

[41] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 5.

[42] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 9.

[43] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 10.

[44] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Chapter 14.

[45] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Book II, Chapter 11.

[46] “Related to one another” in the sense that they express the analogous features of a culture in its “Spring” High Culture cycle and its “Winter” Late Civilization cycle respectively.

[47] Oswald Spengler, The Decline of The West, 1928 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971), Vol. 2, p. 102.

[48] The name of Isak’s farm.

[49] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Book II, Chapter 12.

[50] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Book II, Chapter 12.

[51] Hamsun, August, 1930.

[52] The Boers were–and partly remain–an anomaly in the modern world; the vestige of the bygone era who had to be eliminated as a hindrance to the global economic structure. Hence the recent ideological and economic war against the Afrikaner to destroy his “apartheid” was a continuation of the Boer Wars under other slogans, but with the same aim: to capture the wealth of southern Africa–in the name of “human rights”–for the sake of the same kind of plutocracy which had fought the Afrikaners’ forefathers a century previously.

[53] Hamsun, The Growth of the Soil, Book II, Chapter 12.

[54] Anna Bramwell, Blood and Soil: Walther Darré and Hitler’s Green Party (Buckinghmanshire: The Kensal Press, 1985), p. 91.

[55] Alfred Rosenberg, The Myth of the Twentieth Century, 1930 (Torrance, Cal.: The Noontide Press, 1982), p. 268.

[56] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 326.

[57] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 338.

[58] Ralph Hewins, Quisling: Prophet Without Honour (London: W. H. Allen, 1965), p. 201.

[59] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 333.

[60] Hewins, Quilsing, p. 9. Hewins, a wartime journalist, wrote his biography to amend for the part he had played in portraying Quisling as the epitome of “treason” (p. 11).

[61] Hewins, Quisling, p. 55.

[62] Vidkun Quilsing, Russia and Ourselves (London: Hodden and Stoughton, 1931), p. 275.

[63] Hewins, Quisling, p. 208.

[64] Hewins summarizes the situation when writing: “The whole myth of unprovoked aggression by Germany should be abandoned. It is incredible and does grievous injustice to the ‘quislings’ who are quite wrongly alleged to have engineered the German Occupation. There is no truth in this sinister legend” (Hewins, Quisling, p. 198).

[65] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 357.

[66] Hamsun, “Real Brotherhood,” Berlin-Tokyo-Rome, February 1942; Ferguson, Enigma, p. 351.

[67] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 359.

[68] Ferguson, Enigma, pp. 369–70.

[69] Ferguson, Enigma, pp. 374–75.

[70] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 383.

[71] Hamsun, “Adolf Hitler,” Aftenposten, May 7, 1945, p. 1

[72] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 387.

[73] Hewins, Quisling, pp. 357–58. Hewins notes that these thousands of Norwegians were jailed for years often without charge or trial, interrogated for eight hours a time, subjected to “eeling” (being dragged back and forth across broken stones), and a starvation diet of 800 calories a day. “Many prisoners died of malnutrition or starvation, and limbs swollen from privation were a commonplace. Hundreds, if not thousands, died of dysentery and tuberculosis epidemics. Hundreds more bear the scares of kicking, beating and brutality of their guards” (Hewins, pp. 357–58).

[74] Ferguson, Enigma, pp. 387–88.

[75] Ferguson, Enigma, pp. 389–90.

[76] Hamsun, On Overgrown Paths, 1949 (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968).

[77] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 407.

[78] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 408.

[79] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 409.

[80] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 410.

[81] On Overgrown Paths was also published simultaneously in German and Swedish editions. Ferguson, Enigma, p. 416.

[82] Ferguson, Enigma, p. 421.

[83] Robert Steuckers, “Knut Hamsun: Saved by Stalin?,” Counter Currents, http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/07/knut-hamsun-saved-by-stalin/ The title of the Steuckers article refers to Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Molotov having intervened in 1945 in favor of Hamsun, stating: “it would be regrettable to see Norway condemning this great writer to the gallows.”

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Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/08/knut-hamsun-2/

Tomislav Sunic on the European New Right

Tomislav Sunic on the European New Right

Towards a New World Order: Carl Schmitt's "The LandAppropriation of a New World"

 

Towards a New World Order: Carl Schmitt's "The Land Appropriation of a New World"

Gary Ulmen

Ex: http://freespeechproject.com/

 

The end of the Cold War and of the bipolar division of the world has posed again the question of a viable international law grounded in a new world order. This question was already urgent before WWI, given the decline of the ius publicum Europaeum at the end of the 19th century. It resurfaced again after WWII with the defeat of the Third Reich. If the 20th century is defined politically as the period beginning with the "Great War" in 1914 and ending with the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989, it may be seen as a long interval during which the question of a new world order was suspended primarily because of the confrontation and resulting stalemate between Wilsonianism and Leninism. Far from defining that period, as claimed by the last defenders of Left ideology now reconstituted as "anti-fascism," and despite their devastating impact at the time, within such a context fascism and Nazism end up automatically redimensioned primarily as epiphenomenal reactions of no lasting historical significance. In retrospect, they appear more and more as violent geopolitical answers to Wilsonianism's (and, to a lesser extent, Leninism's) failure to establish a new world order.

Both the League of Nations and the United Nations have sought to reconstitute international law and the nomos of the earth, but neither succeeded. What has passed for international law throughout the 20th century has been largely a transitory semblance rather than a true system of universally accepted rules governing international behavior. The geopolitical paralysis resulting from the unresolved conflict between the two superpowers created a balance of terror that provided the functional equivalent of a stable world order. But this state of affairs merely postponed coming to terms with the consequences of the collapse of the ius publicum Europaeum and the need to constitute a new world order. What is most significant about the end of the Cold War is not so much that it brought about a premature closure of the 20th century or a return to the geopolitical predicament obtaining before WWI, but that it has signaled the end of the modern age--evident in the eclipse of the nation state, the search for new political forms, the explosion of new types of conflicts, and radical changes in the nature of war. Given this state of affairs, today it may be easier to develop a new world order than at any time since the end of the last century.

At the beginning of the 20th century, Ernest Nys wrote that the discovery of the New World was historically unprecedented since it not only added an immense area to what Europeans thought the world was but unified the whole globe.(n1) It also resulted in the European equilibrium of land and sea that made possible the ius publicum Europaeum and a viable world order. In his "Introduction" to The Nomos of the Earth, Carl Schmitt observes that another event of this kind, such as the discovery of some new inhabitable planet able to trigger the creation of a new world order, is highly unlikely, which is why thinking "must once again be directed to the elemental orders of concrete terrestrial existence."(n2) Despite all the spatial exploration and the popular obsession with extra-terrestrial life, today there is no event in sight comparable to the discovery of a New World. Moreover, the end of the Cold War has paved the way for the further expansion of capitalism, economic globalization, and massive advances in communication technologies. Yet the imagination of those most concerned with these developments has failed so far to find any new alternatives to the prevailing thinking of the past decades.

Beyond the Cold War

The two most prominent recent attempts to prefigure a new world order adequate to contemporary political realities have been made by Francis Fukuyama and Samuel P. Huntington.(n3) Fukuyama thinks the West has not only won the Cold War but also brought about the end of history, while Huntington retreats to a kind of "bunker mentality" in view of an alleged decline of the West.(n4) While the one suffers from excessive optimism and the other from excessive pessimism, both fail primarily because they do not deal with the "elemental orders of concrete terrestrial existence" and troth remain trapped in an updated version of Wilsonianism assuming liberal democracy to be the highest achievement of Western culture. While Fukuyama wants to universalize liberal democracy in the global marketplace, If Huntington identifies liberalism with Western civilization. But Huntington is somewhat more realistic than Fukuyama. He not only acknowledges the impossibility of universalizing liberalism but exposes its particularistic nature. Thus he opts for a defense of Western civilization within an international helium omnium contra omnes. In the process, however, he invents an "American national identity" and extrapolates from the decline of liberal democracy to the decline of the West.

Fukuyama's thesis is derived from Alexandre Kojeve's Heideggerian reading of Hegel and supports the dubious notion that the last stage in human history will be a universal and homogeneous state of affairs satisfying all human needs. This prospect is predicated on the arbitrary assumption of the primacy of thymos--the desire for recognition--which both Kojeve and Fukuyama regard as the most fundamental human longing. Ultimately, according to Fukuyama, "Kojeve's claim that we are at the end of history . . . stands or falls on the strength of the assertion that the recognition provided by the contemporary liberal democratic state adequately satisfies the human desire for recognition."(n5) Fukuyama's own claim thus stands or falls on his assumption that at the end of history "there are no serious ideological competitors to liberal democracy."(n6) This conclusion is based on a whole series of highly dubious ideological assumptions, such as that "the logic of modern natural science would seem to dictate a universal evolution in the direction of capitalism"(n7) and that the desire for recognition "is the missing link between liberal economics and liberal politics."(n8)

According to Fukuyama, the 20th century has turned everyone into "historical pessimists."(n9) To reverse this state of affairs, he challenges "the pessimistic view of international relations . . . that goes variously under the titles 'realism,' realpolitik, or 'power politics'."(n10) He is apparently unaware of the difference between a pessimistic view of human nature, on which political realism is based, and a pessimistic view of international relations, never held by political realists such as Niccolo Machiavelli or Hans Morgenthau--two thinkers Fukuyama "analyzes" in order to "understand the impact of spreading democracy on international politics." As a "prescriptive doctrine," he finds the realist perspective on international relations still relevant. As a "descriptive model," however, it leaves much to be desired because: "There was no 'objective' national interest that provided a common thread to the behavior of states in different times and places, but a plurality of national interests defined by the principle of legitimacy in play and the individuals who interpreted it." This betrays a misunderstanding of political realism or, more plausibly, a deliberate attempt to misrepresent it in order to appear original. Although he draws different and even antithetical conclusions, Fukuyama's claim is not inconsistent with political realism.(n11)

Following this ploy, Fukuyama reiterates his main argument that: "Peace will arise instead out of the specific nature of democratic legitimacy, and its ability to satisfy the human longings for recognition."(n12) He is apparently unaware of the distinction between legality and legitimacy, and of the tendency within liberal democracies for legality to become its own mode of legitimation.(n13) Even in countries in which legality remains determined independently by a democratic legislative body, there is no reason to believe it will be concerned primarily or at all with satisfying any "human longing for recognition"; rather, it will pursue whatever goals the predominant culture deems desirable. Consequently, it does not necessarily follow that, were democratic legitimacy to become universalized with the end of the Cold War, international conflict would also end and history along with it. Even Fukuyama admits that: "For the foreseeable future, the world will be divided between a post-historical part, and a part that is still stuck in history. Within the post-historical part, the chief axis of interaction between states would be economic, and the old rules of power politics would have decreasing relevance."(n14)

This is nothing more than the reconfiguration of a standard liberal argument in a new metaphysical guise: the old historical world determined by politics will be displaced by the new post-historical world determined by economics. Schmitt rejected this argument in the 1920s: according to liberals, the "concept of the state should be determined by political means, the concept of society (in essence nonpolitical) by economic means," but this distinction is prejudiced by the liberal aversion to politics understood as a domain of domination and corruption resulting in the privileging of economics understood as "reciprocity of production and consumption, therefore mutuality, equality, justice, and freedom, and finally, nothing less than the spiritual union of fellowship, brotherhood, and justice."(n15) In effect, Fukuyama is simply recycling traditional liberal efforts to eliminate the political(n16)--a maneuver essential for his thesis of the arrival of "the end of history" with the end of the Cold War. Accordingly: "The United States and other liberal democracies will have to come to grips with the fact that, with the collapse of the communist world, the world in which they live is less and less the old one of geopolitics, and that the rules and methods of the historical world are not appropriate to life in the post-historical one. For the latter, the major issues will be economic."(n17) Responding to Walter Rathenau's claim in the 1920s that the destiny then was not politics but economics, Schmitt said "what has occurred is that economics has become political and thereby the destiny."(n18)

For Fukuyama, the old historical world is none other than the European world: "Imperialism and war were historically the product of aristocratic societies. If liberal democracy abolished the class distinction between masters and slaves by making the slaves their own masters, then it too should eventually abolish imperialism."(n19) This inference is based on a faulty analogy between social and international relations. Not surprisingly, Fukuyama really believes that "international law is merely domestic law writ large."(n20) Compounded with an uncritical belief in the theory of progress and teleological history, this leads him to generalize his own and Kojeve's questionable interpretation of the master-slave dialectic (understood as the logic of all social relations) to include international relations: "If the advent of the universal and homogeneous state means the establishment of rational recognition on the level of individuals living within one society, and the abolition of the relationship of lordship and bondage between them, then the spread of that type of state throughout the international system of states should imply the end of relationships of lordship and bondage between nations as well--i.e., the end of imperialism, and with it, a decrease in the likelihood of wars based on imperialism."(n21) Even if a "universal and homogeneous state" were possible today, in an age when all nation-states are becoming ethnically, racially, linguistically and culturally heterogeneous, it is unclear why domestic and international relations should be isomorphic. Rather, the opposite may very well be the case: increasing domestic heterogeneity is matched by an increasingly heterogeneous international scene where "the other" is not regarded as an equal but as "a paper tiger," "the Great Satan," "religious fanatics," etc.

At any rate, imperialism for Fukuyama is not a particular historical phenomenon which came about because of the discovery of the New World at the beginning of the age of exploration by the European powers. Rather, it is seen as the result of some metaphysical ahistorical "struggle for recognition among states."(n22) It "arises directly out of the aristocratic master's desire to be recognized as superior--his megalothymia."(n23) Ergo: "The persistence of imperialism and war after the great bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is therefore due not only to the survival of an atavistic warrior ethos, but also to the fact that the master's megalothymia was incompletely sublimated into economic activity."(n24) Thus the formal market relation between buyer and seller, both reduced to the level of the hyper-rational and calculating homo oeconomicus, comes to displace the master-slave dialectic whereby, miraculously, the interaction between these economic abstractions generates as much recognition as anyone would want, rendering conflict obsolete and putting an end to history.

In terms of Fukuyama's own formulation, the real end of history, as he understands it, is not even close. In his scenario, since there are still a lot of unresolved conflicts between the historical and the post-historical worlds, there will be a whole series of "world order" problems and "many post-historical countries will formulate an abstract interest in preventing the spread of certain technologies to the historical world, on the grounds that world will be most prone to conflict and violence."(n25) Although the failure of the League of Nations and the UN has led to the general discrediting of "Kantian internationalism and international law," in the final analysis, despite his Heideggerian Hegelianism, Fukuyama does not find the answer to the end of history in Hegel, Nietzsche or even Kojeve,(n26) but rather in Kant, who argued that the gains realized when man moved from the state of nature to civilization were largely nullified by wars between nations. According to Fukuyama, what has not been understood is that "the actual incarnations of the Kantian idea have been seriously flawed from the start by not following Kant's own precepts," by which he means that states based on republican principles are less likely than despotisms to accept the costs of war and that an international federation is only viable if it is based on liberal principles.

Although Huntington has a much better grasp of international relations than Fukuyama, his decline of the West scenario is equally unconvincing. The central theme of his book is that "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world."(n27) But whereas Fukuyama couches his thesis in terms of a universal desire for recognition, Huntington couches his thesis in terms of a global search for identity: "Peoples and nations are attempting to answer the most basic question humans can face: Who are we?"(n28) The result is a "multipolar and multi-civilizational" world within which the West should abandon its presumed universalism and defend its own particular identity: "In the clash of civilizations, Europe and America will hang together or hang separately. In the greater clash, the global 'real clash,' between Civilization and barbarism, the worlds great civilizations . . . will also hang together or hang separately. In the emerging era, clashes of civilizations are the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order based on civilizations is the surest safeguard against world war."(n29)

In Huntington's new world, "societies sharing civilizational affinities cooperate with each other."(n30) Leaving aside his cavalier blurring of the differences between cultures, civilizations and societies, what does Huntington regard as the essence of Western particularism? Here he is ambiguous: he first mentions Christianity, then some secular residues of Christianity, but when he adds up the civilizational core of the West it turns out to be none other than liberalism. As Stephen Holmes points out, it is "the same old ideology, plucked inexplicably from the waste-bin of history that once united the West against Soviet Communism."(n31) But Huntington also claims that the West had a distinct identity long before it was modern (since he insists that modernization is distinct from Westernization, so that non-Western societies can modernize without Westernizing, thus retaining their civilizational distinctiveness). In this case, however, the West cannot really be identified with liberalism, nor can its heritage be equated sic et nunc with "American national identity." While liberalism may very well be declining, this need not translate into a decline of the West as such. Similarly, if "American national identity" is threatened by "multiculturalism,"(n32) it need not signal the arrival of barbarians at the gates but may only mark another stage in the statist involution of liberalism. Huntington's fears of a decline of the West at a time when it is actually at the acme of its power and vigor is the result of the unwarranted identification of Western civilization with liberalism and what he understands by "American national identity." Today liberalism has degenerated into an opportunistic statist program of "a small but influential number of intellectuals and publicists," and "American national identity" into a fiction invented as part of a failed project after the War between the States to reconfigure the American federation into a nation-state.(n33)

According to Huntington? the assumption of the universality of Western culture is: false, because others civilizations have other ideals and norms; immoral, because "imperialism is the logical result of universalism"; and dangerous, because it could lead to major civilizational wars.(n34) His equation of universalism and imperialism, however, misses the point of both it misunderstands the philosophical foundations of Western culture and the historical roots of Western imperialism. Other civilizations do have their own ideals and norms, but only Western civilization has an outlook broad enough to embrace all other cultures, which explains why it can readily sponsor and accommodate even confused and counterproductive projects such as "multiculturalism." Of course, Europeans set forth on their journeys of discovery and conquest not only in order to bring Christianity and "civilization" to the world but also to plunder whatever riches they could find. But whatever the reasons, Europeans were the ones who opened the world to global consciousness and what Schmitt called "awakened occidental rationalism."

Until recently, largely because of American cultural hegemony and technological supremacy, the goal of the rest of the world has been "Westernization," which has come to be regarded as synonymous with modernization. In Huntington's "realist" view, however: "A universal civilization requires universal power. Roman power created a near universal civilization within the limited confines of the Classical world. Western power in the form of European colonialism in the nineteenth century and American hegemony in the twentieth century extended Western culture throughout much of the contemporary world. European colonialism is over; American hegemony is receding."(n35) The real question is whether continued American world hegemony is primarily a function of the persistence of colonialism. Despite his emphasis on culture and civilization, Huntington does not appreciate the importance of cultural hegemony.? Had he not restricted the Western tradition to late 20th century liberalism, he may have appreciated the extent to which the rest of the world is becoming increasingly more, rather than less dependent on the US--in communication technologies, financial matters and even aesthetic forms. Today the Internet is potentially a more formidable agency of cultural domination and control than was the British Navy at the peak of the Empire. Here McNeill is right: Huntington's gloomy perception of the decline of the West may merely mistake growing pains for death throes.

If Huntington's salon Spenglerianism were not bad enough, he also adopts a kind of simplistic Schmittianism (without ever mentioning Schmitt). Complementing his "birds of a feather flock together" concept of civilizations --with "core states" assuming a dominant position in relation to "fault line" states--he pictures an "us versus them" type of friend/enemy relations based on ethnic and religious identities. But Schmitt's friend/enemy antithesis is concerned with relations between political groups: first and foremost, states. Accordingly, any organized group that can distinguish between friends and enemies in an existential sense becomes thereby political. Unlike Huntington (or Kojeve, who also explicitly drew geopolitical lines primarily along religious lines(n36), Schmitt did not think in terms of ethnic or religious categories but rather territorial and geopolitical concepts. For Schmitt, the state was the greatest achievement of Western civilization because, as the main agency of secularization, it ended the religious civil wars of the Middle Ages by limiting war to a conflict between states.(n37) In view of the decline of the state, Schmitt analyzed political realities and provided a prognosis of possible future territorial aggregations and new types of political forms.

Huntington finds the "realist" school of international affairs "a highly useful starting point," but then proceeds to criticize a straw man version of it, according to which "all states perceive their interests in the same way and act in the same way." Against it, not only power but also "values, culture, and institutions pervasively influence how states define their interests.... In the post-Cold War world, states increasingly define their interests in civilizational terms."(n38) Had Huntington paid more careful attention to hans Morgenthau, George Kennan or other reputable political realists, he would have concluded that their concept of power is not as limited as his caricature of it. In particular, had he read Schmitt more closely he would not have claimed that nation-states "are and will remain the most important actors in world affairs"(n39)--at a time when economic globalization has severely eroded their former sovereignty and they are practically everywhere threatened with internal disintegration and new geopolitical organizations. At any rate, political realism has been concerned primarily with the behavior of states because they were the main subjects of political life for the past three centuries.(n40) If and when they are displaced by other political forms, political realism then shifts its focus accordingly.

Huntington attempts to think beyond the Cold War. But since he cannot think beyond the nation-state, he cannot conceive of new political forms. When he writes that cultural commonality "legitimates the leadership and order-imposing role of the core state for both member states and for the external powers and institutions,"(n41) he seems to have in mind something akin to the concept of GroBraum.(n42) But Schmitt's model was the American Monroe Doctrine excluding European meddling in the Western Hemisphere. At that time (and well into the 20th century), the US was not a nation-state in the European sense, although it assumed some of these trappings thereafter. Thus it generally followed George Washington's policy--because of the "detached and distant situation" of the US, it should avoid entangling alliances with foreign (primarily European) powers. The Monroe Doctrine simply expanded on the reality and advantages of this situation. Schmitt rightly saw the global line of the Western Hemisphere drawn by the Monroe Doctrine as the first major challenge to the international law of the ius publicum Europaeum.

Given the current understanding of national sovereignty, it is difficult to see what Huntington means by "core state." Despite the title of his book, he has no concept of international law or of world order. Not only does he abandon hope for global regulations governing the behavior of states and civilizations, but he reverts to a kind of anthropological primitivism: "Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes, and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale."(n43) All he can suggest for avoiding major inter-civilizational wars is the "abstention rule" (core states abstain from conflicts in other civilizations), and the "mediation rule" (core states negotiate with each other to halt fault line wars).(n44) Huntington's vision is thus surprisingly conformist--it merely cautions the US from becoming embroiled in the Realpolitik of countries belonging to other civilizational blocs while defending a contrived liberal notion of"Western" civilization.

Anti-Colonialism and Appropriation
The anti-colonialism of both Fukuyama and Huntington is consistent with the predominant 20th century ideology directed primarily against Europe. Anti-colonialism is more historically significant than either anti-fascism and anti-communism. As Schmitt pointed out in 1962: "Both in theory and practice, anti-colonialism has an ideological objective. Above all, it is propaganda--more specifically, anti-European propaganda. Most of the history of propaganda consists of propaganda campaigns which, unfortunately, began as internal European squabbles. First there was France's and England's anti-Spanish propaganda--the leyenda negra of the 15th and 16th centuries. Then this propaganda became generalized during the 18th century. Finally, in the historical view of Arnold Toynbee, a UN consultant, the whole of Europe is indicted as a world aggressor."(n45) Thus it is not surprising that the 500th anniversary of the "discovery" of America was greeted with more condemnation than celebration.(n46)

Anti-colonialism is primarily anti-European propaganda because it unduly castigates the European powers for having sponsored colonialism.(n47) Given that there was no international law forbidding the appropriation of the newly discovered lands--in fact, European international and ecclesiastical law made it legal and established rules for doing so--the moral and legal basis for this judgment is unclear. On closer analysis, however, it turns out to be none other than the West's own universalistic pretenses. Only by ontologizing their particular Western humanist morality--various versions of secularized Christianity--as universally valid for all times and all places can Western intellectuals indict colonialism after the fact as an international "crime." Worse yet, this indictment eventually turns into a wholesale condemnation of Western culture (branded as "Eurocentrism") from an abstract, deterritorialized and deracinated humanist perspective hypostatized to the level of a universally binding absolute morality. Thus the original impulse to vindicate the particularity and otherness of the victims of colonialism turns full circle by subsuming all within a foreign Western frame-work, thereby obliterating the otherness of the original victims. The ideology of anti-colonialism is thus not only anti-European propaganda but an invention of Europeans themselves, although it has been appropriated wholesale and politically customized by the rest of the world.

As for world order, this propaganda has even more fundamental roots: "The odium of colonialism, which today confronts all Europeans, is the odium of appropriation,"(n48) since now everything understood as nomos is allegedly concerned only with distribution and production, even though appropriation remains one of its fundamental, if not the most fundamental, attributes. As Schmitt notes: "World history is a history of progress in the means and methods of appropriation: from land appropriations of nomadic and agricultural-feudal times, to sea appropriations of the 16th and 17th centuries, to the industrial appropriations of the industrial-technical age and its distinction between developed and undeveloped areas, to the present day appropriations of air and space."(n49) More to the point, however, is that "until now, things have somehow been appropriated, distributed and produced. Prior to every legal, economic and social order, prior to every legal, economic or social theory, there is the simple question: Where and how was it appropriated? Where and how was it divided? Where and how was it produced ? But the sequence of these processes is the major problem. It has often changed in accordance with how appropriation, distribution and production are emphasized and evaluated practically and morally in human consciousness. The sequence and evaluation follow changes in historical situations and general world history, methods of production and manufacture--even the image human beings have of themselves, of their world and of their historical situation."(n50) Thus the odium of appropriation exemplified by the rise of anti-colonialism is symptomatic of a changed world situation and changed attitudes. But this state of affairs should not prevent our understanding of what occurred in the past or what is occurring in the present.

In order to dispel the "fog of this anti-European ideology," Schmitt recalls that "everything that can be called international law has for centuries been European international law. . . [and that] all the classical concepts of existing international law are those of European international law, the ius publicum Europaeum. In particular, these are the concepts of war and peace. as well as two fundamental conceptual distinctions: first, the distinction between war and peace, i.e., the exclusion of an in-between situation of neither war nor peace so characteristic of the Cold War; and second, the conceptual distinction between enemy and criminal, i.e. exclusion of the discrimination and criminalization of the opponent so characteristic of revolutionary war--a war closely tied to the Cold War."(n51) But Schmitt was more concerned with the "spatial" aspect of the phenomenon: "What remains of the classical ideas of international law has its roots in a purely Eurocentric spatial order. Anti-colonialism is a phenomenon related to its destruction.... Aside from ... the criminalization of European nations, it has not generated one single idea about a new order. Still rooted, if only negatively, in a spatial idea, it cannot positively propose even the beginning of a new spatial order."(n52)

Having discovered the world as a globe, Europeans also developed the Law of Nations. Hugo Grotius is usually credited with establishing this new discipline with his De lure belli ac pacts (Paris: 1625), since he was the first to deal with the subject as a whole (although various European scholars had dealt at length with themes such as the justice of war, the right of plunder, the treatment of captives, etc.). Nys writes: ". . . from the I 1th to the 1 2th century the genius of Europe developed an association of republics, principalities and kingdoms, which was the beginning of the society of nations. Undoubtedly, some elements of it had been borrowed from Greek and Roman antiquity, from Byzantine institutions, from the Arabo-Berber sultanates on the coast of Africa and from the Moorish kingdoms of Spain. But at the time new sentiments developed, longing for political liberty. The members of this association were united by religious bonds; they had the same faith; they were not widely separated by speech and, at any rate, they had access to Latin, the language of the Church; they admitted a certain equality or at least none of them claimed the right to dominate and rule over the others. A formula came into use to describe this state of affairs: respublica a Christiana, res Christina."(n53)

Steeped in Roman law, 1 3th and 1 4th century jurists opposed any "Law of Nations" recognizing political distinctions between different peoples. In the Roman system, different peoples were only "parts of the Roman Empire." Thus, in a wider sense, ius gentium extended to all civilized peoples and included both public and private law. In a narrower sense, however, it also dealt with the rules governing relations between Romans and foreigners. Understood in this narrower sense, ius gentium promoted the constitution of distinct peoples and consequently kingdoms, intercourse and conflicts between different political communities, and ultimately wars. For this reason, those who still believed in the viability of the Holy Roman Empire thought that this interpretation of ius gentium led to disintegration. This is why the Law of Nations--European public law and international law--did not become a distinct "science" until the Middle Ages.

Spanish theologians first articulated the theoretical and practical problems of ius gentium understood as the Law of Nations. Chief among them was Francisco de Vitoria, whose Relectiones theologicae on the Indians and the right of a "just war" have become classics.(n54) In his lectures, Vitoria invokes the Law of Nations--the ius gentium. At the beginning of the third section of his account of the Spaniards' relations with the aborigines in the New World, he treats them as one people among others, and therefore subject to ius gentium: "The Spaniards have a right to travel into the lands in question and to sojourn there, provided they do no harm to the natives, and the natives may not prevent them. Proof of this may in the first place be derived from the law of nations (ius gentium), which either is natural law or is derived from natural law."(n55) That he understands peoples in the sense of "nations" becomes even more clear when he speaks about gentes nationes. He distinguishes between the political community--the respublica--and the private individual. The latter may defend his person and his property, but he may not avenge wrongs or retake goods after the passage of time. This is the respublica's prerogative--it alone has authority to defend itself and its members. Here Vitoria identifies the prince's authority with that of the state: "The prince is the issue of the election made by the respublica.... The state, properly so called, is a perfect community, that is to say, a community which forms a whole in itself, which, in other words, is not a part of another community, but which possesses its own laws, its own council, its own magistrates."(n56)

Clearly, what developed in Europe from antiquity to the respublica Christiana, from the origin of the sovereign state and ius publicum Europaeum to the Enlightenment and beyond, was as unique and significant as the discovery of the "New World." Yet, given today's predominant ideology, European culture has almost become the truth that dare not speak its name. Not only is Columbus demonized, but the whole Age of Discovery and all of European (Western) culture is dismissed as "imperialistic," "racist?" "sexist," etc. The Nomos of the Earth is a much needed antidote to this anti-European propaganda, which is only a symptom of the crisis of European identity and consciousness.(n57) All the major themes of Schmitt's book are either implicit or explicit in "The Land Appropriation of a New World": the origin and significance of the European and Eurocentric epoch of world history; the discovery of the New World and the American challenge to the European order; the search for a new nomos of the earth; the critique of the discriminatory concept of war; the critique of universalism and the danger of total relativism.

The Conquest of America and the Concept of a "Just War"

In the 20th century, the ideology of anti-colonialism was articulated most prominently by Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin, signaling the end of European domination in world history. Now, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of communism, some American intellectuals have turned this anti-European propaganda against the US, seemingly unaware that their critique is possible only within the orbit of the European culture they otherwise castigate and dismiss. To attack European culture is tantamount to attacking American culture as well, since the latter is but a special case of the former, which is precisely why it has been able to accept and absorb peoples and influences not only from the Western hemisphere but from all over the world. American universalism is but an extension of that same Christian universalism which for centuries has defined European identity. As Schmitt emphasized, the European equilibrium of the ius publicum Europaeum presupposed a seemingly homogeneous Christian Europe, which lasted well into the 19th century. The American project has always been a fundamentally heterogeneous undertaking and Americans have always come from the most diverse ethnic, racial, religious and linguistic backgrounds. But if there had not been some homogeneous culture to unity this diversity, there would have been no distinct American culture which, unfortunately, today many educated Europeans and Americans no longer understand and therefore have come to despise.

A paradigmatic example of this general anti-European syndrome is Tzvetan Todorov's The Conquest of America. In an effort to vindicate the particularity of "the other," the author ends up castigating West European culture as a whole by deploying a secularized version of Christian universalism. Openly acknowledging the moralistic objectives and "mythological" character of his account,(n58) Todorov develops a "politically correct" postmodern interpretation of the Spanish conquista not to understand its historical significance but to show how it has shaped today's Western imperialist identity--one allegedly still unable to come to terms with "the other" and therefore inherently racist, ethnocentric, etc. The book closes with a discussion of "Las Casas' Prophesy" concerning the wrath that "God will vent" not only upon Spain but all of Western Europe because of its "impious, criminal and ignominious deeds perpetrated so unjustly, tyrannically and barbarously."(n59)

Todorov overlooks not only the generally religious framework of Las Casas' prophesy, but also the idiosyncratically Western concept of justice the Dominican bishop deployed. Having ontologized a humanism derived from the Western axiological patrimony, he does not realize the extent to which his postmodernism has already reduced "the other" to "the same," precisely in his effort to vindicate its particularity.(n60) Worse yet, inhibited by his "politically correct" moralism, he not only provides a ridiculous, if academically fashionable, explanation for the Spaniards' success,(n61) but he manages to subvert his own arguments with the very evidence he adduces to support them. He claims that the "present" is more important to him than the past, but in defining genocide he makes no reference whatsoever to either the Armenians or the Holocaust as reference points. Consequently, his claim that "the sixteenth century perpetuated the greatest genocide in human history"(n62) remains not only unsubstantiated but falsified. By his own account, most of the victims died of diseases and other indirect causes: "The Spaniards did not undertake a direct extermination of these millions of Indians, nor could they have done so." The main causes were three, and "the Spaniards responsibility is inversely proportional to the number of victims deriving from each of them: 1. By direct murder, during wars or outside them: a high number, nonetheless relatively small; direct responsibility. 2. By consequence of bad treatment: a high number; a (barely) less direct responsibility. 3. By diseases, by `microbe shock': the majority of the population; an indirect and diffused responsibility."(n63)

Todorov does acknowledge that Columbus was motivated by the "universal victory of Christianity" and that it was Columbus' medieval mentality that led him "to discover America and inaugurate the modern era."(n64) His greatest infraction, however, was that he conquered land rather than people, i.e., he was more interested in nature than in the Indians, which he is treated as "the other", "Columbus summary perception of the Indians [is] a mixture of authoritarianism and condescension . . . In Columus' hermeneutics human beings have no particular place."(n65) Had Todorov set aside his abstract moralizing, he may have realized that the conquest of the New World was primarily a land appropriation. It is not surprising, therefore, that the conquerors thought they were bringing "civilization" to those they conquered--something probably also true of the Mongols who invaded and colonized China, Russia and a few other which, by contrast, had higher than thier own.

The ideological slant of The Conquest of America is by no means unusual. Long before, Schmitt noted that non-European peoples who have undertaken conquest, land appropriations, etc. were not being tarred with the same brush as Europeans.(n66) Unlike Todorov's moralistic tirade, The Nomos of the Earth is dressed to historians and jurists. In no ways does Schmitt excuse the atrocities committed by the Spanish, but rather explains how they were possible in the given circumstances. "The Land Appropriation of a New World" begins with a discussion of the lines drawn by the European powers to divide the world. In this connection, Schmitt discusses the meaning of "beyond the line," which meant beyondn the reach of European law: " At this`line' Europe ended and `New World' began. At any rate, European law -- `European public law' -- ended. Consequently, so did the bracketing of war achieved by the former European international law, meaning the struggle for land appropriations knew no bounds. Beyond the line was an `overseas' zone in which, for want of any legal limits to war, only, the law of the stronger applied."n(67) For Todorov, it is a much simpler explanation: "Far from central government, far from royal law, all prohibitions give way, the social link, already loosened, snaps, revealing not a primitive nature, the beast sleeping in each of us, but a modern being? one with a great future in fact, restrained by no morality and inflicting death because and when he pleases."(n68) The Spaniards are simply racist, ethno-centric, ruthless exploiters, etc., i.e., modern -- they already exhibited traits Todorov claims are characteristic of Western identity.

Of particular interest here are Todorov's comments on Vitoria and the concept of a "just war," since most of Schmitt's chapter is devoted to these subjects. By his own admission, Todorov mixes (in fact, confuses) medieval and modern categories. This is particularly true in the case of Vitoria. Todorov observes that: "Vitoria demolishes the contemporary justifications of the wars waged in America, but nonetheless conceives that `just wars' are possible."(n69) More to the point: "We are accustomed to seeing Vitoria as a defender of the Indians; but if we question, not the subject's intentions, hut the impact of his discourses, it is clear that . . . under the cover of an international law based on reciprocity, he in reality supplies a legal basis to the wars of colonization which had hitherto had none (none which, in any case, might withstand serious consideration)."(n70) But there was no "international law based on reciprocity." Here Todorov is simply transposing modern categories to medieval matters for his own ideological purposes.

Unlike Todorov, Schmitt places the problem in perspective: "For 400 years, from the 16th to the 20th century, the structure of European international law was determined by a fundamental course of events the conquest of the New World. Then, as later, there were numerous positions taken with respect to the justice or injustice of the conquista. Nevertheless, the fundamental problem the justification of European land appropriations as a whole -- was seldom addressed in any systematic way outside moral and legal questions. In fact, only one monograph deals with this problem systematically and confronts it squarely in terms of international law.... It is the famous relectiones of Francisco de Vitoria."(n71) Vitoria rejected the contrary opinions of other theologians and treated Christians and non-Christians alike. He did not even accept discovery, which was the recognized basis of legal title from the 1 6th to the 1 8th century, as legitimate. More to the point, he considered global lines beyond which the distinction between justice and injustice was suspended not only a sin but an appalling crime. However: "Vitoria's view of the conquista was ultimately altogether positive. Most significant for him was the fait accompli of Christianization. . . . The positive conclusion is reached only by means of general concepts and with the aid of objective arguments in support of a just war.... If barbarians opposed the right of free passage and free missions, of liberum commercium and free propaganda, then they would violate the existing rights of the Spanish according to ius gentium; if the peaceful treaties of the Spanish were of no avail, then they had grounds for a just war."(n72)

The papal missionary mandate was the legal foundation of the conquista. This was not only the pope's position but also that of the Catholic rulers of Spain. Vitoria's arguments were entirely consistent with the spatial order and the international law of the respublica Christiana. One cannot apply modern categories to a medieval context without distorting both: "In the Middle Ages, a just war could he a just war of aggression. Clearly, the formal structure of the two concepts of justice are completely different. As far as the substance of medieval justice is concerned, however, it should be remembered that Vitoria's doctrine of a just war is argued on the basis of a missionary mandate issued by a potestas spiritualis that was not only institutionally stable but intellectually self-evident. The right of liberum commercium as well as the ius peregrinandi are to facilitate the work of Christian missions and the execution of the papal missionary mandate.... Here we are interested only in the justification of land appropriation--a question Vitoria reduced to the general problem of a just war. All significant questions of an order based on international law ultimately meet in the concept of a just war."(n73)

 

 

The Question of a New Nomos of the Earth

Following chapters on "The Land Appropriation of a New World" and "The Ius Publicum Europaeum," Schmitt concludes his book with a chapter titled "The Question of a New Nomos of the Earth, which is concerned primarily with the transformation of the concept of war. Clearly, this problem was uppermost in Schmitt's mind following Germany's total defeat in WWII and the final destruction of the European system of states. But he had already devoted a treatise to the development of a discriminatory concept of war following WWI,(n74) and in 1945 he wrote a legal opinion on the criminality of aggressive war.(n75) Despite whatever self-serving motives he may have had in writing these works,(n76) they are consistent with the historical and juridical structure of international law during the respublica Christiana, the ius publicum Europaeum, and what remains of international law today.

This progression can be put into perspective by following Schmitt's discussion of Vitoria's legacy: "Vitoria was in no sense one of the `forerunners of modern lawyers dealing with constitutional questions.'. . . Abstracted entirely from spatial viewpoints, Vitoria's ahistorical method generalizes many European historical concepts specific to the ius gentium of the Middle Ages (such as yolk prince and war) and thereby strips them of their historical particularity."(n77) In this context, Schmitt mentions the works of Ernest Nys, which paved the way for the popularization of Vitoria's ideas after WWI but who, because of his belief in humanitarian progress, also contributed to the criminalization of aggressive war. This was also true of James Brown Scott, the leading American expert on international law, who blatantly instrumentalized Vitoria's doctrines concerning free trade (liberum commercium, the freedom of propaganda, and a just war) to justify American economic imperialism. Schmitt sums up Sctott's argument as follows: "War should cease to be simply a legally recognized matter or only one of legal indifference; rather, it should again become a just war in which the aggressor as such is declared a felon in the full criminal sense of the word. The former right to neutrality, grounded in the international law of the ius publicum Europaeum and based on the equivalence of just and unjust war, should also and accordingly be eliminated."(n78)

Here then is the crux of the matter. Vitoria's thinking is based on the international law obtaining during the Christian Middle Ages rather than on the international law between states established with the ius publicum Europaeum. Moreover, as Schmitt points out, Vitoria was not a jurist but a theologian: "Based on relations between states, post-medieval international law from the 1 6th to the 20th century sought to repress the iusta causa. The formal reference point for the determination of a just war was no longer the authority of the Church in international law but rather the equal sovereignty of states. Instead of iusta causa, the order of international law between states was based on iustus hostis; any war between states, between equal sovereigns, was legitimate. On the basis of this juridical formalization, a rationalization and humanization--a bracketing--of war was achieved for 200 years." The turn to "the modern age in the history of international law was accomplished by a dual division of two lines of thought that were inseparable in the Middle Ages -- the definitive separation of moral-theological from juridical-political arguments and the equally important separation of the question of iusta causa, grounded in moral arguments and natural law," from the juridical question of iustus hostis, distinguished from the criminal, i.e., from object of punitive action."(n79)

With the end of the ius publicum Europaeum, the concept of war changed once again: moralistic (rather than theologically-based) arguments became confused with political arguments, and the iusta causa displaced the just enemy (iustus hostis). Accordingly, war became a crime and the aggressor a criminal, which means that the current distinction between just and unjust war lacks any relation to Vitoria and does not even attempt to determine the iusta causa.(n80) According to Schmitt: "If today some formulas of the doctrine of a just war rooted in the concrete order of the medieval respublica Christiana are utilized in modern and global formulas, this does not signify a return to, but rather a fundamental transformation of concepts of enemy, war, concrete order and justice presupposed in medieval doctrine."(n81) This transformation is crucial to any consideration of a new nomos of the earth because these concepts must be rooted in a concrete order. Lacking such an order or nomos, these free-floating concepts do not constitute institutional standards but have only the value of ideological slogans.

Unimpressed with the duration of the Cold War and its mixture of neither war nor peace, Schmitt speculated on the possibility of the eventual development of what he called GroBetaraume(n82) -- larger spatial entities, similar to but not synonymous with federations or blocs --displacing states and constituting a new nomos.(n83) Since his death in 1985 and the subsequent collapse of communism, the likelihood of his diagnosis and prognosis has increased. While the international situation remains confused and leading intellectuals such as Fukuyama and Huntington, unable to think behind predominant liberal democratic categories, can only recycle new versions of the old Wilsonianism, Schmitt's vision of a world of GroBetaraume as a new geopolitical configuration may well be in the process of being realized.

Carl Schmitt's Decisionism

Carl Schmitt's Decisionism

Paul Hirst

Ex: http://freespeechproject.com/

 

Since 1945 Western nations have witnessed a dramatic reduction in the variety of positions in political theory and jurisprudence. Political argument has been virtually reduced to contests within liberal-democratic theory. Even radicals now take representative democracy as their unquestioned point of departure. There are, of course, some benefits following from this restriction of political debate. Fascist, Nazi and Stalinist political ideologies are now beyond the pale. But the hegemony of liberal-democratic political agreement tends to obscure the fact that we are thinking in terms which were already obsolete at the end of the nineteenth century.

Nazism and Stalinism frightened Western politicians into a strict adherence to liberal democracy. Political discussion remains excessively rigid, even though the liberal-democratic view of politics is grossly at odds with our political condition. Conservative theorists like Hayek try to re-create idealized political conditions of the mid nineteenth century. In so doing, they lend themselves to some of the most unsavoury interests of the late twentieth century - those determined to exploit the present undemocratic political condition. Social-democratic theorists also avoid the central question of how to ensure public accountability of big government. Many radicals see liberal democracy as a means to reform, rather than as what needs to be reformed. They attempt to extend governmental action, without devising new means of controlling governmental agencies. New Right thinkers have reinforced the situation by pitting classical liberalism against democracy, individual rights against an interventionist state. There are no challenges to representative democracy, only attempts to restrict its functions. The democratic state continues to be seen as a sovereign public power able to assure public peace.

The terms of debate have not always been so restricted. In the first three decades of this century, liberal-democratic theory and the notion of popular sovereignty through representative government were widely challenged by many groups. Much of this challenge, of course, was demagogic rhetoric presented on behalf of absurd doctrines of social reorganization. The anti-liberal criticism of Sorel, Maurras or Mussolini may be occassionally intriguing, but their alternatives are poisonous and fortunately, no longer have a place in contemporary political discussion. The same can be said of much of the ultra-leftist and communist political theory of this period.

Other arguments are dismissed only at a cost. The one I will consider here - Carl Schmitt's 'decisionism' - challenges the liberal-democratic theory of sovereignty in a way that throws considerable light on contemporary political conditions. His political theory before the Nazi seizure of power shared some assumptions with fascist political doctrine and he did attempt to become the 'crown jurist' of the new Nazi state. Nevertheless, Schmitt's work asks hard questions and points to aspects of political life too uncomfortable to ignore. Because his thinking about concrete political situations is not governed by any dogmatic political alternative, it exhibits a peculiar objectivity.

Schmitt's situational judgement stems from his view of politics or, more correctly, from his view of the political as 'friend-enemy' relations, which explains how he could change suddenly from contempt for Hitler to endorsing Nazism. If it is nihilistic to lack substantial ethical standards beyond politics, then Schmitt is a nihilist. In this, however, he is in the company of many modern political thinkers. What led him to collaborate with the Nazis from March 1933 to December 1936 was not, however, ethical nihilism, but above all concern with order. Along with many German conservatives, Schmitt saw the choice as either Hitler or chaos. As it turned out, he saved his life but lost his reputation. He lived in disrepute in the later years of the Third Reich, and died in ignominy in the Federal Republic. But political thought should not be evaluated on the basis of the authors' personal political judgements. Thus the value of Schmitt's work is not diminished by the choices he made.

Schmitt's main targets are the liberal-constitutional theory of the state and the parliamentarist conception of politics. In the former, the state is subordinated to law; it becomes the executor of purposes determined by a representative legislative assembly. In the latter, politics is dominated by 'discussion,' by the free deliberation of representatives in the assembly. Schmitt considers nineteenth-century liberal democracy anti-political and rendered impotent by a rule-bound legalism, a rationalistic concept of political debate, and the desire that individual citizens enjoy a legally guaranteed 'private' sphere protected from the state. The political is none of these things. Its essence is struggle.

In The Concept of the Political Schmitt argues that the differentia specifica of the political, which separates it from other spheres of life, such as religion or economics, is friend-enemy relations. The political comes into being when groups are placed in a relation of emnity, where each comes to perceive the other as an irreconcilable adversary to be fought and, if possible, defeated. Such relations exhibit an existential logic which overrides the motives which may have brought groups to this point. Each group now faces an opponent, and must take account of that fact: 'Every religious, moral, economic, ethical, or other antithesis transforms itself into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friends and enemy.' The political consists not in war or armed conflict as such, but precisely in the relation of emnity: not competition but confrontation. It is bound by no law: it is prior to no law.

For Schmitt: 'The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political.' States arise as a means of continuing, organizing and channeling political struggle. It is political struggle which gives rise to political order. Any entity involved in friend-enemy relations is by definition political, whatever its origin or the origin of the differences leading to emnity: 'A religious community which wages wars against members of others religious communities or engages in other wars is already more than a religious community; it is a political entity.' The political condition arises from the struggle of groups; internal order is imposed to pursue external conflict. To view the state as the settled and orderly administration of a territory, concerned with the organization of its affairs according to law, is to see only the stabilized results of conflict. It is also to ignore the fact that the state stands in a relation of emnity to other states, that it holds its territory by means of armed force and that, on this basis of a monopoly of force, it can make claims to be the lawful government of that territory. The peaceful, legalistic, liberal bourgeoisie is sitting on a volcano and ignoring the fact. Their world depends on a relative stabilization of conflict within the state, and on the state's ability to keep at bay other potentially hostile states.

For Hobbes, the political state arises from a contract to submit to a sovereign who will put an end to the war of all against all which must otherwise prevail in a state of nature - an exchange of obediance for protection. Schmitt starts where Hobbes leaves off - with the natural condition between organized and competing groups or states. No amount of discussion, compromise or exhortation can settle issues between enemies. There can be no genuine agreement, because in the end there is nothing to agree about. Dominated as it is by the friend-enemy alternative, the political requires not discussion but decision. No amount of reflection can change an issue which is so existentially primitive that it precludes it. Speeches and motions in assemblies should not be contraposed to blood and iron but with the moral force of the decision, because vacillating parliamentarians can also cause considerable bloodshed.

In Schmitt's view, parliamentarism and liberalism existed in a particular historical epoch between the 'absolute' state of the seventeenth century and the 'total state' of the twentieth century. Parliamentary discussion and a liberal 'private sphere' presupposed the depoliticization of a large area of social, economic and cultural life. The state provided a legally codified order within which social customs, economic competition, religious beliefs, and so on, could be pursued without becoming 'political.' 'Politics' as such ceases to be exclusively the atter of the state when 'state and society penetrate each other.' The modern 'total state' breaks down the depoliticization on which such a narrow view of politics could rest:

 

Heretofore ostensibly neutral domains - religion, culture, education, the economy - then cease to be neutral. . . Against such neutralizations and depoliticizations of important domains appears the total state, which potentially embraces every domain. This results in the identity of the state and society. In such a state. . . everything is at least potentially political, and in referring to the state it is no longer possible to assert for it a specifically political characteristic.

 

Democracy and liberalism are fundamentally antagonistic. Democracy does away with the depoliticizations characteristic of rule by a narrow bourgeois stratum insulated from popular demands. Mass politics means a broadening of the agenda to include the affairs of all society - everything is potentially political. Mass politics also threatens existing forms of legal order. The politicization of all domains increases pressure on the state by multiplying the competing interests demanding action; at the same time, the function of the liberal legal framework - the regulating of the 'private sphere' - become inadequate. Once all social affairs become political, the existing constitutional framework threatens the social order: politics becomes a contest of organized parties seeking to prevail rather than to acheive reconciliation. The result is a state bound by law to allow every party an 'equal chance' for power: a weak state threatened with dissolution.

Schmitt may be an authoritarian conservative. But his diagnosis of the defects of parliamentarism and liberalism is an objective analysis rather than a mere restatement of value preferences. His concept of 'sovereignty' is challenging because it forces us to think very carefully about the conjuring trick which is 'law.' Liberalism tries to make the state subject to law. Laws are lawful if properly enacted according to set procedures; hence the 'rule of law.' In much liberal-democratic constitutional doctrine the legislature is held to be 'sovereign': it derives its law-making power from the will of the people expressed through their 'representatives.' Liberalism relies on a constituting political moment in order that the 'sovereignty' implied in democratic legislatures be unable to modify at will not only specific laws but also law-making processes. It is therefore threatened by a condition of politics which converts the 'rule of law' into a merely formal doctrine. If this 'rule of law' is simply the people's will expressed through their representatives, then it has no determinate content and the state is no longer substantially bound by law in its actions.

Classical liberalism implies a highly conservative version of the rule of law and a sovereignty limited by a constitutive political act beyond the reach of normal politics. Democracy threatens the parliamentary-constitutional regime with a boundless sovereign power claimed in the name of the 'people.' This reveals that all legal orders have an 'outside'; they rest on a political condition which is prior to and not bound by the law. A constitution can survive only if the constituting political act is upheld by some political power. The 'people' exist only in the claims of that tiny minority (their 'representatives') which functions as a 'majority' in the legislative assembly. 'Sovereignty' is thus not a matter of formal constitutional doctrine or essentially hypocritical references to the 'people'; it is a matter of determining which particular agency has the capacity - outside of law - to impose an order which, because it is political, can become legal.

Schmitt's analysis cuts through three hundred years of political theory and public law doctrine to define sovereignty in a way that renders irrelevant the endless debates about principles of political organization or the formal constitutional powers of different bodies.

 

From a practical or theoretical perspective, it really does not matter whether an abstract scheme advanced to define sovereignty (namely, that sovereignty is the highest power, not a derived power) is acceptable. About an abstract concept there will be no argument. . . What is argued about is the concrete application, and that means who decides in a situation of conflict what constitutes the public interest or interest of the state, public safety and order, le salut public, and so on. The exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like, but it cannot be circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.

 

Brutally put: ' Sovereign is he who decides on the exception.' The sovereign is a definite agency capable of making a decision, not a legitimating category (the 'people') or a purely formal definition (plentitude of power, etc.). Sovereignty is outside the law, since the actions of the sovereign in the state of exception cannot be bound by laws since laws presuppose a normal situation. To claim that this is anti-legal is to ignore the fact that all laws have an outside, that they exist because of a substantiated claim on the part of some agency to be the dominant source of binding rules within a territory. The sovereign determines the possibility of the 'rule of law' by deciding on the exception: 'For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation must exist, and he is sovereign who definitely decides whether this normal situation actually exists.'

Schmitt's concept of the exception is neither nihilistic nor anarchistic, it is concerned with the preservation of the state and the defence of legitimately constituted government and the stable institutions of society. He argues that ' the exception is different from anarchy and chaos.' It is an attempt to restore order in a political sense. While the state of exception can know no norms, the actions of the sovereign within the state must be governed by what is prudent to restore order. Barbaric excess and pure arbitrary power are not Schmitt's objecty. power is limited by a prudent concern for the social order; in the exception, 'order in the juristic sense still prevails, even if it is not of the ordinary kind.' Schmitt may be a relativist with regard to ultimate values in politics. But he is certainly a conservative concerned with defending a political framework in which the 'concrete orders' of society can be preserved, which distinguishes his thinking from both fascism and Nazism in their subordination of all social institutions to such idealized entities as the Leader and the People. For Schmitt, the exception is never the rule, as it is with fascism and Nazism. If he persists in demonstrating how law depends on politics, the norm on the exception, stability on struggle, he points up the contrary illusions of fascism and Nazism. In fact, Schmitt's work can be used as a critique of both. The ruthless logic in his analsysis of the political, the nature of soveriegnty, and the exception demonstrates the irrationality of fascism and Nazism. The exception cannot be made the rule in the 'total state' without reducing society to such a disorder through the political actions of the mass party that the very survival of the state is threatened. The Nazi state sought war as the highest goal in politics, but conducted its affairs in such a chaotic way that its war-making capacity was undermined and its war aims became fatally overextended. Schmitt's friend-enemy thesis is concerned with avoiding the danger that the logic of the political will reach its conclusion in unlimited war.

Schmitt modernizes the absolutist doctrines of Bodin and Hobbes. His jurisprudence restores - in the exception rather than the norm - the sovereign as uncommanded commander. For Hobbes, lawas are orders given by those with authority - authoritas non veritas facit legem. Confronted with complex systems of procedural limitation in public law and with the formalization of law into a system, laws become far more complex than orders. Modern legal positivism could point to a normal liberal-parliamentary legal order which did and still does appear to contradict Hobbes. Even in the somewhat modernized form of John Austin, the Hobbesian view of sovereignty is rejected on all sides. Schmitt shared neither the simplistic view of Hobbes that this implies, nor the indifference of modern legal positivism to the political foundation of law. He founded his jurisprudence neither on the normal workings of the legal order nor on the formal niceties of constitutional doctrine, but on a condition quite alien to them. 'Normalcy' rests not on legal or constitutional conditions but on a certain balance of political forces, a certain capacity of the state to impose order by force should the need arise. This is especially true of liberal-parliamentary regimes, whose public law requires stablization of political conflicts and considerable police and war powers even to begin to have the slightest chance of functioning at all. Law cannot itself form a completely rational and lawful system; the analysis of the state must make reference to those agencies which have the capacity to decide on the state of exception and not merely a formal plentitude of power.

In Political Theology Schmitt claims that the concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts. This is obvious in the case of the concept of sovereignty, wherein the omnipotent lawgiver is a mundane version of an all-powerful God. He argues that liberalism and parliamentarism correspond to deist views of God's action through constant and general natural laws. His own view is a form of fundamentalism in which the exception plays the same role in relation to the state as the miracles of Jesus do in confirming the Gospel. The exception reveals the legally unlimited capacity of whoever is sovereign within the state. In conventional, liberal-democratic doctrine the people are sovereign; their will is expressed through representatives. Schmitt argues that modern democracy is a form of populism in that the people are mobilized by propaganda and organized interests. Such a democracy bases legitimacy on the people's will. Thus parliament exists on the sufferance of political parties, propaganda agencies and organized interest which compete for popular 'consent.' When parliamentary forms and the rule of 'law' become inadequate to the political situation, they will be dispensed with in the name of the people: 'No other constitutional institution can withstand the sole criterion of the people's will, however it is expressed.'

Schmitt thus accepts the logic of Weber's view of plebiscitarian democracy and the rise of bureaucratic mass parties, which utterly destroy the old parliamentary notables. He uses the nineteenth-century conservatives Juan Donoso Cortes to set the essential dilemma in Political Theology: either a boundless democracy of plebiscitarian populism which will carry us wherever it will (i.e. to Marxist or fascist domination) or a dictatorship. Schmitt advocates a very specific form of dictatorship in a state of exception - a "commissarial' dictatorship, which acts to restore social stability, to preserve the concrete orders of society and restore the constitution. The dictator has a constitutional office. He acts in the name of the constitution, but takes such measures as are necessary to preserve order. these measures are not bound by law; they are extralegal.

Schmitt's doctrine thus involves a paradox. For all its stress on friend-enemy relations, on decisive political action, its core, its aim, is the maintenance of stability and order. It is founded on a political non-law, but not in the interest of lawlessness. Schmitt insists that the constitution must be capable of meeting the challenge of the exception, and of allowing those measures necessary to preserve order. He is anti-liberal because he claims that liberalism cannot cope with the reality of the political; it can only insist on a legal formalism which is useless in the exceptional case. He argues that only those parties which are bound to uphold the constitution should be allowed an 'equal chance' to struggle for power. Parties which threaten the existing order and use constitutional means to challenge the constitution should be subject to rigorous control.

Schmitt's relentless attack on 'discussion' makes most democrats and radicals extremely hostile to his views. He is a determined critic of the Enlightenment. Habermas's 'ideal speech situation', in which we communicate without distortion to discover a common 'emancipatory interest', would appear to Schmitt as a trivial philosophical restatement of Guizot's view that in representative government, ' through discussion the powers-that-be are obliged to seek truth in common." Schmitt is probably right. Enemies have nothing to discuss and we can never attain a situation in which the friend-enemy distinction is abolished. Liberalism does tend to ignore the exception and the more resolute forms of political struggle.

Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror

Carl Schmitt: The Conservative Revolutionary Habitus and the Aesthetics of Horror

Richard Wolin

Ex: http://freespeechproject.com/

 

"Carl Schmitt's polemical discussion of political Romanticism conceals the aestheticizing oscillations of his own political thought. In this respect, too, a kinship of spirit with the fascist intelligentsia reveals itself."
—Jürgen Habermas, "The Horrors of Autonomy: Carl Schmitt in English"

"The pinnacle of great politics is the moment in which the enemy comes into view in concrete clarity as the enemy."
—Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1927)

Only months after Hitler's accession to power, the eminently citable political philosopher and jurist Carl Schmitt, in the ominously titled work, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, delivered one of his better known dicta. On January 30, 1933, observes Schmitt, "one can say that 'Hegel died.'" In the vast literature on Schmitt's role in the National Socialist conquest of power, one can find many glosses on this one remark, which indeed speaks volumes. But let us at the outset be sure to catch Schmitt's meaning, for Schmitt quickly reminds us what he does not intend by this pronouncement: he does not mean to impugn the hallowed tradition of German étatistme, that is, of German "philosophies of state," among which Schmitt would like to number his own contributions to the annals of political thought. Instead, it is Hegel qua philosopher of the "bureaucratic class" or Beamtenstaat that has been definitely surpassed with Hitler's triumph. For "bureaucracy" (cf. Max Weber's characterization of "legal-bureaucratic domination") is, according to its essence, a bourgeois form of rule. As such, this class of civil servants—which Hegel in the Rechtsphilosophie deems the "universal class"—represents an impermissable drag on the sovereignty of executive authority. For Schmitt, its characteristic mode of functioning, which is based on rules and procedures that are fixed, preestablished, calculable, qualifies it as the very embodiment of bourgeois normalcy—a form of life that Schmitt strove to destroy and transcend in virtually everything he thought and wrote during the 1920s, for the very essence of the bureaucratic conduct of business is reverence for the norm, a standpoint that could not exist in great tension with the doctrines of Carl Schmitt himself, whom we know to be a philosopher of the state of emergency—of the Auhsnamhezustand (literally, the "state of exception"). Thus, in the eyes of Schmitt, Hegel had set an ignominious precedent by according this putative universal class a position of preeminence in his political thought, insofar as the primacy of the bureaucracy tends to diminish or supplant the perogative of sovereign authority.

But behind the critique of Hegel and the provocative claim that Hitler's rise coincides with Hegel's metaphorical death (a claim, that while true, should have offered, pace Schmitt, little cause for celebration) lies a further indictment, for in the remarks cited, Hegel is simultaneously perceived as an advocate of the Rechtsstaat, of "constitutionalism" and "rule of law." Therefore, in the history of German political thought, the doctrines of this very German philosopher prove to be something of a Trojan horse: they represent a primary avenue via which alien bourgeois forms of political life have infiltrated healthy and autochthonous German traditions, one of whose distinguishing features is an rejection of "constitutionalism" and all it implies. The political thought of Hegel thus represents a threat—and now we encounter another one of Schmitt's key terms from the 1920s—to German homogeneity.

Schmitt's poignant observations concerning the relationship between Hegel and Hitler expresses the idea that one tradition in German cultural life—the tradition of German idealism—has come to an end and a new set of principles—based in effect on the category of völkish homogeneity (and all it implies for Germany's political future)—has arisen to take its place. Or, to express the same thought in other terms: a tradition based on the concept of Vernuft or "reason" has given way to a political system whose new raison d'être was the principle of authoritarian decision—whose consummate embodiment was the Führerprinzep, one of the ideological cornerstones of the post-Hegelian state. To be sure, Schmitt's insight remains a source of fascination owing to its uncanny prescience: in a statement of a few words, he manages to express the quintessence of some 100 years of German historical development. At the same time, this remark also remains worthy insofar as it serves as a prism through which the vagaries of Schmitt's own intellectual biography come into unique focues: it represents an unambiguous declaration of his satiety of Germany's prior experiments with constitutional government and of his longing for a total- or Führerstaat in which the ambivalences of the parliamentary system would be abolished once and for all. Above all, however, it suggest how readily Schmitt personally made the transition from intellectual antagonist of Weimar democracy to whole-hearted supporter of National Socialist revolution. Herein lies what one may refer to as the paradox of Carl Schmitt: a man who, in the words of Hannah Arendt, was a "convinced Nazi," yet "whose very ingenious theories about the end of democracy and legal government still make arresting reading."

The focal point of our inquiry will be the distinctive intellectual "habitus" (Bourdieu) that facilitated Schmitt's alacritous transformation from respected Weimar jurist and academician to "crown jurist of the Third Reich." To understand the intellectual basis of Schmitt's political views, one must appreciate his elective affinities with that generation of so-called conservative revolutionary thinkers whose worldview was so decisive in turning the tide of public opinion against the fledgling Weimar republic. As the political theorist Kurt Sontheimer has noted: "It is hardly a matter of controversy today that certain ideological predispositions in German thought generally, but particularly in the intellectual climate of the Weimar Republic, induced a large number of German electors under the Weimar Republic to consider the National Socialist movement as less problematic than it turned out to be." And even though the nationalsocialists and the conservative revolutionaries failed to see eye to eye on many points, their respective plans for a new Germany were sufficiently close that a comparison between them is able to "throw light on the intellectual atmosphere in which, when National Socialism arose, it could seem to be a more or less presentable doctrine." Hence "National Socialism . . . derived considerable profit from thinkers like Oswald Spengler, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, and Ernst Jünger," despite their later parting of the ways. One could without much exaggeration label this intellectual movement protofascistic, insofar as its general ideological effect consisted in providing a type of ideological-spiritual preparation for the National Socialist triumph.

 

Schmitt himself was never an active member of the conservative revolutionary movement, whose best known representatives—Spengler, Jünger, and van den Bruck—have been named by Sontheimer (though one might add Hans Zehrer and Othmar Spann). It would be fair to say that the major differences between Schmitt and his like-minded, influential group of right-wing intellectuals concerned a matter of form rather than substance: unlike Schmitt, most of whose writings appeared in scholarly and professional journals, the conservative revolutionaries were, to a man, nonacademics who made names for themselves as Publizisten—that is, as political writers in that same kaleidoscope and febrile world of Weimar Offentlichkeit that was the object of so much scorn in their work. But Schmitt's status as a fellow traveler in relation to the movement's main journals (such as Zehrer's influential Die Tat, activities, and circles notwithstanding, his profound intellectual affinities with this group of convinced antirepublicans are impossible to deny. In fact, in the secondary literature, it has become more common than not simply to include him as a bona fide member of the group.

The intellectual habitus shared by Schmitt and the conservative revolutionaries is in no small measure of Nietzschean derivation. Both subscribed to the immoderate verdict registered by Nietzsche on the totality of inherited Western values: those values were essentially nihilistic. Liberalism, democracy, utlitarianism, individualism, and Enlightenment rationalism were the characteristic belief structures of the decadent capitalist West; they were manifestations of a superficial Zivilisation, which failed to measure up to the sublimity of German Kultur. In opposition to a bourgeois society viewed as being in an advanced state of decomposition, Schmitt and the conservative revolutionaries counterposed the Nietzschean rites of "active nihilism." In Nietzsche's view, whatever is falling should be given a final push. Thus one of the patented conceptual oppositions proper to the conservative revolutionary habitus was that between the "hero" (or "soldier") and the "bourgeois." Whereas the hero thrives on risk, danger, and uncertainity, the life of bourgeois is devoted to petty calculations of utility and security. This conceptual opposition would occupy center stage in what was perhaps the most influential conservative revolutionary publication of the entire Weimar period, Ernst Jünger's 1932 work, Der Arbeiter (the worker), where it assumes the form of a contrast between "the worker-soldier" and "the bourgeois." If one turns, for example, to what is arguably Schmitt's major work of the 1920s, The Concept of the Political (1927), where the famous "friend-enemy" distinction is codified as the raison d'être of politics, it is difficult to ignore the profound conservative revolutionary resonances of Schmitt's argument. Indeed, it would seem that such resonances permeate, Schmitt's attempt to justify politics primarily in martial terms; that is, in light of the ultimate instance of (or to use Schmitt's own terminology) Ernstfall of battle (Kampf) or war.

Once the conservative revolutionary dimension of Schmitt's thought is brought to light, it will become clear that the continuities in his pre- and post-1933 political philosophy and stronger than the discontinuities. Yet Schmitt's own path of development from arch foe of Weimar democracy to "convinced Nazi" (Arendt) is mediated by a successive series of intellectual transformations that attest to his growing political radicalisation during the 1920s and early 1930s. He follows a route that is both predictable and sui generis: predictable insomuch as it was a route traveled by an entire generation of like-minded German conservative and nationalist intellectuals during the interwar period; sui generis, insofar as there remains an irreducible originality and perspicacity to the various Zeitdiagnosen proffered by Schmitt during the 1920s, in comparison with the at times hackneyed and familar formulations of his conservative revolutionary contemporaries.

The oxymoronic designation "conservative revolutionary" is meant to distinguish the radical turn taken during the interwar period by right-of-center German intellectuals from the stance of their "traditional conservative" counterparts, who longed for a restoration of the imagined glories of earlier German Reichs and generally stressed the desirability of a return to premodern forms of social order (e.g., Tönnies Gemeinschaft) based on aristocratic considerations of rank and privilege. As opposed to the traditional conservatives, the conservative revolutionaries (and this is true of Jünger, van den Bruck, and Schmitt), in their reflections of the German defeat in the Great War, concluded that if Germany were to be successful in the next major European conflagaration, premodern or traditional solutions would not suffice. Instead, what was necessary was "modernization," yet a form of modernization that was at the same time compatible with the (albeit mythologized) traditional German values of heroism, "will" (as opposed to "reason"), Kultur, and hierarchy. In sum, what was desired was a modern community. As Jeffrey Herf has stressed in his informative book on the subject, when one searches for the ideological origins of National Socialism, it is not so much Germany's rejection of modernity that is at issue as its selective embrace of modernity. Thus National Socialist's triumph, far from being characterized by a disdain of modernity simpliciter, was marked simultaneously by an assimilation of technical modernity and a repudiation of Western political modernity: of the values of political liberalism as they emerge from the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century. This describes the essence of the German "third way" or Sonderweg: Germany's special path to modernity that is neither Western in the sense of England and France nor Eastern in the sense of Russia or pan-slavism.

Schmitt began his in the 1910s as a traditonal conservative, namely, as a Catholic philosopher of state. As such, his early writings revolved around a version of political authoritarianism in which the idea of a strong state was defended at all costs against the threat of liberal encroachments. In his most significant work of the decade, The Value of the State and the Significance of the Individual (1914), the balance between the two central concepts, state and individual, is struck one-sidely in favour of the former term. For Schmitt, the state, in executing its law-promulgating perogatives, cannot countenance any opposition. The uncompromising, antiliberal conclusion he draws from this observation is that "no individual can have full autonomy within the state." Or, as Schmitt unambiguously expresses a similar thought elsewhere in the same work: "the individual" is merely "a means to the essence, the state is what is important." Thus, although Schmitt displayed little inclination for the brand of jingoistic nationalism so prevalent among his German academic mandarin brethern during the war years, as Joseph Bendersky has observed, "it was precisely on the point of authoritarianism vs. liberal individualism that the views of many Catholics [such as Schmitt] and those of non-Catholic conservatives coincided."

But like other German conservatives, it was Schmitt's antipathy to liberal democratic forms of government, coupled with the political turmoil of the Weimar republic, that facilitated his transformation from a traditional conservative to a conservative revolutionary. To be sure, a full account of the intricacies of Schmitt's conservative revolutionary "conversion" would necessitate a year by year account of his political thought during the Weimar period, during which Schmitt's intellectual output was nothing if prolific, (he published virtually a book a year). Instead, for the sake of concision and the sake of fidelity to the leitmotif of the "conservative revolutionary habitus," I have elected to concentrate on three key aspects of Schmitt's intellectual transformation during this period: first, his sympathies with the vitalist (lebensphilosophisch) critique of modern rationalism; second, his philosophy of history during these years; and third, his protofascistic of the conservative revolutionary doctrine of the "total state." All three aspects, moreover, are integrally interrelated.

II.

The vitalist critique of Enlightenment rationalism is of Nietzschean provenance. In opposition to the traditional philosophical image of "man" qua animal rationalis, Nietzsche counterposes his vision of "life [as] will to power." In the course of this "transvaluation of all values," the heretofore marginalized forces of life, will, affect, and passion should reclaim the position of primacy they once enjoyed before the triumph of "Socratism." It is in precisely this spirit that Nietzsche recommends that in the future, we philosophize with our affects instead of with concepts, for in the culture of European nihilism that has triumphed with the Enlightenment, "the essence of life, its will to power, is ignored," argues Nietzsche; "one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions."

It would be difficult to overestimate the power and influence this Nietzschean critique exerted over an entire generation of antidemocratic German intellectuals during the 1920s. The anticivilizational ethos that pervades Spengler's Decline of the West—the defence of "blood and tradition" against the much lamented forces of societal rationalisation—would be unthinkable without that dimension of vitalistic Kulturkritik to which Nietzsche's work gave consummate expression. Nor would it seem that the doctrines of Klages, Geist als Widersacher der Seele (Intellect as the Antagonist of the Soul; 1929-31), would have captured the mood of the times as well as they did had it not been for the irrevocable precedent set by Nietzsche's work, for the central opposition between "life" and "intellect," as articulated by Klages and so many other German "anti-intellectual intellectuals" during the interwar period, represents an unmistakably Nietzschean inheritance.

While the conservative revolutionary components of Schmitt's worldview have been frequently noted, the paramount role played by the "philosophy of life"—above all, by the concept of cultural criticism proper to Lebensphilosophie—on his political thought has escaped the attention of most critics. However, a full understanding of Schmitt's status as a radical conservative intellectual is inseparable from an appreciation of an hitherto neglected aspect of his work.

In point of fact, determinate influences of "philosophy of life"—a movement that would feed directly into the Existenzphilosophie craze of the 1920s (Heidegger, Jaspers, and others)—are really discernable in Schmitt's pre-Weimar writings. Thus, in one of his first published works, Law and Judgment (1912), Schmitt is concerned with demonstrating the impossibility of understanding the legal order in exclusively rationalist terms, that is, as a self-sufficient, complete system of legal norms after the fashion of legal positivism. It is on this basis that Schmitt argues in a particular case, a correct decision cannot be reached solely via a process of deducation or generalisation from existing legal precedents or norms. Instead, he contends, there is always a moment of irreducible particularity to each case that defies subsumption under general principles. It is precisely this aspect of legal judgment that Schmitt finds most interesting and significant. He goes on to coin a phrase for this "extralegal" dimension that proves an inescapable aspect of all legal decision making proper: the moment of "concrete indifference," the dimension of adjudication that transcends the previously established legal norm. In essence, the moment of "concrete indifference" represents for Schmitt a type of vital substrate, an element of "pure life," that forever stands opposed to the formalism of laws as such. Thus at the heart of bourgeois society—its legal system—one finds an element of existential particularity that defies the coherence of rationalist syllogizing or formal reason.

The foregoing account of concrete indifference is a matter of more than passing or academic interest insofar as it proves a crucial harbinger of Schmitt's later decisionistic theory of sovereignty, for its its devaluation of existing legal norms as a basis for judicial decision making, the category of concrete indifference points towards the imperative nature of judicial decision itself as a self-sufficient and irreducible basis of adjudication. The vitalist dimension of Schmitt's early philosophy of law betrays itself in his thoroughgoing denigration of legal normativism—for norms are a product of arid intellectualism (Intelligenz) and, as such, hostile to life (lebensfeindlick)—and the concomitant belief that the decision alone is capable of bridging the gap between the abstractness of law and the fullness of life.

The inchoate vitalist sympathies of Schmitt's early work become full blown in his writings of the 1920s. Here, the key text is Political Theology (1922), in which Schmitt formulates his decisionist theory of politics, or, as he remarks in the work's often cited first sentance: "Sovereign is he who decides the state of exception [Ausnahmezustand]."

It would be tempting to claim from this initial, terse yet lapidry definition of sovereignty, one may deduce the totality of Schmitt's mature political thought, for it contains what we know to the be the two keywords of his political philosophy during these years: decision and the exception. Both in Schmitt's lexicon are far from value-neutral or merely descriptive concepts. Instead, they are both accorded unambiguously positive value in the economy of his thought. Thus one of the hallmarks of Schmitt's political philosophy during the Weimar years will be a privileging of Ausnahmezustand, or state of exception, vis-à-vis political normalcy.

It is my claim that Schmitt's celebration of the state of exception over conditions of political normalcy—which he essentially equates with legal positivism and "parliamentarianism"—has its basis in the vitalist critique of Enlightenment rationalism. In his initial justification of the Ausnahmezustand in Political Theology, Schmitt leaves no doubt concerning the historical pedigree of such concepts. Thus following the well-known definition of sovereignty cited earlier, he immediantly underscores its status as a "borderline concept"—a Grenzbegriff, a concept "pertaining to the outermost sphere." It is precisely this fascination with extreme or "boundry situations" (Grenzsituationen—K. Jaspers—those unique moments of existential peril that become a proving ground of individual "authenticity"—that characterizes Lebensphilosophie's sweeping critique of bourgeois "everydayness." Hence in the Grenzsituationen, Dasein glimpses transcendence and is thereby transformed from possible to real Existenz." In parallel fashion, Schmitt, by according primacy to the "state of exception" as opposed to political normalcy, tries to invest the emergency situation with a higher, existential significance and meaning.

According to the inner logic of this conceptual scheme, the "state of exception" becomes the basis for a politics of authenticity. In contrast to conditions of political normalcy, which represent the unexalted reign of the "average, the "medicore," and the "everyday," the state of exception proves capable of reincorporating a dimension of heroism and greatness that is sorely lacking in routinized, bourgeois conduct of political life.

Consequently, the superiority of the state as the ultimate, decisionistic arbiter over the emergency situation is a matter that, in Schmitt's eyes, need not be argued for, for according to Schmitt, "every rationalist interpretation falsifies the immediacy of life." Instead, in his view, the state represents a fundamental, irrefragable, existential verity, as does the category of "life" in Nietzsche's philosophy, or, as Schmitt remarks with a characteristic pith in Political Theology, "The existence of the state is undoubted proof of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm." Thus "the decision [on the state of exception] becomes instantly independent of argumentative substantiation and receives autonomous value."

But as Franz Neumann observes in Behemoth, given the lack of coherence of National Socialist ideology, the rationales provided for totalitarian practice were often couched specifically in vitalist or existential terms. In Neumann's words,

 

[Given the incoherence of National Socialist ideology], what is left as justification for the [Grossdeutsche] Reich? Not racism, not the idea of the Holy Roman Empire, and certainly not some democratic nonsense like popular sovereignty or self-determination. Only the Reich itself remains. It is its own justification. The philosophical roots of the argument are to be found in the existential philosophy of Heidegger. Transferred to the realm of politics, exisentialism argues that power and might are true: power is a sufficient theoretical basis for more power.

 

[Excerpts from The Seduction of Unreason: The Intellectual Romance with Fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism (2004).]

Keith Preston: Understanding Carl Schmitt

 

Keith Preston: Understanding Carl Schmitt

Sommerakademie zur Konservativen Revolution

 

Sommerakademie zur Konservativen Revolution

 

Cf: http://www.sezession.de/

Seit dem verheerenden Attentat in Norwegen haben bestimmte Kausalketten wieder Konjunktur. Beispielsweise wenn Volker Weiß bei Spiegelonline irgendein Zitat Oswald Spenglers für die Tat verantwortlich macht. Treffen will Weiß damit die ganze sogenannnte Konservative Revolution und möglichst auch jede Art von Demokratiekritik, die nicht von links kommt.

Carl Schmitt nannte solche Konstrukte „irreale Bedingungssätze“: Wenn Oswald Spengler nicht gelebt hätte, wäre Breivik nicht zum Mörder geworden. So einfach (in doppelter Hinsicht) kann Geistesgeschichte sein. Wir wollen Weiß auf seinen simplen Pfaden nicht folgen, sondern uns grundsätzlich mit dem Phänomen „Konservative Revolution“ auseinandersetzen, das immer wieder in einen Ruf gerät, der in einem so merkwürdigen Widerspruch zu seiner tatsächlichen Wirkungslosigkeit steht.

Die 12.Sommerakademie des IfS wird sich daher vom 16. bis 18. September 2011 dem Thema „Konservative Revolution“ widmen. Dabei geht es nicht um das Herunterbeten der fünf Mohlerschen Hauptgruppen, sondern um die gegenwärtig gültigen Gedanken dieser Geistesrichtung. Daher wird es nach einer ausführlichen Einleitung durch Karlheinz Weißmann u.a. um folgende Themen gehen: den Zusammenhang von Politik und Lebensreform, den Gedanken einer schöpferischen Restauration, um Heideggers konservative Revolution der Philosophie, um das Verhältnis von Deutschtum und Christentum…

Wie immer: 40 Teilnehmerplätze, sieben Vorträge, Film, Diskussionen, Sport: Wenn Sie 35 Jahre oder jünger sind, können und sollten Sie teilnehmen! Die 11. Winterakademie wird nicht in Schnellroda stattfinden, sondern in der Region zwischen Hannover und Kassel! Der Ausweichort ist gut mit der Bahn erreichbar. Genaue Informationen gibt es nach der Anmeldung. Die Hörerbeiträge sind nicht hoch, wer Geld verdient, bezahlt für zwei Übernachtungen, Vollpension und alle Vorträge 80,00 €, alle anderen bezahlen 35,00 €. Und: Keiner sollte wegen finanzieller Engpässe fernbleiben. Rufen Sie uns an, falls es knapp wird!

Tagungsfolge und Antwortbogen.

 

Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

 Oswald Spengler ed il senso metapolitico del declino occidentale

Luca Valentini

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La crisi morale, oltre che economica e finanziaria, che attualmente attanaglia l’Italia, le farsesche vicende dell’attuale cricca di potere al governo, spesso conducono anche i più acuti osservatori a smarrire quella visione d’insieme e di lontani orizzonti che dovrebbe sempre caratterizzare una visione del mondo e della vita autenticamente tradizionale, cioè fondata e determinata su principi dall’Alto.

E’ importante tale precisazione, perché, al di là delle giuste analisi sociologico-politiche, delle doverose battaglie per il benessere del Popolo Italiano, mai si dovrebbe dimenticare che l’ampiezza della crisi va ben oltre il nostro Paese e che le radici sono ben più profonde di ciò che ai nostri occhi si manifesta, essendo il piano finanziario solamente una risultante di un processo degenerativo, che interessa, nelle sue profondità abissali, i caratteri più interni dell’intera civilizzazione occidentale, nel suo spirito, nella sua moderna involuzione, nelle imboscate e nei tradimenti che essa ha subito.

Riferirsi a Oswald Spengler ed a ciò che ha espresso nelle sue opere, particolarmente nel Il Tramonto dell’Occidente, come noi faremo sinteticamente in questo articolo, ha proprio la determinata volontà di mettere in risalto codesto piano d’osservazione, un orizzonte che va ben oltre la semplice narrazione storicistica o i lineari ed apparentemente confusi e contradditori accadimenti del quotidiano, ma che vuole riaprire una riflessione, un ragionamento all’interno della nostra comunità sull’essenzialità di un approfondimento metapolitico che è e deve essere un approfondimento sulla nostra civiltà, sulla decadenza secolare che la caratterizza, nel rapporto della Tradizione Europea – che dal nostro punto di vista è essenzialmente Tradizione elleno-romano-germanica – con la sfera del Sacro, con l’esplicitazione nell’istituzione statuale, fino alle più ramificate e secondarie sezioni dello sviluppo produttivo e sociale: “Le civiltà sono degli organismi. La storia mondiale è la loro biografia complessiva” (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente).

Un’analisi che valorizzi e ridesti il senso nascosto, occulto, quella terza dimensione della storia che molti smarriscono, insieme con quei punti di riferimento che unici possono stabilire un preciso quanto indispensabile percorso di autoriconoscimento identitario per la nostra comunità, per chi ricerca nell’impegno politico e culturale l’Uomo Nuovo e Differenziato dalla modernità, dalla pandemia inarrestabile che conduce oramai da diversi secoli l’intero Occidente – e con esso tutto il resto del mondo – verso un baratro di cui non si riescono a vedere vie d’uscita o possibilità di risalita. Per riferirci direttamente a Oswald Spengler, si rammenti come affermasse esserci un ciclo vitale per ogni singola civiltà, quasi fosse la stessa un vero e proprio ente animico, con una precisa contezza di se stesso. In riferimento all’Occidente sarebbe esistita prima la civiltà greco-romana, sorta grazie alle migrazioni indoeuropee in Grecia e nella penisola italica, che lo stesso ha definito “apollinea”, seguita da una civiltà germanica o detta “faustiana”. Entrambe queste Kultur hanno in sé un simbolo esprimente il proprio spirito vitale: Apollo, divinità della forma e della misura, dell’equilibrio interno, spirituale ed estetico; Faust, il personaggio creato da Goethe, come aspirazione perpetua che tenta di colmare lo iato tra l’esistenza parziale e limitata dell’Uomo e le altezze metafisiche della Divinità Trascendente. L’odierna società, pertanto, è il prodotto dell’esaurimento di tale forza originaria, di tale spirito ancestrale, lo spegnimento progressivo di ogni slancio oltre l’umano, di ogni classica forma interna: “Ognuna ha la sua fanciullezza, la sua gioventù, la sua età virile e la sua senilità (da Il Tramonto dell’Occidente)”.

A tal punto, partendo proprio da questa presa di coscienza, che dovrà risultare quanto più profonda e lucidamente attiva, si può accennare a ciò può e deve essere il senso di una militanza, di un impegno politico-culturale. Nella fase finale di questo ciclo, in questa umanità parodistica, l’unica via da percorrere è quella che conduce alla fedeltà nel proprio essere, alla costruzione di una comunità di uomini e di donne, conscia delle proprie radici e fiera della propria diversità dal resto del mondo. La lotta interna per la nascita di uomo che tragga da sé la legge da osservare, che sia impassibile ed inattaccabile di fronte alla marea che tutto corrompe, un uomo che con il suo essere sia esempio e trasmissione di Tradizione, questa la via d’onore che i nostri cuori hanno il diritto di percorrere. Il nostro ed unico scopo è quello, pertanto, anche grazie a questo giornale, di mettere a disposizione di quanti possano e vogliano le nostre umili  conoscenze di studio e di ricerca tradizionali, per “fare ciò che deve essere fatto”, come Evola ci ricorda, e per rimanere fedeli all’Idea, che può essere valorosamente servita solo se da Spengler si assume la consapevolezza del mondo in cui siamo stati destinati a vivere: “…civiltà crepuscolare che è – scrive su La Vita italiana Evola riferendosi agli scritti di Spengler – una civiltà delle masse, civiltà antiqualitativa, inorganica, urbanistica, livellatrice, intimamente anarchica, demagogica, antitradizionale”.

* * *

Pubblicato sul periodico d’informazione politica Il Megafono, anno 2011.

Luca Valentini

Carl Schmitt: Total Enemy, Total State & Total War

Total Enemy, Total State, & Total War

Carl SCHMITT

Ex: http://www.counter-currents.com/

 Translated by Simona Draghici

Editor’s Note:

The following translation from Carl Schmitt appears online for the first time in commemoration of Schmitt’s birth on July 11, 1888. The translation originally appeared in Carl Schmitt, Four Essays, 1931–1938, ed. and trans. Simona Draghici (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1999).

I

In a certain sense, there have been total wars at all times; a theory of the total war, however, presumably dates only from the time of Clausewitz who would talk of “abstract” and “absolute” wars.”[1] Later on, under the impact of the experiences of the last Great War, the formula of total war has acquired a specific meaning and a particular effectiveness. Since 1920, it has become the prevailing catchword. It was first brought out in sharp relief in the French literature, in book titles like La guerre totale. Afterwards, between 1926 and 1928, it found its way into the language of the proceedings of the disarmament committee at Geneva. In concepts such as “war potential” (potentiel de guerre), “moral disarmament” (désarmement moral) and “total disarmament” (désarmement total). The fascist doctrine of the “total state” came to it by way of the state; the association yielded the conceptual pair: total state, total war. In Germany, the publication of the Concept of the Political has since 1927 expanded the pair of totalities to a set of three: total enemy, total war, total state. Ernst Jünger’s book of 1930 Total Mobilization made the formula part of the general consciousness. Nonetheless, it was only Ludendorff’s 1936 booklet entitled Der Totale Krieg (The Total War) that lent it an irresistible force and caused its dissemination beyond all bounds.

The formula is omnipresent; it forces into view a truth whose horrors the general consciousness would rather shun. Such formulas, however, are always in danger of becoming widespread nationally and internationally and of being degraded to summary slogans, to mere gramophone records of the publicity mill. Hence some clarifications may be appropriate.

(a) A war may be total in the sense of summoning up one’s strength to the limit, and of the commitment of everything to the last reserves.[2] It may also be called total in the sense of the unsparing use of war means of annihilation. When the well-known English author J. F. C. Fuller writes in a recent article, entitled “The First of the League Wars, Its Lessons and Omens,” that the Italian campaign in Abyssinia was a modern total war, he only refers to the use of efficacious weapons (airplanes and gas), whereas looked at from another vantage point, Abyssinia in fact was not capable of waging a modern total war nor did Italy use its reserves to the limit, reach the highest intensity, and lead to an oil blockade or to the closing of the Suez Canal, because of the pressure exerted through the sanctions imposed by the League of Nations.

(b) A war may be total either on both sides or on one side only. It may also be deliberately limited, rationed and measured out, because of the geographical situation, the war technique in use, and also the predominant political principles of both sides. The typical 18th-century war, the so-called “cabinet war,” was essentially and deliberately a partial war. It rested on the clear segregation of the soldiers participating in the war from the non-participant inhabitants and non-combatants. Nevertheless, the Seven Years War of Frederick the Great was relatively total, on Prussia’s side, when compared with the other powers’ mobilization of forces. A situation, typical of Germany, showed itself readily in that case: the adversity of geographical conditions and the foreign coalitions compelled a German state to mobilize its forces to a higher degree than its more affluent and fortunate bigger neighbors.[3]

(c) The character of the war may change during the belligerent showdown. The will to fight may grow limp or it may intensify, as it happened in the 1914–1918 world war, when the war trend on the German side towards the mobilization of all the economic and industrial reserves soon forced the English side to introduce general conscription.

(d) Finally, some other methods of confrontation and trial of strength, which are not total, always develop within the totality of war. Thus for a time, everyone seeks to avoid a total war which naturally carries a total risk. In this way, after the world war, there were the so-called military reprisals (the 1923 Corfu Conflict, Japan-China in 1932), followed by the attempts at non-military, economic sanctions, according to Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (against Italy, autumn 1935), and finally, certain methods of power testing on foreign soil (Spain 1936–1937) emerged in a way that could be correctly interpreted only in close connection with the total character of modern warfare. They are intermediate and transitional forms between open war and true peace; they derive their meaning from the fact that total war looms large in the background as a possibility, and an understandable caution recommends itself in the delineation of the conflictual spaces. Likewise, it is only from this point of view that they can be grasped by the science of international law.

II

The core of the matter lies in warfare. From the nature of the total war one may grasp the character and the whole aspect of state totality; from the special character of the decisive weapons one may deduce the peculiar character and aspect of the totality of war. But it is the total enemy that gives the total war its meaning.[4]

The different services and types of warfare, land warfare, sea warfare, air warfare, they each experience the totality of war in a particular way. A corresponding world of notions and ideas piles on each of these types of warfare. The traditional notions of “levée en masse” (levy), “nation armée” (nation in arms), and “Volk in Waffen” (the people in arms) belong to land warfare.[5] Out of these notions emerged the continental doctrine of total war, essentially as a doctrine of land warfare, and that thanks mainly to Clausewitz. Sea warfare, on the other hand, has its own strategic and tactical methods and criteria; moreover, until recently, it has been first and foremost a war against the opponent’s trade and economy, whence a war against non-combatants, an economic war, which by its laws of blockade, contraband, and prizes, drew neutral trade into the hostilities, as well. Air warfare has not so far built up a similar fully-fledged and independent system of its own. There is no doctrine of air warfare yet that would correspond to the world of notions and concepts accumulated with regard to land and sea warfare. Nonetheless, as a consequence of air warfare, the overall configuration sways in the main towards a three-dimensional total war.

The “if” of a total war is beyond any doubt today. The “how” may vary. The totality is perceptible from opposite vantage points. Hence the standard type of guide and leader in a total war is necessarily different. It would be too simple an equation to accept that the soldier will step into the centre of this totality as the prevailing type in a total war to the same extent as in other kinds of wars previously.[6] If, as it has been said, total mobilization abolishes the separation of the soldier from the civilian, it may very well happen that the soldier changes into a civilian as the civilian changes into a soldier, or both may change into something new, a third alternative. In reality, it all depends on the general character of the war. A real war of religion turns the soldiers into the tools of priests or preachers. A total war that is waged on behalf of the economy becomes the tool of economic power groups. There are other forms in which the soldier himself is the typical model and the ascending expression of the character of the people. Geographical conditions, racial and social peculiarities of all kinds, are factors that determine the type of warfare waged by great nations. Even today it is unlikely that a nation could engage in all the three kinds of warfare to a degree equal to the three-dimensional total war. It is probable that the centre of gravity in the deployment of forces will always rest with one or the other of the three kinds of warfare and the doctrine of total war will draw on it.[7]

Until now the history of the European peoples has been dominated by the contrast of the English sea warfare with the Continental land warfare. It is not a matter of “traders and heroes” or that sort of thing, but rather the recognition that any of the various kinds of warfare may become total, and out of its own characteristics generate a special world of notions and ideals as its own doctrine and also relevant to international and constitutional law, particularly in the assessment of the soldier’s worth and of his position in the general body of the people. It would be a mistake to regard the English sea warfare of the last three centuries in the light of the total land warfare of Clausewitz’s theory, essentially as mere trade and economic but not total warfare, and to misinterpret it as unconnected with and markedly different from totality. It is the English sea warfare that generated the kernel of a total world view.[8]

The English sea warfare is total in its capacity for total enmity. It knows how to mobilize religious, ideological, spiritual, and moral forces as only few of the great wars in world history have done. The English sea warfare against Spain was a world-wide combat of the Germanic and Romance peoples, between Protestantism and Catholicism, Calvinism and Jesuitism, and there are few instances of such outbursts of enmity as intense and final as Cromwell’s against the Spaniards. The English war against Napoleon likewise changed from a sea war into a “crusade.” In the war against Germany between 1914 and 1918, the world-wide English propaganda knew how to whip up enormous moral and spiritual energies in the name of civilization and humanity, of democracy and freedom, against the Prussian-German “militarism.” The English mind had also proved its ability to interpret the industrial-technical upsurge of the 19th century in the terms of the English worldview. Herbert Spencer drew an extremely effective picture of history that was disseminated all over the world, in countless works of popularization, the propagandistic force of which proved its worth in the 1914–1918 World War. It was the philosophy of mankind’s progress, presented as an evolution from feudalism to trade and industry, from the political to the economic, from soldiers to industrialists, from war to peace. It portrayed the soldier essentially as Prussian-German, eo ipso “feudal reactionary,” a “medieval” figure standing in the way of progress and peace. Moreover, out of its specificity, the English sea warfare evolved a full, self-contained system of international law. It asserted itself and its own concepts held on their own against the corresponding concepts of Continental international law throughout the 19th century. There is an Anglo-Saxon concept of enemy, which in essence rejects the differentiation between combatants and non-combatants, and an Anglo-Saxon conception of war that incorporates the so-called economic war. In short, the fundamental concepts and norms of this English international law are total as such and certainly indicative of an ideology in itself total.

Finally, the English constitutional regulations turned the subordination of the soldiers to the civilians into an ideological principle and imposed it upon the Continent during the liberal 19th century. By those standards, civilization lies in the rule of the bourgeois, civilian ideal which is essentially unsoldierly. Accordingly, the constitution is always but a civil-bourgeois system in which, as Clemenceau put it, the soldier’s only raison d’être is to defend the civilian bourgeois society, while basically he is subject to civilian command. The Prussian soldier state carried on a century-long political struggle on the home front against this bourgeois constitutional ideal. It succumbed to it in the Autumn of 1918. The history of Prussian Germany’s home politics from 1848 to 1918 was a ceaseless conflict between the army and parliament, an uninterrupted battle which the government had to fight with the parliament over the structure of the army, and the army budget necessary to make ready for an unavoidable war, that were determined not by the necessities of foreign policy but rather by compromises regarding internal policy. The dictate of Versailles, which stipulated the army’s organization and its equipment to the smallest detail, in an agreement of foreign policy, was preceded by half a century of periodical agreements of internal policy between the Prussian-German soldier state and its internal policy opponents, in which all the details of the organization and the equipment of the army had been decided by the internal policy. The conflict between bourgeois society and the Prussian soldier state led to an unnatural isolation of the War Office from the power of command and to many other separations, consistently rooted in the opposition between a bourgeois constitutional ideal imported from England either directly or through France and Belgium, on the one hand, and the older constitutional ideal of the German soldiery, on the other.[9]

Today Germany has surmounted that division and achieved a close integration of its soldier force.[10] Indeed, attempts will not fail to be made to describe it as militarism, in the manner of earlier propaganda methods, and to hold Germany guilty of the advent of total war. Such questions of guilt too belong to the totality of the ideological wrangles. Le combat spirituel est aussi brutal que la bataille d’hommes (spiritual combat is as brutal as the battles of men). Nonetheless, before nations stagger into a total war once more, one must raise the question whether a total enmity truly exists among the European nations nowadays. War and enmity belong to the history of nations. But the worst misfortune only occurs wherever the enmity is generated by the war itself, as in the 1914–1918 war, and not as it would be right and sensible, namely that an older, unswayed enmity, true and total to the Day of Judgment, should led to a total war.

Translator’s Notes

Originally published in Völkerbund und Völkerrecht, vol. 4, 1937, this essay was reproduced in Posirionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar-Gent-Versailles, 1929–1939, (Hamburg, 1940), pp. 235–239.

1. General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) is best known for his book Vom Kriege, never finished and published posthumously, which incidentally has been translated into English under the title On War. There are numerous versions available in print.

2. Carl Schmitt’s own political principles of “will” and “energy,” components of his qualitative concept of total state, derive from this characteristic feature of “total war”: collective determination to assume a cause considered worthwhile and unreserved commitment to its fulfillment. As a generalized rallying around and enthusiasm for a cause and a particular course of action, it is a frequent phenomenon of social psychology, yet its usually ephemeral character makes it unfit as a durable basis of any social structure. I remember the enthusiasm with which in 1982, to a man, the Argentines, for instance, rallied to the idea of going to war to free the Maldives and hurried to put it into practice, and the accompanying hatred which grew against the British. The enthusiasm cooled off quickly, but not the hatred, which lingered on. To perpetuate the enthusiasm, a plethora of other factors have to be brought in, of which, in the case of Germany at the beginning of the ’thirties, Carl Schmitt actually had not a clue.

3. The “lesson” is in keeping with the Hitlerite Frederician cult and legitimating tradition and does not claim to be historically accurate. Although a digression that seems out of place, it has a certain significance for the time it was made. In the autumn of 1936, Hitler circulated a memorandum revealing his expansionist intentions. Then in 1937, the organization of the nation to serve those intentions began, a process which coincided with the rise of the SS state. In November of the same year the German media were ordered to keep silent about the preparations for a “total war.” Bearing all that in mind, Schmitt’s short digression reads more as a warning of danger than a point of military strategy.

4 . What is interesting here is his insistence on the existential essence of the phenomenon, which is consonant with his earlier definition of the political and at the same time renders the distinction between the professional soldier and the civilian meaningless. Moreover, total enmity with its implicit elimination of the adversary excludes any prospect of a peace treaty, as the war is to go on until one of the belligerents is annihilated.

5. Das Volk in Waffen (The Nation in Arms) happens to be the title of a work on total war by Colmar von der Goltz (1843–1916), published in 1883, and which is an important stepping stone in the reflection on modern warfare that led to Ludendorff’s book.

6. At the beginning of February 1938, Adolf Hitler became commander in chief of the German armed forces, appointing General Keitel his assistant at the head of the High Command of the Armed Forces, as the War Ministry was dissolved.

7. Eventually only the Soviet Union came closest to Carl Schmitt’s expectations, while the United States waged a fully-fledged three-dimensional war, dictated by its geographical position and sustained by its vast economic and technical resources most of which remained outside the battle zone.

8. For a broader treatment of the subject-matter see Carl Schmitt’s Land und Meer, which as Land and Sea is available in an English translation (Washington, D.C.: Plutarch Press, 1997).

9. The conflict between the civil society and the military in Germany was the subject-matter of a longer essay by Carl Schmitt, published in Hamburg in 1934 under the title Staatsgefüge und Zusammenbruch des Zweites Reiches. Der Sieg des Burgers über den Soldaten (The State Structure and the Collapse of the Second Reich. The Burghers’ Victory Over the Soldiers).

 

10. Röhm, the ideological soldier, had been eliminated in 1934, at the same time as the political soldiers, the Generals von Schleicher and von Bredow. Furthermore, as already mentioned in note 6 above, the War Ministry ceased to exist at the beginning of 1938, while the Commander in Chief, Field Marshal Werner von Blomberg was removed from his post for having compromised himself by marrying a “lady with a past,” and his prospective successor, General von Fritsch was forced to resign on a trumped-up Charge of homosexuality. At the same time, sixteen other generals were retired and forty-four were transferred. Göring who had been very active in carrying out this “integration” got for it only the title of field marshal, as Hitler kept for himself the supreme military command.

 

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Article printed from Counter-Currents Publishing: http://www.counter-currents.com

URL to article: http://www.counter-currents.com/2011/07/total-enemy-total-state-and-total-war/

Herman Wirth en de Indo-Europese voorgeschiedenis

door Marc. EEMANS

Ex: http://marceemans.wordpress.com/

Toen het Derde Rijk ineengestort was hebben heel wat gezellen van het eerste uur gepoogd zich – met min of meer sukses – als slachtoffers van het nationaal-socialisme voor te doen. Anderzijds had de regelrechte nazi-jacht die de overwinnaars ontketenden tot gevolg dat een aantal persoonlijkheden die tot de konservatieve revolutie behoorden en vanaf het begin duidelijk afstand hadden genomen van Hitler, toch werden verdacht, vervolgd en soms zelfs gedood.

Dat was onder meer het geval met de jurist Carl Schmitt, de schrijvers Ernst en Georg Jünger en Ernst von Salomon, de wijsgeren Martin Heidegger en Hermann von Keyserling, Rudolf von Sebottendorf, een der meest eminente leden der Thule-Gesellschaft, of nog de geleerden Friedrich Hielscher en Herman Wirth.

 

Ernst Jünger bracht de oorlog door te Parijs, als Duits officier. Hij had kennis van het tegen Hitler gerichte komplot van 20 juli 1944, maar was een van de weinige, zoniet de enige samenzweerder die werd gespaard. Hoe Heidegger vervolgd werd door de fanatici van het regime hebben wij hier reeds beschreven (zie: Martin Heidegger en de traditie van het Westers denken, in TK&S afl. 12, november 1980, pag. 150/11-20). Met opmerkelijke waardigheid en een stoïcisme dat dat der Oudheid evenaart, verdroeg hij zowel deze vervolging als, na 1945, die door linksen van allerlei pluimage.

Men kent Ernst von Salomons boek Der Fragebogen (1951), waarin hij de soms lachwekkende, maar altijd hatelijke aard van de “denazifikatie-riten” aanklaagt. In feite trad von Salomon nooit tot het nationaal-socialisme toe, dat hij – net als o.m. Julius Evola – zijn demagogische en plebeïsche aard verweet. Zijn vriend uit de dagen van de Brigade Ehrhardt, Hartmut Plaas, werd in 1944 omgebracht in het KZ Ravensbrück.

Datzelfde misprijzen vinden we bij Hermann von Keyserling, stichter van de School der Wijsheid, die echter toch, na de anarchie van de Weimar-republiek, de opkomst van het nationaal-socialisme begroette als een zegen voor Duitsland, maar zich dan weer plots uit alle politieke aktiviteit terugtrekt.

Rudolf von Sebottendorf kreeg last met de nazi-autoriteiten na de publikatie van zijn boek Bevor Hitler kam: het werd meteen verboden en bijna alle beschikbare eksemplaren vernietigd. Maar ook na 1945 blééf het door de Geallieerden verboden, zodat dit boek, dat voor de genesis van het nationaal-socialisme van kapitaal belang is, omzeggens onvindbaar werd, vermits het nooit heruitgegeven of vertaald werd. (1) De schrijver zelf verliet Duitsland en verdronk in 1945 in de Bosporus, in geheimzinnige omstandigheden.

Een geheimzinnig personage is ook Friedrich Hielscher. Men kent zijn naam doorgaans nog enkel omdat hij Wolfram Sievers, sekretaris-generaal van het wetenschappelijk instituut Ahnenerbe bijstond, toen die op 2 juni 1948 als “oorlogsmisdadiger” in Landsberg werd opgehangen. Hielscher zélf werd door de denazificeerders niet verontrust. Men beweerde dat hij lid zou zijn geweest van de Thule-Gesellschaft, maar in de ledenlijst van dit genootschap (opgesteld door Rudolf von Sebottendorf en door René Alleau gepubliceerd in zijn Hitler et les sociétés secrètes, Grasset, Parijs, 1969) vinden we zijn naam niet terug.

Ernst Jünger, die hem goed moet hebben gekend, noteert in zijn Parijs’ dagboek op 14 oktober 1943 “Hielscher bevestigde het vermoeden – dat ik al lang koesterde – dat hij een Kerk zou gesticht hebben. De dogmatiek is hij al voorbij en in de liturgie is hij ver gevorderd. Hij heeft mij een reeks gezangen getoond en een cyclus feesten, het heidens jaar, die een ganse ordening godheden, kleuren, dieren, spijzen, edelstenen, planten … omvat.” De konfrontatie Hielscher-Sievers, tijdens diens laatste ogenblikken, lijkt de thesis “Hielscher, kerkstichter” te bevestigen, als men tenminste geloof mag hechten aan hen die Wolfram Sievers’ martelgang beschreven. Jean-Claude Frère schrijft in zijn boek Nazisme et sociétés secrètes (Grasset, Parijs, 1974): “Toen Sievers zijn vonnis vernam, vroeg hij in zijn laatste ogenblikken te worden bijgestaan door Hielscher. Dit werd hem toegestaan; en toen kon men, aan de voet van de galg, het verbazend, krankzinnig schouwspel beleven van twee mannen die een onbekende ritus voltrokken, onbegrijpelijke formules spraken, en alle aanwezigen – tot de beul toe – zenuwachtig maakten. Tenslotte drukte Hielscher Sievers tegen zich aan, de veroordeelde trad achteruit, boog voor zijn meester en leverde zich dan, onbewogen, aan de beul over.”

In het spoor van de studie der geschiedenis van onze voorouders zullen we straks Herman Wirth ontmoeten, maar blijven we nog even bij Friedrich Hielscher stilstaan. Hij werd geboren in 1902, studeerde rechten en bewoog zich in de jaren twintig in zgn. nationaalrevolutionaire kringen, op een behoorlijke afstand van het nationaal-socialisme. Hij schreef diverse boeken, waaronder Das Reich (1931) en raakte bevriend met Sievers, die hem het werk leerde kennen van Herman Wirth, wiens leerlingen ze beide werden. Hun wegen liepen echter weldra sterk uiteen: terwijl Sievers het nationaal-socialisme vervoegde ging Hielscher in de oppositie. Das Reich werd verboden en hij kreeg bij herhaling last met de nazi-autoriteiten. Hij werd de ‘ideoloog’ van een verzetsgroep die men best als Widerstandsgruppe Hielscher kan aanduiden. Toch bleef hij met Sievers bevriend, werkte aan de rand van het Ahnenerbe met hem mee en zou hem zelfs in zijn verzetsaktiviteiten hebben betrokken – wat hij tevergeefs, om Sievers van de strop te redden, voor het Nürnbergtribunaal trachtte te bewijzen.

Carl Schmitt werd er door zijn tegenstanders van beticht te hebben meegewerkt aan het opstellen van wetten, ten tijde van het Derde Rijk: ongetwijfeld deed hij dat ook. Vanaf 1935 werd hij echter de schietschijf van een aantal aan het nazi-regime onderworpen juristen en een aanval tegen hem in het officiële SS-blad Das schwarze Korps bracht hem ertoe zich volledig terug te trekken uit het openbare leven. Na 1945 hield een geallieerde onderzoekskommissie zich met hem bezig, klasseerde de aantijgingen “zonder gevolg” en rehabiliteerde hem.

Alvorens we nu de idee en het werk van de protohistoricus Herman Wirth behandelen, schetsen we eerst zijn levensloop. Herman Wirth Roeper Bosch, Nederlander, werd in 1885 te Utrecht geboren, als zoon van een turnleraar. Hij studeerde Germaanse filologie, volkskunde, geschiedenis en muziekwetenschap aan de universiteiten van Utrecht, Leipzig en Bazel. In 1910 doktoreert hij op de thesis De ondergang van het Nederlandse Volkslied, die een jaar later in Den Haag als boek verscheen. In 1909 was hij al tot lektor benoemd aan de universiteit van Berlijn, voor het vakgebied Nederlandse filologie.

Hij meldt zich in 1914 als oorlogsvrijwilliger in het Pruissische leger en wordt kort daarop verbindingsofficier te Brussel. Hij onderhield de kontakten met de groep Jong Vlaanderen, die de motor was van het aktivisme, en nam ook aktief deel aan de proklamatie van de Raad van Vlaanderen in 1917 en de kortstondige Vlaamse zelfstandigheid , die in 1918 met de nederlaag van het Duitse keizerrijk ter ziele ging (2). Intussen was hij, in 1916, aan de Berlijnse universiteit tot professor benoemd.

ln 1920 probeerde Wirth in Nederland onder de benaming Dietse Trekvogels een jeugdbeweging van de grond te krijgen, naar het model van de Wandervogel in Duitsland en de Blauwvoeterie in Vlaanderen. In 1923 vestigt hij zich dan in Marburg an der Lahn, als zelfstandig ethnograaf en begint met zijn diepgaand onderzoek naar de Europese pre historie. In 1925 werd hij lid van de  N.S.D.A.P., maar in juli 1926 stapt hij er weer uit. In 1928 laat hij bij Diederichs in Jena zijn bekend werk Der Aufgang der Menschheit verschijnen. In die periode behoorden Friedrich Hielscher en Wolfram Sievers tot zijn trouwste leerlingen. Net ais Wirth zelf werkten ze, op diverse vlakken, aan Ahnenerbe mee, ook al was alleen Sievers een partijman. Wirth was trouwens een van de oprichters van Ahnenerbe en moet er één der invloedrijke leden van zijn geweest, vermits hem meteen de sektie Studie van voorhistorisch schrift en symbolen werd toevertrouwd. In 1935 en 1936 was hij vele maanden op studiereis in Skandinavië. In 1938 brak hij met Ahnenerbe, wei onder de dubbele druk van de vakhistorici, die hem voor een dilettant hielden, en van de nazi•ideologen die hem hoogst kwalijk namen dat hij niet ophield te proklameren dat elke Führerkultus historisch gezien een vervalverschijnsel is…

De eerste bekende anti-Wirth brochure was van de hand van Prof. Dr. Paul Hambruch en droeg de alleszins niet dubbelzinnige titel: Die Irrtumer und Phantasien des Prof. Dr. Herman Wirth/Marburg, Verfasser von “Der Aufgang der Menschheit” und “Was heisst deutsch”. Dit denunciërende geschrift werd dan nog uitgerekend door het Deutscher Polizeiverlag uitgegeven (Lübeck, 1931). De latere Berlijnse n.s.-rektor Alfred Baeumler, bekend o.m. om zijn even perfide als doldrieste aanvallen tegen Heidegger, volgde weldra met het boekje Was bedeutet Herman Wirth für die Wissenschaft? (1932).

ln datzelfde jaar volgde van de geoloog Prof. Dr. Fritz Wiegers Herman Wirth und die deutsche Wissenschaft, waarin Wirth openlijk van dilettantisme werd aangeklaagd: “De geschriften van deze ethnoloog vormen slechts een weefsel van valse besluiten, van onbewezen beweringen en van ontkenningen van wetenschappelijke evidenties” … En verder: “De ‘ontdekkingen’ van Wirth zijn niets meer dan de fantazieën van een door de religieuze gedachte geobsedeerde geest”. In 1934 verscheen dan van Rudolf Glaser een brochure die Herman Wirth kategorisch verwierp, ditmaal niet in naam van de wetenschap, maar in naam van het nationaal-socialisme: Wer ist Herman Wirth? Volkstümliche Aufsatze über die Forschungen Herman Wirth’s von Rudolf Glaser. In de bibliografie vindt men al 62 pro- en contra-Wirth geschriften.

Natuurlijk verschenen er ook artikels en werken die van sympathie en belangstelling getuigden, maar de (tegen)partij had een veel grotere invloed, vooral toen Prof. Dr. Wiegers het argument hanteerde dat Wirth nog in 1932 relaties onderhield met de vrijmetselarij en Bolko Freiherr von Richthofen, de voorzitter van de Beroepsvereniging der Duitse Prehistorici, de aandacht trok op Wirth’s vriendschappelijke betrekkingen met bepaalde Joden… In een brief aan Prof. Hans F.K. Günther schreef Richthofen dat hij “niet begreep waarom men Wirth zou moeten ontzien omwille van taktische en humanitaire redenen” en op 16 januari 1934 liet hij aan Ministerialrat Sunkel weten: “Herr Wirth weiss genau, dass ihm führend besonders kiimpferische Nationalsozialisten gegenüberstehen. Mit Heil Hitler und deutschem Gruss, Ihr ergebenster gez. B. Frhr. v. Richthofen”.

Ook voor de grote kampagne tegen zijn ideeën en zijn persoon moet Herman Wirth binnen Ahnenerbe wel aanstoot gegeven hebben, door zijn onderzoekingen naar een oerkultuur en een oerreligie, die op een heel andere man-vrouw-relatie steunde, als hoogste godheid een “Almoeder” zou gekend hebben en eerder “demokratisch” van inslag was, in de zin van de latere IJslandse demokratie dan.

Wirth verdedigde de stelling dat de overheersend mannelijke trekken in de late kultuur, met hun overwaardering van het militaire leiderschap, typische dekadentieverschijnselen waren uit een periode van kulturele laagkonjunktuur zoals de tijd van de grote volksverhuizingen en de Vikingerperiode. De pogingen van het nationaal-socialisme om precies met deze periodes terug aan te knopen waren hem dan ook een politieke gruwel én kulturele nonsens.

In zijn studie Die Frage der Frauenberge – eine europäische Gegenwartsfrage (1972) komt Herman Wirth nog eens terug op zijn oude thesis: “De Vrouwenberg bij Cappel, nabij Marburg, is een van de meer dan honderd vrouwenbergen, maagden-, jonkvrouwen- enz. – bergen, -burgen, -stenen van het Duitse taalgebied en volksgebied. Wat hun ontstaan en hun bloeitijd betreft behoren deze Vrouwenbergen tot een bepaalde grote periode van het Avondland, gaande van de periode der grote stenen graven en de rotstekeningen in de Jongsteentijd tot bij het begin van de Volksverhuizingen. Over de geschiedenis en de betekenis van deze “Vrouwenbergen” is niets bekend. Dat er niets over geweten is, dat men niet eens geprobeerd heeft op het vraagstuk van de “Vrouwenbergen” enige vat te krijgen, heeft een tweeledige reden. De eerste reden is van psychologische aard: in een nog altijd mannelijk-ideologisch gericht wetenschapssysteem kan het probleem van een blijkbaar verheven plaats van de vrouw op religieus, kultureel en sociaal vlak geen geschiedkundige betekenis en belangrijkheid worden toegekend. En de tweede reden was dat de “Vrouwenbergen” tot de zgn. voorgeschiedenis behoren, d.w.z. dat er over dit onderwerp geen historische bronnen, geen schriftelijke overlevering (inskripties, berichten) bestaat. Dat er daarover toch een schriftelijke overlevering bestond en bestaat, niet in letterschrift maar in symboolschrift, daarvan hadden en hebben de totnogtoe bevoegde wetenschappen tot op de dag van vandaag geen idee: de prehistorici niet, maar evenmin de volkskundigen, de germanisten, de godsdiensthistorici, de mythologen enz.”

Zijn vriend Dr. Joachim Weitzäcker schrijft: “Na Herman Wirth’s “verwijdering” uit Ahnenerbe, dat hij gesticht had (3), verloor hij in 1938 zijn leerstoel aan de Berlijnse universiteit, omwille van zijn op gewetensbezwaren gegrondveste oppositie en zijn eis tot vrij onderzoek. Hij moest terug naar Marburg en kreeg verbod om nog onderricht te geven, te publiceren en in het openbaar te spreken. Tenslotte leverde de wet van het stilzwijgen zijn naam aan de vergetelheid over…”

Maar Wirth was niét helemaal vergeten: in 1945 namen de Amerikanen zijn bibliotheek en zijn omvangrijke dokumentatie in beslag; hij bleef aan dezelfde verbodsbepalingen onderworpen als tijdens de laatste zeven jaren van het Hitlerregime.

Zonder dokumentatie en bijna zonder bestaansmiddelen, herbegon hij, bijgestaan door zijn echtgenote Margarete Schmitt, en enkele vrienden, met bewonderswaardige moed aan zijn levenswerk. In 1960 verscheen in Wenen Um den Ursinn des Menschseins. Hij stichtte de Europaische Sammlung für religionsgeschichte en, in 1979 begon hij – 94 jaar jong! – in de ruïnes van een oud slot te Lichtenberg nabij Kusel, met de installatie van een museum en van archieven, die al zijn geschriften en zijn verzamelingen zou herbergen.

De allerlaatste jaren, haast volledig verlamd, werkte hij onverdroten verder, geholpen door enkele trouwe vrienden, en in leven gehouden met wat schaarse subsidies. Begin van dit jaar is hij er overleden.

Laat ons nu (noodgedwongen oppervlakkig) onderzoeken, wat Herman Wirth’s werk betekent. In zijn paleo-epigrafische opzoekingen, die de historische rekonstruktie van een oerreligie beogen, waagt Wirth zich in feite erg ver in de voorhistorie. In zijn opvatting zouden de Indo-europeërs slechts de vertegenwoordigers zijn van een erg late, hoogstens protohistorische periode.

Inderdaad, al wat de voorstanders van de “primordiale traditie”, waarvan René Guénon en Julius Evola de meest eminente vertegenwoordigers zijn, als positief d.i. kontroleerbaar kunnen bevestigen, gaat niet verder achteruit dan de eerste geschriften, waarmede volgens hen in feite de geschiedenis begint. Al de rest is slechts gissing, die op – weliswaar konvergerende – tradities steunt … doch het blijven tradities, om niet het woord ‘legenden’ te gebruiken. De meeste van Wirth’s werken moeten ook tot deze konjekturale wetenschap gerekend worden, en al zijn opsommingen van tekens en symbolen, waarvan hij de uitleg geeft, steunen (althans volgens zijn criticus Fritz Wiegers) slechts op vaak vernunftige interpretaties, die niet of moeilijk kontroleerbaar zijn. Dat er naast het “letterschrift” ook een koherent “symboolschrift” bestaat, word t intussen minder betwist dan ten tijde van Wirth’s eerste werken: het probleem ligt op het vlak van de duiding.

Vermelden we terloops dat de klassieke prehistorici wantrouwig staan tegenover elke subjektieve interpretatie. Ze doen opgravingen, ontdekken fossielen of voorwerpen van aile aard, klasseren ze en situeren ze meestal naar gelang de vindplaats. Uit hun ontdekkingen kunnen we afleiden, dat in deze of gene periode de Homo sapiens die of deze stap zette in de langzame opgang der mensheid naar wat we prozaisch “beschaving” noemen. Zo spreekt men over lager-, midden-, en lioger-paleoliticum, mesoliticum, neoliticum, bronstijdperk en ijzertijdperk, mét hun onderverdelingen, die ais “beschavingen” bestempeld worden, en waarvan de recentste die van Hallstatt en die van La Tène zijn. Om die periodes te dateren gebruikt men heden de radio-carbonmethode. Intussen ontdekken de prehistorici aanwijzingen omtrent de religie, de technologie, de begrafenisriten, zonder de eerste kunstuitingen te vergeten.

Onder de resten van een tamelijk geëvolueerde beschaving vermelden we de rotstekeningen van Altamira en Lascaux, die volgens de klassieke prehistorici uit het laag-neoliticum stammen (zowat tussen 35.000 en 10.000 v.o.j.). Vermits ze in een geografische ruimte liggen die zich ver van Noord-Europa bevindt, konden ze noch Wirth, noch de geleerden van Ahnenerbe interesseren, vervuld ais ze waren van die Indo-europese beschaving, waarvan de oudste sporen niet vroeger te situeren zijn dan in het 5de of 4de milennium vóór onze tijdrekening. Eerder zou men van het 3de of zelfs het 2de milennium moeten spreken, wat onze Europese primordiale traditie wei érg dicht bij ons legt. Werkt een kenner van de Indo-europese traditie ais Georges Dumézil trouwens niet bij voorkeur op geschreven bronnen? En nu weten we, dat het schrift van tamelijk recente datum is.

De klassieke prehistorici struikelen nog over raadsels, zoals die van de megalithen. Ze stellen hun bestaan vast, wagen een interpretatie, maar trekken geen besluiten: dat laten ze liever over aan geleerden als Wirth, die ze voor het overige wantrouwen. En wat raadsels ais Atlantis of het verloren kontinent Mu betreft, verkiezen ze er niet aan te raken en laten gissingen omtrent die vraagstukken over aan mensen die ze ais specialisten van “science-fiction” beschouwen.

Wij moeten toegeven dat de klassieke prehistorici al wat wij onze “primordiale Traditie” noemen, ignoreren; het vertrekpunt van deze benaming en van de vraagstukken die er verband mee houden, vindt men in een werk van de Duitse taalkundige Franz Bopp Vergleichende Grammatik des Sanskrit, Zend, Griechischen, Lateinischen, Lithauischen, Gotischen und Deutschen, dat uit de jaren 1833-52 stamt. Het vraagstuk van de Indo-europeërs breidde zich vlug uit van de taalkunde naar het probleem van het woongebied der volkeren die Indo-europese talen spraken en schreven, zonder dat de geleerden het eens konden worden over het vertrekpunt en de datering van deze verspreiding. Het zou interessant zijn dit probleem te bestuderen: men zou dan vaststellen dat op dit vlak de grootste verwarring heerst. Wat zeker is: overal waar de Indo-europeërs zich vestigden, overvleugelden ze de bevolking die al in dat gebied woonde, en onderwierpen ze hen (de Dravida’s in Indië b.v.).

Overal, zowel in Europa ais in Azië, vormden ze de twee overheersende kasten, die de geestelijken en die der strijders of ridders.

Om naar Herman Wirth te rug te keren, stellen we vast dat hij, al zat hij dan min of meer in de lijn van Bachofen, de theoreticus van het matriarchaat, toch niet afkerig was van de Odinistische mythologie, die hij uit de graffiti op de rotswanden van Noord-Europa meende te mogen afleiden en die hij poogde in te voegen in zijn konstrukties omtrent een matriarchale godsdienst. Ook de runen horen daar ergens bij, zodat men in zijn theorieën een soort mythisch-godsdienstig synkretisme mag zien, waarvan het “Mutter Erde”-begrip het sluitstuk is. Het is onbetwistbaar (de klassieke prehistorie bévestigt het ons) dat er in het Atlantisch Europa van het derde millenium een “megalitische” godsdienst bestond, met aanbidden van een vruchtbaarheidsgodin, die tegelijk de begrafenis-riten voorzat. Maar even zeker is dat er sinds het neoliticum (wellicht zelfs sinds het paleolitieum) een verering van de vrouwelijke godheid bestond: dit wordt bevestigd door talrijke beelden, als de “Venus” van Savignano (Italië), Gargarino (USSR) en Willendorff (Oostenrijk); of door de vrouwenkoppen van Dolmi Vestaniee (Tsjeehoslovakije) en Brassempuy (Frankrijk), wat ons zéker tot zowat 30.000 jaren vóór onze tijdrekening terugvoert.

Wirth’s onderzoeken waren vooral op Noord-Europa gericht, zoals zijn reizen uit 1935-36 aantonen. Wij moeten er, om met de klassieke prehistorici te spreken, uit besluiten dat zijn onderzoek vooral het zogenaamd mesoliticum betrof, dat aanvangt rond 10.000 v66r onze jaartelling en zich uitstrekt over het neoliticum en de twee metaaltijdperken, tot de eerste eeuwen van onze jaartelling, voor de kerstening van Noord-Europa.

Volgens de primordiale Traditie moet er echter, vóór die tijd, een ander, veel zachter klimaat geheerst hebben, toen Groenland en Spitzbergen groene en vruchtbare gebieden waren , (de naam Groenland wijst er op!). Hoe dit tijdperk situeren ? Laat ons het antwoord afwachten van de geologen, de prehistorici of de historici van de primordiale Traditie. Immers, in welke periode van het Pleistoceen de groene velden van het aloude Ultima Thule situeren ? Wie weet gaat het om een vrij recente periode, uit het zesde tot derde milennium vóór onze jaartelling, en die men in de geologie de Atlantische periode noemt. Toen was het legendarische Mu-gebied allang, rond 12.500 of 12.000 jaar voor onze jaartelling, in de golven verdwenen (4). Waarschijnlijk verdween, tijdens dezelfde natuurramp, Atlantis, dat andere hypothetische land .

Wat er ook van zij, doorheen heel zijn lange loopbaan heeft Wirth niet opgehouden, zijn studies over Europa’s voorgeschiedenis voort te zetten, daarbij vooral de aandacht vestigend op de paleo-epigrafie.

In zijn speurtocht naar al wat de voorhistorische Moeder Aarde-kultus kan bevestigen, heeft hij het onmetelijk belang onderstreept van de pre-Indo-europese beschaving voor het kultureelleven én de religie in Europa. Het magisch-religieuze leven in die periode hield hem voortdurend bezig, en hij bewees dat vóór de stroom Indogermaanse veroveraars, die over heel de antieke wereld van de Atlantische oceaan tot het Nabije- en Verre-Oosten neerstortte, er hier reeds mensen leefden die zich even zeer als de nieuwkomers om geestelijke zaken bekommerden.

Mogelijk zijn Wirth’s werken getekend door een zeker dilettantisme, maar loopt niet iedereen die zich in de kronkelingen van ons oudste verleden waagt, dit risiko ? Hoeveel bewonderaars van dat geheimzinnig verleden goochelen niet met min of meer fantaisistische gevolgtrekkingen en benaderingen, zich tegelijk als “gezaghebbend” voordoend ? Zij weten, wat u, de lezer, niet weet; zij zijn ingewijd en u bent het niet. Zij halen hun ‘wetenschap’, rechtstreeks of onrechtstreeks, bij een of ndere Tibetaanse monnik, of bij een of andere, min of meer geheimzinnige Goeroe, die de sleutel tot een eeuwenoud mysterie bezit…

Laat ons maar toegeven: hoeveel pretentieuze domheden vinden we niet onder de dekmantel van wat onze vrienden van de Traditie, de ‘Primordiale Traditie’ noemen ? René Guénon en Julius Evola hebben zich veel moeite getroost, de kwakzalvers van de – zogezegd – traditionele wetenschappen te ontmaskeren. Desondanks lopen ze nog rond en staan ze voortdurend klaar, u om het even welke valse ‘revelatie’ of welk produkt van hun op hol geslagen verbeelding ook aan te smeren …

Moeten we Herman Wirth bij de kwakzalvers van de Traditie onderbrengen ? Wij zijn overtuigd van niet, maar wél dienen we met omzichtigheid de resultaten van zijn onderzoekingen te beschouwen.

Zo heeft hij zich vér in de zogenaamde Ura Linda-kroniek gewaagd. Is ze een vervalsing, een louter literaire fantasie in de aard van de “Ossian-liederen” ? Is het een laattijdige kompilatie van een mondelinge traditie, ais de “Kalewala” ? De vraag blijft gesteld.

Vergeten we anderzijds ni et dat hij zolang hij persona grata was bij Ahnenerbe, ais groot geleerde op het vlak van de prehistorie werd beschouwd; en dat hij na zijn ongenade, zelfs het recht verbeurde les te geven en in het openbaar te spreken.

Jean Beelen schreef: “De onmetelijke verdienste van Prof. Wirth ligt erin, de oerperiode van het geschrift en de symboliek te hebben dóórgelicht en te hebben bewezen dat de mensen uit die tijd een kosmisch aanvoelen hadden dat aan de basis lag van een volkse godsdienst”. Dat is al héél wat en zo moeten we wei rekening houd en met al wat hij deed, en al wat hij schreef, zelfs al blijven we vrij te redetwisten over zijn – onbetwistbaar belangrijke – aanbreng inzake de voorgeschiedenis van de Westerse wereld.

Marc. EEMANS

(Vert. Roeland Raes)
(1) Het boek van Sebottendorf is niet te verwarren met dat van Dietrich Bronder dat eveneens de titel “Bevor Hitler kam” draagt (Hans Pfeiffer-Verlag, Hannover, 1964). Het essay van R.H. Phelps “Before Hitler came”. Thule Society and German Order” (in het Journal of Modern History, 1963) is géén vertaling maar een zelfstandige studie.
(2) Over Herman Wirth en het aktivisme, over Herman Wirth en het Vlaams-nationalisme, is het laatste woord nog niet gezegd. Willemsen en Elias vermelden hem even in de rand. Heel wat meer gegevens vindt men in een studie van Dr. Lammert Buning over Wirth, verschenen in Wetenschappelijke Tijdingen, 3/74.
(3) In feite medegesticht, samen met Hermann Reischle, Heinrich Himmler, Adolf Babel, Georg Ebrecht, Erwin Metzner en Richard Hintmann.
(4) Zie James Churchward: “Mu, le continent perdu.”

Interview with "New Antaios"

 

Interview with "New Antaios"

(http://www.new-antaios.net)

Who are you? What’s the main purpose of your “New-Antaios” project? And why do you refer to the mythological figure of Antaios? Is it a revival of Jünger’s and Eliade’s Antaios or an English counterpart of the former Antaios journal of the Belgian novelist Christopher Gérard?

I was born in Agram (a German name for the city of Zagreb) in Croatia just over 42 years ago. I have lived in Zagreb during the times while my country was occupied by Yugoslav communist regime led by dictator Josip Broz Tito. There I have studied Political Sciences at the University of Zagreb and later on Philosophy and Psychology at Hrvatski Studiji, University of Zagreb. I have studied as well at Universities in Scandinavia, United Kingdom and Germany. I am coming from a family which is of an ethnic German heritage.

Antaios is uniting Earth and Sea, soil and water without whom both there is no life. Antaios father was Poseidon, the God of Sea and mother Gaia of the Earth. Antaios or Antaeus in Greek means as well ‘’against’’ so in this way ‘’The New Antaios’’ is in cultural and philosophical terms set to make an intellectual bulwark against that what is destroying Our European culture, tradition, heritage, folklore and with that ultimately our roots.

Journal ‘’The New Antaios’’ is the continuation of the original ‘’Antaios’’ Journal of Mircea Eliade and Ernst Jünger so we can say it is a revival albeit the Journal will/is as well reflecting on all that is happening in these postmodern times. Hence Journal represents what I call ‘’Postmodern European thought’’ and as such serves primarily as an outlet for the postmodern philosophers and thinkers.

I do respect and highly admire Christopher Gerard and his work on Antaios in years from years 1992 to 2001. Like Gerard I dislike New Age teachings and don’t have any interest in TraditionalistSchool.  The New Antaios is made of four sections which are making the whole Journal. First part is ‘’Plethon’’ the name I gave after the Byzantine Hellenistic philosopher George Gemistos Plethon and articles in that section are related to Hellenism, Heathenism in a scholarly way. Contributions will be made as well by certain authors from Asatru background. Heathenism and Heithni comes from the Old Norse word heiðni which was used to describe the pre-Christian spiritual beliefs and practices of the Northern European peoples. The word Heithinn (or Heathen) comes from the Old Norse word heiðinn, an adjective to describe the ideals of Heithni (ex. Heithinn ethics - those ethics which conform to Heithni), or as a noun to describe those who live by the ethic and world-view of Heithni (ex. He is Heithinn, those people are Heithnir [plural]). Heiðni also means 'high, pure, clear' in Icelandic language. Word also describes person who is a dweller in place in the nature. Postmodern Heathens are those people who are reviving and revitalizing the tradition through serious study, research and dedication combined with the worship of the Gods and Goddesses or just simply in a way of their thinking without the ritual worship part. Personally I am keen of combining the two in a proper and balanced way. Second section is ‘’Aesthetic Vedanta’’ named after the book by Swami Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Maharaja, Western teacher of ancient tradition of Gaudiya Vaishnavism. Aesthetic Vedanta section deals with Hindutva, Hinduism,Vaishnavism and Gaudiya Vaishnavism exclusively. Third section is ‘’Suncovrat’’ a Croatian archaic word for the Solstice and deals with pre-Christian cultures which existed prior to Christianization of what makes nowadays Republic of Croatia. Fourth section is the main section of the Antaios Journal.

I would further like to point out that Christopher Gerard has no input whatsoever and isn’t in any way associated or affiliated with this new Journal. That is why the journal has prefix ‘’The New’’ to clearly mark difference with previous two journals. As far as I know Gerard’s Journal ceased to exist just on the turn of the century hence prefix ‘’The New’’ is completely appropriate here. While it will preserve and retain the original idea and concept with due respect to previous editors and directors of the Journal, it will be updated with short blog style texts, proper academic articles and essays which reflect on and take a critical eye of current state of affairs in different areas of  philosophy, politics, culture, art, tradition, science and these postmodern times .

What was the maturation process of your worldview? Has it to do with Croatian politics or not?

 I would say that I have spiritual and political Weltanschauung complementing each other. I was brought up in a family whose background is Christian albeit my late grandfather and my late father were both reading authors like Nietzsche and Jünger and considere themselves to be Pagans. I was brought up on stories from ancient Greece and Old Norse and Germanic tales whom my friends in school didn’t even hear about. My own father was a Heathen. He wrote small and up until now unpublished treatise on what he calls ‘’Raan’’. In this book Raan is knowledge of the Gods and Goddesses who once in previous Yugas did visit our planet. In this work he is influenced by Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophy.

After spending years at the University in Croatia studying Political sciences in Zagreb I went to become a monk in Gaudiya Vaishnava tradition. The reason for that was again in the Family. During the mid to late 80es my family got interested in Gaudiya Vaishnavism so I started reading and studying different books of Vedic knowledge like Upanishads, Puranas and Bhagavad Gita. I have discovered in mid 90es about Traditionalist School, Rene Guenon and Julius Evola. In years to come I have been reading and studying about diverse cultures, traditions of Europe and parallel with that I got initiated in the Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism while travelling to one of my spiritual pilgrimages to India.

Hence as a result, my own spiritual belief system would be Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism, while I permanently study and read about Indo-European beliefs of our ancestors, Ostrogothic pre-Christian beliefs, Old Norse, Hellenic and Germanic pre-Christian belief systems and Mithraism. Vedic knowledge in my opinion is very important key to unlock many secrets of the European tradition itself. In line with that I very much admire Hindutva writers such as Sita Ram Goel and Ram Swarup, Indian historian Bal Gangadhar Tilak , contemporary scholar from Belgium Dr. Koenraad Elst as well as Alain Danielou who are all big influence. Next influence would be primarily my own teacher Sri Ananta das Babaji Maharaja by whom I was directly initiated in Parivar or Traditional line which goes back many centuries ago, then authors such as: Sri Kunjabihari das Babaji Maharaja (who is the direct teacher of my own teacher Ananta das Babaji Maharaja), Kundali das, Binode Bihari das Babaji and Sripad Bhaktivedanta Tripurari Swami Maharaja whose certain books and teachings are in my opinion the Gaudiya Vaishnava answer to Traditionalist school. There should be veneration of our ancestors together with the firm belief in divine origins of Our Ancestral lines, veneration of Nature and veneration of the Gods and Goddesses which are part of our European Identity. Perhaps it would be the best to quote here another great influence of mine, Dominique Venner: ''To live according to tradition is to conform to the ideal that incarnates, to cultivate excellence according to its standard, to rediscover its roots, to transmit its heritage, to be in solidarity with the people who uphold it. ''

Croatian politics were influential to my worldview and perhaps it would be better to give a bit of background explanation from the not so well known Croatian history. Certain people would like such knowledge to remain hidden as such. In my opinion Croatian people have a unique position in Europe. There are people who label Croatia Western Balkans which is a complete nonsense. According to what I was reading from diverse sources Croats aren’t only just Slavs and are mixture of Slavenized Germanic tribes, Celtic tribes, Illyrians, ancient Romans, ancient Greeks and Indo-Persians. Over the span of more than half a century Croat academics and researchers who were proclaiming such theories were executed or ‘’disappeared’’. Persecutions started in times of the monarchist Yugoslavia up to late 80es of 20^th century in the communist regime. Names like Haraqwati and Haraxvati which paleographic expert Dr. Kalyanaraman has found were names of the tribes, etnonymes which clearly show how early we can find about Croatian origins. Places where such names were found were part of Bharata Varsha or what is today India. Archaeologists have found along names emblems and coats of arms which look very much similar to Croatian coat of arms with the twenty - five field "chessboard". In a similar way the remnants and artefacts were also found when those tribes have moved from what is today India to Persia and those names can be found in 6th century before Christ in places like Bagistan and Persepolis and also with ancient peoples like Hurrwuhé. Ancestors of today’s Croats were worshippers of Saraswati Goddess of Vedic India (Goddess of learning, arts and music) and from her name comes originally name Hrvati. Croats are therefore known as Hrvati, Haravaitii, Arachosians or Sarasvatians, descendants of the ancient inhabitants of the Harauti province & the Haravaiti or the Sarasvati River. The recent hravati /hrvati [sic] hence comes from haraxvaiti and earlier spelt as haraquati (arachotos, arachosia, araxes). Sarasvati is the river and Arachosia being the region." Their mention is as well on the legendary inscriptions of Darius the Great. Early Croatian pre-Christian religion was derived from primordial Persian Sun-worship. Even the Croatian word for tie is kravat(a) which is again another connecting word.

Furthermore, the name of the Croatian capital, Zagreb, is related to the Zagros mountain range of Iran. The Dinara mountains in Dalmatia may be connected to Mount Dinar (Dene) of Iran. When the tribes came to what is nowadays Croatia they have mingled with the numerous local Slavic (or Slavenized Germanic tribes) tribes and adopted the Slavic language from them. Meanwhile after the collapse of the Hunnic Empire Croats organized the local Slavs into a state and gave them their national name. Before the invasion of the Avars ca. 560 the White or Western Croats created along with the Antes a great state extending north of the Carpathians from the upper Elbe to the upper Dniester. (35: Niederle, 263-266; Dvornik, The Slavs, 277-297) R. Heinzel is of the opinion that the Carpathians of the old Germanic Hervarsaga took their name from the Croats who called them the Harvate mountains i.e. Croatian mountains. (36: Heinzel, 499; Dvornik, op. cit., 284, sq.)" (Mandic 1970, Ch.1)

There are similarities in folklore as well. "There are old Croatian customs and national poems that have been cited as evidencing lingering traces of the fire and sun worship of the Persians. Fire, the essence of human origin, the sun, and the great boiling cauldron around which the warriors spring in the age old kolo or circle dance, all these are ingredients in the national lore of the Croatian nation. The Croat vilas or fairy witches resemble the peris of Iranian mythology. Then there is the legendary Sviatozov, the personification of strength, a being almost too huge for the earth to bear. He is strongly reminiscent of the "elephant-bodied" Rustum of Persian legend." (Guldescu 1964, pt.1.II) "It should be noted that only the thesis of the Iranian origin of the Croats can explain the name "Horvath", the title of a Croat dignitary Banus, the names "White" and "Red Croatian", and the Bogumile phenomenon (like Cathars in Occitania). According to this theory, the Croats were a branch of the Caucasian Iranians, who lived somewhere in the western Caucasus during the era of the Roman Emperors. The Caucasian Anten were another branch of this group." (Dobrovich 1963)

Research shows clearly everything what I have written and quoted above to be the truth although some oppose that theory as they want to preserve artificial Panslavism , idea of  Yugosphere ( the idea for the 3^rd  united Yugoslavia without Slovenia and with Albania) under the guise of ‘’Western Balkans’’. In Croatian language there is an excellent word I really like: ‘’Samosvojnost’’. Samosvojnost means Identity in Croatian language. In my opinion Croatian identity should and must be preserved only through the independent republic of Croatia or as it is now. Hence Croatia does not need any new unions. Friendship yes, but union definitely not.

Serbia on the other hand would like to establish themselves as a regional leader. They play with naive Croatian government and Croatian president Josipović while behind their back they lobby in EU to make what was once war in ex-Yugoslavia look as a ‘’civil war’’ and accuse Croatia who were defending themselves . They do have some allies and friends in Europe who would like to see them as the leaders in the region. Those allies on the other hand actually don’t consider Serbia as a friend but as a tool for their own means and nothing else. It is a travesty of justice to see Croatian generals such as Gotovina and Markač to be sitting in Hague so just that Croatia can get a green light for EU so that bureaurocrats in EU they can say that ‘’all sides’’ were equally responsible. I would like to ask the question then. What about the people and country of Croatia which was invaded, whose homes are burned and destroyed? According to that ‘’theory’’ Croatians should not have been defending themselves as they were supposed just to sit and wait to be erased from the face of this planet. 

Croatia has been suffering since demise of Austria-Hungary. It wasn’t good for Croatians either to be in any previous unions but union with Serbs has proven to be so far the worst one. Union with Austria-Hungary was far from perfect but at least we were in a monarchy which had culture and tradition. Croatian people don’t need anything anymore other than their own independence and peace with the neighbouring nations.

How the time is passing by I am less and less interested in Croatian politics. As a result I won’t be writing in Croatian language anymore since there is no purpose for it. I will rather use and invest my energy, effort and time for something I think will yield certain results than to write constantly for something what will anyway reach just a handful of people or just completely wither away. I have learned that from an example of the members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’. Over the years I have read articles by leading Croatian intellectuals and scholars such as Dr. Tomislav Sunić then Dr. Jure Georges Vujić, prof. Amir Riđanović, prof. Petar Bujas (all members of Croatian group similar to G.R.E.C.E. – Arhelinea – www.arhelinea.com ) Dr. Zoran Kravar, then Croat republican conservatives such as: Tomislav Jonjić, Mario Marcos Ostojić, Hrvoje Hitrec, Croatian scientists such as : Dr. Vitomir Belaj, prof. Tomo Vinšćak, Dr. Radoslav Katičić, and prof. Mario Kopić and Dr. Hrvoje Lorković (of whom we can’t hear these days what is a real tragedy since Dr. Lorković is one of Croatian important intellectuals). Croatians should be happy to have such giants of free thinking yet many in Croatia don’t even know about some of them. That is for me completely bizarre. If one is carefully reading articles and books by above mentioned intellectuals and scholars one can only see that many of them are actually disillusioned with the current state of Croatia altogether. That is evident even from their articles. Hence as a result of that Zoran Kravar is not interested in any kind of politics neither he wants to be or get involved (yet he is one of authorities on Ernst Jünger in Croatia) same is with prof. Tomo Vinšćak as well, while others like Mario Kopić and Dr. Tom Sunić are publishing their new books outside of Croatia because there is hardly any interest in their ideas in Croatia. It seems that Dr. Jure Georges Vujić will publish his new books as well outside of Croatia. That is unavoidable since Croatians are lethargic in finding new solutions in political dialogue or any kind of new political ideas. They would rather stick to something what is completely falling apart while thinking that ‘’it would get better’’. I have a best friend in Croatia whose political ideas are in minority and while he wants betterment in any spheres of Croatian life (including politics and his fight against corruption) he doesn’t have as much support as he actually would and should get. It is the apathy and lethargy which are deeply rooted in certain parts of Croatian nation (thankfully not all of it) with its roots in the fear of change and political and historical lower self-esteem (which is really uncalled for, since Croats have such rich history, tradition and culture of whom they should be absolutely proud of) . The question they often ask themselves is: ‘’ What would happen if things change? ‘’ and because of constantly repeating that question they are indeed unable to make any significant change. I believe firmly that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections Croats will elect again some party or coalition of parties which will not bring nothing new to already stagnating Croatian political scene. In the right as well as left and centre there is nobody who could potentially have a quality for the deep changes Croatia needs desperately. In the right side of spectrum and as well on centre and left one can just see political opportunists in Croatia who long for their seat in parliament (called Sabor in Croatia) or certain position. That is their goal before anything else I am afraid, of course my humble bow to those politicians who aren’t like that and are in significant, significant minority.

My own political interests nowadays evolve around Eurocontinentalism and European Identitarian Communitarianism. Even though I do speak Croatian language I consider myself first and foremost an ethnic German with Prussian mentality, after that I am an European.

Eurocontinentalism in this case represents strong continental Europe which stands between USA and Great Britain on one and Russia on the other side. The question of Europe here is not just a matter a blood; it is spiritual, historical and cultural phenomenon.
This further quote actually explains some of my thinking on the matter: ‘’Implicit in this view is the assumption that the body is inseparable from the spirit animating it, that biological difference, as a distinct vitality, is another form of spiritual difference, and that the significance of such differences (given that man is a spiritual being, not merely an animal) is best seen in terms of culture and history rather than nineteenth-century biological science. American "white racialists" with their materialist-technical conceptions of race actually diminish the significance of the Racial Question by reducing it to a simple matter of genes, biology, equations....’’ ( Mladikov – The Phora Forum)

Dominique Venner is in my opinion the greatest influence for the Eurocontinentalism and my own political Weltanschauung with his writings, articles and books. In Croatia some of his books are available as well.

His thoughts describe the best what I think further:

‘’ The idea that is made of love is no more frivolous than the tragic sense of history that characterizes the European spirit. It defines the civilization, its immanent spirit, and each person’s sense of life, in the same way the idea shapes one’s work. Is the sole point of work to make money, as they believe across the Atlantic, or, besides ensuring a just return, is it to realize oneself in a job well done, even in such apparently trivial things as keeping one’s house. This idea urged our ancestors to create beauty in their most humble and most lofty efforts. To be conscious of the idea is to give a metaphysical sense to “memory.”

To cultivate our “memory,” to transmit it in a living way to our children, to contemplate the ordeals that history has imposed on us–this is requisite to any renaissance. Faced with the unprecedented challenges that the catastrophes of the twentieth century have imposed on us and the terrible demoralization it has fostered, we will discover in the reconquest of our racial “memory” the way to respond to these challenges, which were unknown to our ancestors, who lived in a stable, strong, well-defended world.

The consciousness of belonging to Europe, of Europeanness, is far older than the modern concept of Europe. It is apparent under the successive names of Hellenism, Celticness, Romanism, the Frankish Empire, or Christianity. Seen as an immemorial tradition, Europe is the product of a multi-millennial community of culture deriving its distinctness and unity from its constitutive peoples and a spiritual heritage whose supreme expression is the Homeric poems. ‘’

To read further perhaps I would recommend this article (and as well all other articles by Dominique Venner) : http://www.counter-currents.com/2010/06/europe-and-europeanness/#more-881

What were your main sources of inspiration?

I have mentioned some of them above. I would say that Ernst Jünger, Dominique Venner and Nicolás Gómez Dávila are the most significant and important influence for me personally simply because they complement each other perfectly and in my own opinion they represent the true European Tradition which Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel, Alain Danielou and Koenraad Elst represent in Hindu Tradition. Apart from them other authors, thinkers and philosophers I would say first of all I feel especially close regarding ideas and Weltanschauung are : Croatian thinkers and members of the ‘’Croatian Historical Revolution’’, Classical philosophers such as : Emperor Julian the Apostate, Porphyry, Celsus, Platonis Sallustius, Libanius, Julius Firmicus Maternus, Iamblichus, Gemistus Pletho(n) and other such philosophers, Erik von von Kuehnelt - Leddihn, Croatian philosopher prof. Mario Kopić, prof. Robert Steuckers, certain ideas of Alain de Benoist, certain ideas of Dr. Guillaume Faye, Dr. Georges Dumezil, Dr. Jan Assmann, Mircea Eliade, Emile Cioran, Alain Danielou, German greatest living poet Rolf Schilling,  Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, German Romanticism period authors and artists, Felix Dahn, Antoine Saint du Exupery, certain ideas of Julius Evola, Norwegian composer Geirr Tveitt, composers Arvo Part and Johannes Brahms, Felix Mendelssohn, Sibelius, Ralph Vaughan Williams, postmodern musical projects such as Triarii, Arditi, In Slaughter Natives and new project Winglord, artists such as Ludwig Fahrenkrog, Karl Wilhelm Diefenbach, Fidus, Caspar David Friedrich, Hermann Hendrich, Franz von Stuck, Carl Larsson, John Atkinson Grimshaw, Jean Béraud and others.

Who are the main Croatian thinkers according to you and that are completely ignored in the rest of the world? How could we discover them?

Main and most influential Croatian thinkers were:  Dr. Milan von Šufflay, Dr. Ivo Pilar, Dr. Vinko Krišković, Dr. Filip Lukas, Dr. Julije (Julius) von Makanec, Dr. Stjepan Buć and authors involved with journal ‘’Spremnost’’ : prof. Tias Mortigjija, Dr. Milivoj Magdić, Dr. Ante Ciliga & Dr. Vilko Rieger (Dr. George W. Cesarich) . Influential are also early works of prof. Ivan Oršanić, Dr. Ivo Korsky, then author Ivan Softa (Croatian Knut Hamsun), national poet Jerko Skračić and a few others. It is very hard for somebody in Europe to discover them as their works were burned, destroyed and left to be forgotten by Yugoslavian and Serbian communist regime. Back in 1970es of 20^th century for just reading the works of these authors, philosophers and thinkers one could get a lengthy prison term and that would be of course if you did find their books somewhere. I am collecting their works wherever I can find them and that is in most cases extremely hard and on top of that some of their books command very high prices. Situation is not like with authors of Conservative Revolution whose works remain saved and translated to many languages now. Most of the above mentioned people were brutally murdered by either Serbian Monarchist regime who ruled the first Yugoslavia or by communist regime who ruled Yugoslavia and occupied Croatia after the year 1945.

At this point in time there is no translated literature in any of other languages except the book ‘’Southslav question’’ written by Dr. Ivo Pilar (under pseudonym Dr. Leon v. Südland) which was printed at the beginning of the 20^th century in Vienna originally in German language. Book was never reprinted again either in German or English (or any other foreign language) and was translated in Croatian language and has since been in print only twice. Copies of both editions are virtually impossible to find. Books of other authors are not being reprinted at all. I really don’t know if that is because of the economic crisis in Croatia since many members of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) turned out to be crooks and thieves who were stealing money from their own country and country’s resources. It has been going on like that for a long time and no government (even the coalition of liberals and social democrats which lasted for 4 years)  didn’t make situation any better or because there is no interest in those books and those authors at all. It is partially because of many Croatians were killed and murdered from 1944 to early 1950es by communist regime (and in years after that up to 1990 just prior to war in Croatia) and because of the mentality which became a norm since 1918, after Croats lost the war as part of Austria-Hungary. Dr. Ivo Pilar did warn Croatians about those kinds of problems especially in two of his books. One of those books was above mentioned ‘’Southslav question’’.

I am afraid that the only way to discover them will be through book I am currently writing and subsequently I will translate some of the most important works by Šufflay, Pilar, Lukas, Krišković, Makanec, Mortigjija and Magdić. I will start with works of Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić whose works I am collecting at the present time. I am putting together Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s and dr. Ivo Pilar’s articles and smaller important works and will include one very informative article about Milivoj Magdić’s life done by one Croatian historian. Dr. Pilar’s book ‘’Southslav question’’ will be most likely the first one to surface followed by Dr. Magdić’s collected works. It is very interesting to mention that Dr. Ivo Pilar and Dr. Milivoj Magdić had both the biggest private libraries in the city of Zagreb and most likely in Croatia at that time. I have heard that currently Alain de Benoist has one of the biggest private libraries.

So we can talk about a genuine Croatian “Conservative Revolution”?

Croatian Historical Revolution was a German Conservative Revolution’s and France’s Ordre Nouveau’s counterpart. It strikes me how there wasn’t anybody in Croatia trying to compare German Conservative Revolution with all these authors we have had. My guess is that certain levels of academia in Croatia have some sort of inferiority complex and lower self-esteem. Except post modern Croatian intellectuals and academics I have mentioned above (and most in this group were living, studying and teaching for some time outside of Croatia) other Croatian intellectuals constantly behave in a way which has ruined indescribably reputation of Croatia. Members of Croatian Historical revolution were totally opposite. Partially that is because they grew up in Austria- Hungary and partially because up until year 1918 influence of Balkan ‘’culture’’ wasn’t predominant in Croatia and our gene pool wasn’t almost destroyed as it is the case today (holocaust of Croats and ethnic Germans from years 1944 -1950es). Most of the people who today want any kind of communism to be back in Croatia are leftovers of previous regime and they are not even Croats by their genes or in spirit.

Members of CHR (Croatian Historical Revolution) have had experience with different ideologies and transformations as the ones in Germany. They rallied for the Croatia as an integral part of Europe and how some of them called it at the time ‘’Bieli Zapad’’ (White West). Like authors in German counterpart they have produced diverse works such as philosophical treatises, political journalism, manifestoes which have outlined their ideas for the transformation of Croatia and role of Croatia in Central Europe and Europe altogether. They were strongly opposing liberalism and even liberal democracy and they have rejected despiritualization and commercial culture. They advocated new conservative thought which was inspired by Croatian national patriotism. I find their ideal very much connected with ideals of German Conservative Revolution members and nowadays with prof. Dominique Venner.

How could we connect Croatian authors with their other European counterparts? Who are the Croatian authors that should be read together, beyond every language barrier?

My opinion is that all the works of the above mentioned members of the Croatian Historical revolution are very much worth exploring, studying and reading. They all do come highly recommended albeit due to totalitarian and primitive backwards communist regime headed by Josip Broz Tito and his blind followers lots of original writings are lost , destroyed or are very rare to that extent that only Croatian National Library may have only one copy or original of each of the original works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution. None of those works were translated in any languages (as I have mentioned above) except Dr. Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ which was originally written in German and then translated to Croatian. Dr. Ivo Pilar was speaking and writing as Dr. Milan v. Šufflay and many other members of CHR, in several languages. In those times after the I WW it was quite normal for people of Croatia to speak German as a second and in many cases as their mother language together with Croatian language. Hopefully in time through my own ‘’ Hyperborea Press’’ which is the part of Somnium Media all the main works of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution will surface and be translated in English language. As always one has to be realistic, as with any of such efforts good will isn’t enough, I will have to invest money and time into this project in a balanced manner.

Do you see original viewpoints or bias by these Croatian authors that you cannot find back in the works of their other European counterparts?

 I know that I risk now sounding a bit vague but most of their viewpoints are similar or identical with their German and French counterparts, although one of their main focal points or focus was naturally fight against the repressive Serbian monarchist regime and its imperialistic hegemony. I have written recently some articles about this topic. I believe that I will answer much broader to this question in my book about Croatian Historical Revolution.

What are your projects for the near future?

The New Antaios Journal’s further development is my priority and alongside with TNAJ there is ‘’Eurocontinentalism Journal’’ and my own ‘’Somnium Media’’ website which offers music, merchandise and books which are serving as an alternative to world of mass consumerism we live in. Great help in that effort is my dear friend mr. Zvonimir Tosic who is an editor in chief and managing webmaster of The New Antaios Journal and Somnium websites. The New Antaios and Eurocontinentalism Journal will both have some interesting interviews and articles in months to come. Somnium Media imprint ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ will publish most significant works of members of the Croatian Historical revolution and hopefully some works by Nicolas Gomez Davila.

Further related to ‘’Hyperborea Press’’ I have plans for the three books and three translations. First one is above already mentioned book about Croatian Historical Revolution and its members and it will be an overview of the significance of Croatian Historical Revolution and works of its members and authors not only for Croatia but for Europe and European thought as well. Another book is ‘’ Gaudiya Vaishnavism - The Living and Timeless Tradition ‘’ which will explain how important Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnavism is (a belief in Hinduism) not only for Hinduism but for the resurgence of Indo – European thought in general. I know that Dr. Alexander Jacob has written extensively on the topic of resurgence of Indo-European thought but his emphasis is not like in authors such as Georges Dumezil , Jan de Vries, or Ram Swarup, Sita Ram Goel and Alain Danielou in Hinduism or ancestral pre-christian beliefs. Rather he uses as an example for restoration of Indo –European thought resurgence of European Medieval Christian noble spirit of ‘’archaic and brave’’ and Prussian noble spirit. In my own opinion the best starting point for such study would be a Saxon epic ‘’Heliand’’.

Traditional Gaudiya Vaishnava thought in this book will serve as an alternative for the Traditionalist thought which was espoused by Guenon, Schuon and other Traditionalists. Third book deals with Croatian pre-Christian and pre-Slavic legends and it delves in times of the heroic Croatian past. I have contacted one still living Croatian author who gave me information on stories and its characters which obviously have roots in pre-Christian and pre-Slavic times of Croatia. It is quite a work and a huge challenge to reconstruct those tales and to find out and connect certain characters. Some shortened versions of those stories I will be presenting at certain Storytelling Fairs in Ireland during the summer. Three translations will be my most likely first translation work on the new book by Dr. Jure Georges Vujic (which will be his first book in English language) followed by translations of two books of the members of the Croatian Historical Revolution, Dr. Ivo Pilar’s ‘’Southslav question’’ and Dr. Milivoj Magdić’s best and collected works complete with my own explanations and commentaries. I will also continue writing for Brett Stevens's Journal on line www.amerika.org which is with Europa Synergon one of the most interesting journals to be found on line.

Thank you very much Robert for the opportunity you gave me with this interview and as well thank you for your influence on my own thought which is indispensable and very important. I would also like to thank to anybody who has read this interview and found it interesting or just thought provoking.

 

(interview taken by Robert Steuckers, late spring 2011).

Urkultur 15: Moeller van den Bruck, conservadurismo revolucionario

URKULTUR Nº 15. MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK: CONSERVADURISMO REVOLUCIONARIO

Ex: http://urkultur-imperium-europa.blogspot.com/ 

 

URKULTUR Nº 15.

MOELLER VAN DEN BRUCK:
CONSERVADURISMO REVOLUCIONARIO.

REVISTA ELECTRÓNICA:
Enlace con issuu.com

SUMARIO.

Editorial.
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck y la Nouvelle Droite
Sebastian J. Lorenz

Moeller van den Bruck: un rebelde conservador
Luca Leonello Rimbotti

Moeller van den Bruck: ¿un “precursor póstumo”?
Denis Goedel

Moeller y Dostoievski
Robert Steuckers

Moeller y la Kulturpessimismus de Weimar
Ferran Gallego

Moeller y los Jungkonservativen
Erik Norling

Moeller y Spengler
Ernesto Milá

Moeller y la Konservative Revolution
Keith Bullivant

Moeller van den Bruck
Alain de Benoist

 

Publicado por [e-mail]

Wertvollzug

 

Wertvollzug

 

Ex: http://rezistant.blogspot.com/

 

Die Wertlehre feiert in der Erörterung der Frage des gerechten Krieges ihre eigentlichen Triumphe. Das liegt in der Natur der Sache. Jede Rücksicht auf den Gegner entfällt, ja sie wird zum Unwert, wenn der Kampf gegen diesen Gegner ein Kampf für die höchsten Werte ist. Der Unwert hat kein Recht gegenüber dem Wert, und für die Durchsetzung des höchsten Wertes ist kein Preis zu hoch. Hier gibt es dann infolgedessen nur noch Vernichter und Vernichtete. Alle Kategorien des klassischen Kriegsrechts des Jus Publicum Europaeum - gerechter Feind, gerechter Kriegsgrund, Verhältnismässigkeit der Mittel und das geordnete Vorgehen, der debitus modus - fallen dieser Wertlosigkeit hoffnungslos zum Opfer. Der Drang zur Wertdurchsetzung wird hier ein Zwang zum unmittelbaren Wertvollzug.

Carl Schmitt, Die Tyrannei der Werte, 1960.

Gottfried Benn

Gottfried Benn in Interview (1956)

Gottfried Benn liest aus "Kunst und Drittes Reich"

 

Evola e il mondo di lingua tedesca

Evola e il mondo di lingua tedesca

Alberto Lombardo

Ex: http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/

La Germania e in genere il mondo di cultura tedesca ebbero per Evola un’importanza centrale. Sin da giovanissimo questi apprese il tedesco per avvicinarsi alle opere della filosofia idealistica; la sua dottrina filosofica deve molto all’idealismo, ma ancor più a Nietzsche, Weininger e Spengler. Nel 1933 compì il suo primo viaggio in Austria ; per tutti gli Anni ’30 e ’40 continuò a tenersi aggiornato leggendo saggî scientifici in lingua tedesca sui diversi argomenti dei quali si occupava: dalla romanità antica (Altheim) alla preistoria (Wirth, Günther), dall’alchimia (Böhme) alle razze (Clauß, ancora Günther), dalla teoria politica (Spann, Heinrich) all’economia (Sombart) e via dicendo. In generale, considerando gli apparati di note, i riferimenti culturali e in un bilancio che tenga conto di tutti gli apporti non mi sembra affatto di esagerare sostenendo che il peso degli studi pubblicati in tedesco sia nell’opera complessiva di Evola almeno pari a quello di quelli italiani.

Tutto questo è già assai indicativo dell’influenza della cultura tedesca sull’opera di Evola. Vanno aggiunti però altri dati: richiamando qui quanto accennato in sede biografica nel capitolo primo, ricordo i lunghi soggiorni di Evola in Austria e Germania, le numerose conferenze ivi tenute, i rapporti con esponenti della tradizione aristocratica e conservatrice mitteleuropea e della Konservative Revolution etc . Inoltre nei paesi di lingua tedesca Evola godette, almeno sino alla fine della seconda guerra mondiale, di una notorietà diversa da quella che ebbe in Italia, poiché vi fu accolto quasi come l’esponente di una particolare corrente di pensiero italiana, e ciò sin dal 1933, anno della pubblicazione di Heidnischer Imperialismus . Questo il giudizio in merito di Adriano Romualdi: «L’azione di Evola in Germania non fu politica, anche se contribuì a dissipare molti equivoci e a preparare un’intesa tra Fascismo e Nazionalsocialismo. Essa investì il significato di quelle tradizioni cui in Italia e in Germania si richiamavano i regimi, il simbolo romano e il mito nordico, il significato di classicismo e romanticismo, o di contrapposizioni artificiose, come quella tra romanità e germanesimo» .

Dal 1934 Evola tiene conferenze in Germania: in un’università di Berlino, al secondo nordisches Thing a Brema, e all’Herrenklub di Heinrich von Gleichen, rappresentante dell’aristocrazia tedesca (era barone) col quale stabilì una «cordiale e feconda amicizia» . Così Evola ricordò nel 1970 quest’importante esperienza: «ogni settimana si invitava una personalità tedesca o internazionale in quel circolo di Junkers. Devo dire peraltro che, se ci fossimo aspettati di vedere dei giganti biondi con gli occhi azzurri la delusione sarebbe stata grande, poiché per la maggior parte erano piccoli e panciuti. Dopo la cena e il rituale dei toasts, l’invitato doveva tenere una conferenza. Mentre questi signori fumavano il loro sigaro e sorseggiavano il loro bicchiere di birra, io parlavo. Fu allora che Himmler sentì parlare di me» .
È effettivamente assai verosimile che l’attenzione da parte degli ambienti ufficiali per Evola sia nata in seguito alle prime conferenze in Germania. I suoi rapporti col nazionalsocialismo furono di collaborazione esterna, e specialmente con diversi settori delle SS tra cui l’Ahnenerbe ; Evola espresse nei confronti dell’“ordine” guidato da Himmler parole assai positive , anche nel dopoguerra , che da una parte gli valsero i prevedibili (e fors’anche scontati) strali dei suoi detrattori, dall’altra determinarono una rilettura – in seno alla storiografia e allo stesso “sentimento del mondo” della Destra Radicale del dopoguerra – del nazionalsocialismo come di un movimento popolare guidato da un’élite ascetico-guerriera . Dagli ormai numerosi dati d’archivio pubblicati, risulta un quadro di Evola tenuto in considerazione ma sempre osservato con cura dagli ambienti ufficiali tedeschi .

Dopo il conflitto mondiale la notorietà di Evola nei paesi di lingua tedesca andò scemando; la sua immobilità fisica pare che gli impedì, tra l’altro, ulteriori viaggi all’estero. Solo negli ultimi decenni Evola è stato fatto oggetto di una sorta di riscoperta, per merito soprattutto di Hans Thomas Hansen, che ne ha tradotto (e ritradotto) la buona parte delle opere, con il consenso dello stesso Evola quando questi era ancora in vita, e che viene giustamente considerato uno dei massimi conoscitori del pensiero e della vita di Evola. Oltre alla rivista da questi fondata e animata, «Gnostika» (che come suggerisce il titolo ha interessi prevalentemente esoterici), negli ultimissimi anni stanno nascendo diverse attività che si ispirano in vario modo all’opera di Evola, tra le quali meritano una menzione le riviste tedesche «Elemente» e «Renovatio Imperii» e soprattutto l’austriaca «Kshatriya», diretta da Martin Schwarz (autore della più ampia bibliografia evoliana sino a oggi stilata ), di più marcata impronta “evoliana ortodossa”. A margine di ciò, si stanno iniziando a tenere convegni sul pensatore e a tradurre sue ulteriori opere. Inoltre il centenario della nascita di Evola, nel 1998, è stato occasione per varie testate tedesche per ricordarlo con ampi articoli, tra cui quelli apparsi sulla storica «Nation & Europa» (che esce ormai da mezzo secolo, e cui nei primi Anni ’50 lo stesso Evola collaborò), «Criticn» e la prestigiosa «Zeitschrift für Ganzheitforschung», altra rivista cui Evola collaborò (nei primi Anni ’60) e che fu fondata e lungamente diretta da Walter Heinrich (sino alla morte di questi, avvenuta nel 1984), che era in grande amicizia con Evola. Come curiosità, segnaliamo che per l’occasione numerosi complessi e gruppi musicali tedeschi e austriaci hanno dedicato nel centenario allo scrittore tradizionalista un disco, intitolato Cavalcare la tigre.

* * *

Sebbene alcuni elementi politici della storia d’Italia e di quella tedesca appaiano affini, (il processo di unificazione nazionale avvenuto nella seconda metà dell’Ottocento, la comune partecipazione alla Triplice Alleanza, l’Asse Roma-Berlino), Evola individua nella “tradizione germanica” dei tratti che differenziano nettamente – in senso positivo – i paesi di lingua tedesca dall’Italia. Così anzitutto «può dirsi che in Germania il nazionalismo democratico di massa di tipo moderno non fece che una fuggevole apparizione. […]. Il nazionalismo in tal senso, con un fondo democratico, non andò oltre il fugace fenomeno del parlamento di Francoforte del 1848, in connessione con i moti rivoluzionari che in quel periodo imperversavano in tutta l’Europa (è significativo che il re di Prussia Federico Guglielmo IV rifiutò l’offerta, fattagli da quel parlamento, di mettersi a capo di tutta la Germania perché accettandola egli avrebbe anche accettato il principio democratico – il potere conferito da una rappresentanza popolare – rinunciando al suo diritto legittimistico, sia pure ristretto alla sola Prussia). E Bismarck, creando il secondo Reich, non gli diede affatto una base “nazionale”, vedendo nella corrispondente ideologia il principio di pericolosi disordini anche dell’ordine europeo, mentre i conservatori della Kreuzzeitung accusarono nel nazionalismo un fenomeno “naturalistico” e regressivo, estraneo ad una più alta tradizione e concezione dello Stato» . Estranei a questa forma “naturalistica” di nazionalismo, i paesi di lingua tedesca cullarono un diverso spirito, quello del Volk, che animò lo spirito pangermanico. La corrente völkish, che un notevole peso ebbe anche nella genesi del nazionalsocialismo, affondava le sue radici nei Discorsi alla nazione tedesca di Fichte, in Arndt, Jahn e Lange e soprattutto nel Deutschbund e nella deutsche Bewegung . In questa diversità di retroterra si ha la prima divaricazione tra Italia e Germania.

Ma le differenze di ambiente sono assai più nette. Nel suo saggio sul Terzo Reich, delineando le correnti culturali complesse e spesso irriducibili che cooperarono nella sua genesi, Evola scrive: «Dopo la prima guerra mondiale in Germania la situazione era sensibilmente diversa da quella dell’Italia. […] Mussolini dovette creare quasi dal nulla, nel senso che nel punto di combattere la sovversione rossa e di rimettere in piedi lo Stato non poteva rifarsi ad una tradizione nel senso più alto del termine. Tutto sommato, ad essere minacciato era solo il prolungamento dell’Italietta democratica ottocentesca, con un retaggio risorgimentale risentente delle ideologie della Rivoluzione Francese, con una monarchia che regnava ma non governava e senza salde articolazioni sociali. In Germania le cose stavano altrimenti. Anche dopo il crollo militare e la rivoluzione del 1918 e malgrado il marasma sociale sussistevano resti aventi radici profonde in quel mondo gerarchico, talvolta ancora feudale, incentrato nei valori dello Stato e della sua autorità, facenti parte della precedente tradizione, in particolare del prussianesimo. […]. In effetti, nell’Europa centrale le idee della Rivoluzione Francese non presero mai tanto piede quanto nei restanti paesi europei» .

In un’occasione Evola cita la teoria giuridica di Carl Schmitt dell’international law . Il filosofo della politica tedesco aveva espresso l’idea della caduta del diritto internazionale europeo consuetudinario avvenuta, all’incirca, dopo il 1890, e la conseguente affermazione di un diritto internazionale più o meno ufficializzato. «Noi però qui non siamo interamente del parere dello Schmitt», scrive Evola, spiegando che «di contro all’opinione di molti, nei riguardi dell’azione svolta da Bismarck, sia all’interno della Germania che in Europa, non tutte le cose sono “in ordine”. […]. Più che Bismarck, a noi sembra che, se mai, Metternich sia stato l’ultimo “Europeo”, vale a dire l’ultimo uomo politico che seppe sentire la necessità di una solidarietà delle nazioni europee non astratta, o dettata solo da ragioni di politica “realistica” e da interessi materiali, ma rifacentesi anche a delle idee e alla volontà di mantenere il migliore retaggio tradizionale dell’Europa» . Contrariamente a quanto sostenuto da Baillet , Evola fu dunque piuttosto critico nei confronti di Bismarck, che non ebbe, secondo la visione tradizionale evoliana, il coraggio di opporsi in modo sistematico e rigoroso al mondo moderno e della sovversione (nella sua forma economico-capitalistica), ma dovette in alcuni casi venire a patti con esso.

La stessa Germania federiciana e poi guglielmina, seppur conservante le strutture e l’ordine di uno stato tradizionale, nel quale la stessa burocrazia e l’apparato statale apparivano quasi come corpi di un ordine, conteneva i germi della dissoluzione, dovuti alle idee illuministe che avevano iniziato a filtrare – in modo più larvato che altrove – presso le varie corti. Se il giudizio evoliano nei confronti del codice federiciano conservante l’ordinamento diviso negli Stände è positivo, ciò è poiché, per l’epoca in cui sorse, quel codice conservava meglio d’ogni altro le strutture feudali e gerarchiche precedenti. Esse, tramite la tradizione prussiana, affondavano nell’Ordine dei cavalieri teutonici e nella loro riconquista delle terre baltiche: un ordine ascetico-cavalleresco formato da una disciplina e da una severa organizzazione gerarchica. Così, sin da giovanissimo Evola intuì l’assurdità della “guerra civile europea” che, come ufficiale, egli andava a combattere sulla frontiera carsica: l’Italia si schierava cioè contro ciò che restava della migliore tradizione europea. «Nel 1914 gli Imperi Centrali rappresentavano ancora un resto dell’Europa feudale e aristocratica nel mondo occidentale, malgrado innegabili aspetti di egemonismo militaristico ed alcune alleanze sospette col capitalismo presenti soprattutto nella Germania guglielmina. La coalizione contro di essi fu dichiaratamente una coalizione del Terzo Stato contro le forze residue del Secondo Stato […]. Come in poche altre della storia, la guerra del 1914-1918 presenta tutti i tratti di un conflitto non fra Stati e nazioni, ma fra le ideologie di diverse caste. Di essa, i risultati diretti e voluti furono la distruzione della Germania monarchica e dell’Austria cattolica, quelli indiretti il crollo dell’impero degli Czar, la rivoluzione comunista e la creazione, in Europa, di una situazione politico-sociale talmente caotica e contraddittoria, da contenere tutte le premesse per una nuova conflagrazione. E questa fu la seconda guerra mondiale» .

Come accennato, anche nei confronti della tradizione dell’Austria Evola espresse un giudizio marcatamente positivo. La stessa linea dinastica degli Asburgo ebbe un ruolo di rilievo in questa valutazione (Evola si era espresso in termini molto positivi nei confronti di Massimiliano I) ; nel periodo in cui visse a Vienna Evola respirò ciò che restava dell’atmosfera antica dell’Austria felix, e venne in contatto con quella temperie culturale e spirituale e soprattutto con uomini in cui, per usare le parole di Ernst Jünger, «la catastrofe aveva certo lasciato le sue ombre […], ma si era limitata a distruggerne la serenità innata senza distruggerla. A tratti scorgevamo […] una patina di quella sofferenza che potremmo definire austriaca e che è comune a tanti vecchi sudditi dell’ultima vera monarchia. Con essa venne distrutta una forma del piacere di vivere che negli altri paesi europei già da generazioni era diventata inimmaginabile, e le tracce di questa distruzione si avvertono ancora nei singoli individui. […]. Da noi nel Reich, se si prescinde dal generale esaurimento delle forze, si incominciava a notare tutt’al più la disparità degli strati sociali; qui invece si erano aperte, come voragini, le differenze tra le varie etnie» . In questo humus storico degli anni compresi tra le due guerre, in cui ancora forti erano i legami sentimentali ed etici di molti con la precedente tradizione imperiale – la monarchia asburgica d’Austria aveva almeno formalmente conservato, sino al Congresso di Vienna, la titolarità del Sacro Romano Impero – Evola ebbe anche modo di percepire direttamente l’attaccamento diffuso a livello popolare alla monarchia , e lo spiegò in questi termini: «Senza riesumare forme anacronistiche, invece di una propaganda che “umanizzi” il sovrano per accattivare la massa, quasi sulla stessa linea della propaganda elettorale presidenziale americana, si dovrebbe vedere fino a che punto possano avere un’azione profonda i tratti di una figura caratterizzata da una certa innata superiorità e dignità, in un quadro adeguato. Una specie di ascesi e di liturgia della potenza qui potrebbero avere una loro parte. Proprio questi tratti, mentre rafforzeranno il prestigio di chi incarna un simbolo, dovrebbero poter esercitare sull’uomo non volgare una forza d’attrazione, perfino un orgoglio nel suddito. Del resto, anche in tempi abbastanza recenti si è avuto l’esempio dell’imperatore Francesco Giuseppe che, pur frapponendo fra sé e i sudditi l’antico severo cerimoniale, pur non imitando per nulla i re “democratici” dei piccoli Stati nordici, godette di una particolare, non volgare popolarità» . In questo stesso senso nel 1935, scrivendo a proposito della possibilità di una restaurazione regale in Austria, Evola riferisce ciò che gli esponenti del pensiero conservatore e monarchico in quel paese sostenevano: «La premessa, intanto, è quella a cui ogni mente non ingombra di pregiudizî può anche aderire, cioè che il regime monarchico, in generale, è quello che più può garantire un ordine, un equilibrio e una pacificazione interna, senza dover ricorrere al rimedio estremo della dittatura e dello Stato centralizzato, sempreché nei singoli sussista la sensibilità spirituale richiesta da ogni lealismo. Questa condizione, secondo dette personalità, sarebbe presente nella gran parte della popolazione austriaca, se non altro, per la forza di una tradizione e di uno stile di vita pluricentenario» .

Il problema dell’Anschluss, dell’annessione dell’Austria alla Germania naizonalsocialista, fu negli anni che lo precedettero al centro di un ampio dibattito internazionale. Giuristi e politici lo affrontarono da diversi punti di vista; Evola non fu in concordanza di vedute, su questo tema, con l’amico Othmar Spann, che, scriveva Evola, per la coraggiosa coerenza delle sue idee non era ben visto né in Austria né in Germania. Scrivendo sul sociologo viennese, Evola affermava: «gli Austriaci non perdonano le sue simpatie per la Germania, mentre i Tedeschi non gli perdonano le critiche da lui mosse al materialismo razzista» . Ampliando alla scuola organicistica viennese e al mondo culturale austriaco il suo sguardo, Evola ne esponeva in questi termini le vedute: «Non ci si può rassegnare a far scendere una nazione, che ha la tradizione che l’Austria ha avuto, al livello di un piccolo Stato balcanico. Qui non si fa quistione della mera autonomia politica, si fa essenzialmente quistione di cultura e di tradizione. Storicamente, la civiltà austriaca è indisgiungibile da quella germanica. Non è possibile che oggi l’Austria a tale riguardo si emancipi e cominci a far da sé. Proprio perché essa è stata menomata, ridotta ad un’ombra di quel che essa fu precedentemente, le si impone di connettersi nel modo più stretto alla Germania, appoggiarsi ad essa, trarre da essa gli elementi che possono garantire l’integrità della sua eredità tedesca». Proseguiva Evola sostenendo che dal lato positivo l’Austria avrebbe avuto molto a sua volta da trasmettere alla Germania sotto il profilo della tradizione culturale. Ma di là dal piano squisitamente intellettuale, «Nel dominio delle tradizioni politiche l’antitesi è ancor più visibile. Vi sarebbe infatti da chiedere a questi intellettuali germanofili che cosa essi pensino quando parlano di tradizione austro-tedesca. La tradizione austriaca era una tradizione imperiale. Erede del Sacro Romano Impero, il Reich austriaco, formalmente almeno, non poteva dirsi tedesco. Di diritto, era supernazionale, e di fatto esso sovrastava un gruppo di popoli assai diversi come razza, costumi e tradizioni, gruppo nel quale l’elemento tedesco non figurava che come parte. Nemmeno giova dire che purtuttavia la direzione dell’impero austriaco era intonata in senso tedesco e faceva capo ad una dinastia tedesca. Dal punto di vista dei principî ciò conta così poco quanto il fatto che i rappresentanti del principio supernazionale della Chiesa Romana siano stati in larga misura italiani. Se si deve parlare di tradizione austriaca», concludeva Evola, «è ad una tradizione imperiale che bisogna riferirsi. Ora, che cosa può avere a che fare una tale tradizione con la Germania, se Germania oggi vuol dire nazionalsocialismo?» . Francesco Germinario ha scritto a tale proposito che per Evola «un’Austria legata alle radici cattoliche, e in cui, soprattutto, rimaneva ancora vivo il ricordo degli Asburgo, era molto più vicina ai valori della Tradizione rispetto a una Germania travolta dalla nuova ondata di modernizzazione promossa dal nazismo» .

Si esprimevano in questi termini già nel 1935 le posizioni critiche di Evola nei confronti del nazismo, di cui il filosofo tradizionalista accusava gli eccessi populistici, sociali e di sinistra. Il tono in questo caso è particolarmente critico perché il raffronto è con l’Austria, nella quale Evola vedeva appunto l’erede spirituale della più alta tradizione europea. D’altronde, si tratta di una linea interpretativa e storiografica apprezzabile, e che Evola mantenne anche nel dopoguerra, tendendo a separare i diversi elementi e le varie correnti che operarono nel nazionalsocialismo per giudicarli separatamente . Concludeva dunque la sua lettura politica della situazione internazionale affermando: «Se non ci si vuole rassegnare alla perdita dell’antica tradizione supernazionale centro-europea, l’Austria più che verso la Germania dovrebbe volgere i suoi sguardi verso gli Stati successori, nel senso di vedere fino a che punto è possibile ricostruire una comune coscienza centro-europea come base non solo della soluzione di importantissimi problemi economici e commerciali ma eventualmente […] anche della formulazione di un nuovo principio politico unitario di tipo tradizionale» .

Nei confronti della seconda guerra mondiale, il cui esito indubbiamente Evola vedeva come l’ultima fase del crollo epocale della civiltà europea, lo scrittore tradizionalista denunciava le colpe morali delle potenze occidentali: «a Himmler si deve un tentativo di salvataggio in extremis (considerato da Hitler come un tradimento). Pel tramite del Conte Bernadotte egli tramise una proposta di pace separata agli Alleati occidentali per poter continuare la guerra soltanto contro l’Unione Sovietica e il comunismo. Si sa che tale proposta, la quale, se accettata, forse avrebbe potuto assicurare all’Europa un diverso destino, evitando la successiva “guerra fredda” e la comunisticizzazione dell’Europa di là dalla “cortina di ferro”, fu nettamente respinta in base ad un cieco radicalismo ideologico, come era stata respinta, per un non diverso radicalismo, l’offerta di pace fatta da Hitler di sua iniziativa all’Inghilterra in termini ragionevoli in un famoso discorso dell’estate del 1940 quando i Tedeschi erano la parte vincente» .

Anche dopo la seconda guerra mondiale Evola mantenne un occhio di riguardo nei confronti dei paesi di lingua tedesca. La sua visione fu di ammirazione nei confronti della nuova resurrezione economica operata dai Tedeschi dopo la distruzione del secondo dopoguerra («questa nazione ha saputo completamente rialzarsi di là da distruzioni senza nome. Perfino in regime di occupazione essa ha sopravvanzato le stesse nazioni vincitrici sul piano industriale ed economico riprendendo il suo posto di grande potenza produttrice») , e per il coraggio col quale la Repubblica federale aveva bandito il pericolo comunista dalla sua politica («I Tedeschi fanno sempre le cose con coerenza. Così anche nel giuoco di osservanza democratica. Essi hanno messo su una democrazia-modello come un sistema “neutro” – diremmo quasi amministrativo, più che politico – equilibrato ed energico a un tempo. A differenza dell’Italia, la Germania proprio dal punto di vista di una democrazia coerente ha messo al bando il comunismo. La Corte Costituzionale tedesca ha statuito ciò che corrisponde all’evidenza stessa delle cose, ossia che un partito che, come quello comunista, segue le regole democratiche soltanto in funzione puramente tattica e di copertura, per scopo finale dichiarato avendo invece la soppressione di ogni contrastante corrente politica e la dittatura assoluta del proletariato, non può essere tollerato da uno Stato democratico che non voglia scavare la fossa a sé stesso») . Ma, ciò nonostante, la guerra aveva ormai prodotto un vacuum, un vuoto spirituale non più colmato: «Di contro a tutto ciò, stupisce, nella Repubblica Federale, la mancanza di qualsiasi idea, di qualsiasi “mito”, di qualsiasi superiore visione del mondo, di qualsiasi continuità con la precedente Germania» . Anche nel campo della cultura, Evola ravvisa un generale franamento, una sorta di generale “venire meno” alle posizioni coraggiose e d’avanguardia tenute dall’intellettualità tedesca negli anni – ad avviso di Evola, assai floridi e proficui sotto il profilo culturale – del Reich nazionalsocialista. Nel suo giudizio negativo Evola prende come esempio di questo crollo Gottfried Benn ed Ernst Jünger (cadendo con ciò in errori di veduta piuttosto grossolani ).

 

* * *

 

Da Vie della Tradizione 125 (2002), pp. 37-50.
Il presente articolo è stato ripubblicato privo delle note a pié pagina.

Revista de Historia del Fascismo - Julius Evola en Alemania

 

Revista de Historia del Fascismo

Sumario

REVISIONES

Hitler [no] me ha dicho: Rauschning, un falsario desenmascarado

Durante décadas el libro de Hermann Rauschning Hitler me ha dicho se ha considerado como un pieza fundamental del Caso Hitler. Desde obras “ligeras” como El retorno de los brujos de Louis Pauwels y Jacques Bergier hasta las  sesudas  obras  de  historiadores  académicos  como Trevor-Roper, era frecuente entre los años 50 hasta finales del milenio, recurrir a esta obra para dirimir cómo era la verdadera personalidad del führer. Aun hoy algunos siguen considerando a esta obra como “fuente primaria”… lamentablemente  para  ellos,  desde  hace  20  años,  está demostrado ad nauseam que la obra de Rauschning no tiene credibilidad sino que es uno de tantos ejemplos de propaganda de guerra.

BIOGRAFIAS

Abate Barruel: el padre de todas las conspiranoias

A  finales  del  siglo  XVIII  al  abate  Augustin  Barruel  consiguió una fama extraordinaria con la publicación de su obra Memorias para servir a la historia del jacobinismo en  donde  daba  una  explicación  teleológica  a  todos  los episodios que se habían sucedido en Francia a partir de 1780 y que se desencadenaron aquella orgía de sangre que  fue  la  Revolución  Francesa.  El  éxito  de  Barruel  fue tan rutilante como efímero, sin embargo, todavía hoy se le considera como el introductor de la visión conspirativa de la historia y su obra como el “padre” de todas las conspiraciones. Esta es la vida y la obra del abate Barruel…

NEOFASCISMO

L’Uomo Qualunque: un producto de postguerra

En la confusión de la Italia de la postguerra, durante un corto  ciclo  de  apenas  tres  años,  un  partido  político  de nuevo cuño llamó particularmente la atención: el Fronte dell’Uomo Qualunque, literalmente el Frente del Hombre Cualquiera (aunque otra traducción alternativa sería “del Pobre Diablo”) entendiendo como tal al ciudadano sin expectativas  que  sufre  las  consecuencias  de  las  situaciones  adversas  generadas  por  otros.  El Uomo  Qualunque fue  un  grito  de  desesperados  que  se  extinguió  pronto ingresando una parte sustancial de sus miembros en el Movimiento  Social  Italiano  que  heredó  también  buena parte de sus votos. 

MÍSTICA FASCISTA

Codreanu y su mística guerrera

Nuestro colaborador Eduardo Basurto nos envía este artículo sobre la mística guerrera de Codreanu que supone el primer estudio publicado en la Revista de Historia del Fascismo  sobre  esta  corriente  en  Rumania.  Además  de hacer honor al título, el estudio de Eduardo Basurto realiza un repaso a la historia de la varidad rumana del fascismo singularmente preciso.

CINEMATOGRAFÍA

Forces Occultes… El cine francés bajo la ocupación

Hasta hace poco inencontrable y desde que se han puesto en marcha las plataformas de intercambio de archivos Peer to Peer y youTube fácilmente accesibles en la red, Forces Occultes es un película extraña que responde en primer lugar a las exigencias antimasónicas del gobierno francés de Vichy y de la propaganda alemana. Pero nos equivocaríamos si considerásemos que Forces Occultes solamente  es  “propaganda”.  Es  mucho  más:  refleja  por primera vez en la historia del cine cómo es una iniciación masónica de la que hasta ese momento el “gran público” no tenía conciencia exacta en qué consistía. Y no hay en ella absolutamente ninguna falsificación. La pesquisa en torno  a Forces  Occultes  nos  llevará,  por  extensión  lógica, en la segunda parte de este artículo, a examinar el panorama del cine “colaboracionista” realizado durante la ocupación y terminará con una referencia a la figura de Claude Autant-Lara, fallecido en 2000 después de ser durante un período diputado europeo del Front National.

DOSSIER:

Julius Evola y el III Reich
Las relaciones y los proyectos de Julius Evola en Alemania 1930-1945.

I. Introduccion

II. Julius Evola y la cultura alemanas

III. Contactos en el Reich 

          - La Comunidad de  Trabajo de los nacionalistas

          - Con la “revolución conservadora”

          - La red del príncipe KarlAnton von Rohan

          - Gottfried Benn y el Rivolta  

          - Del Herrenklub a las SS

          - La “defensa de la raza” en Alemania e Italia

          - Los objetivos del período 1938-1943

          - Evola en el Cuartel General del Führer

 

Características: 

Formato libro 150 x 210 mm

Páginas 216

Tapas en cuatricomía con solapas 

Pedidos: [e-mail] 

Precio venta al público: 18,00 euros + 3,00 euros de gastos de envío (precios para España, resto mundo, consultar) 

Forma e pago: ingreso en cuenta corriente BBVA (al hacer el pedido indicamos el número) o pago a través de pay-pal (ver columna de la derecha)

 

Suscripción: 

6 números: 100 euros

12 números: 200 euros

Othmar Spann / Jungkonservativ

 

Jungkonservativ

 

pdf der Druckfassung aus Sezession 41 / April 2011

 

Sebastian Maaß: Dritter Weg und wahrer Staat. Othmar Spann – Ideengeber der Konservativen Revolution
(= Kieler Ideengeschichtliche Studien, Bd. 3),  Kiel: Regin-Verlag 2010. 174 S., 18.95 €  (hier bestellen).

 

Die »Kieler Ideengeschichtlichen Studien« gewinnen mit
Band III an Konturen.

 

Den vorausgehenden Monographien über Edgar Julius Jung und Arthur Moeller van den Bruck steuert Sebastian Maaß mit der Studie zu Othmar Spann ein weiteres Puzzleteil in der Darstellung der »profiliertesten Vertreter der jungkonservativen Richtung der Konservativen Revolution« bei.

 

Als Fraktion mit gemäßigten Strukturelementen nahm der Jungkonservatismus eine Mittelstellung zwischen Völkischen und Nationalrevolutionären ein und konnte sowohl in der Weimarer Republik (Regierung von Papens) als auch der Ersten Republik Österreichs (Heimwehrbewegung) in die realpolitischen Auseinandersetzungen der Zeit eingreifen. Die Kontextualisierung in die ideengeschichtliche Umwelt der KR unternimmt Maaß einerseits über das Aufzeigen dezidiert jungkonservativer Positionen (ständestaatliche Konzeption, mittelalterliche Reichsidee, christliche Bezugspunkte, ganzheitlicher Ansatz) in Abgrenzung zu anderen Gruppierungen der KR, andererseits mittels Bezugnahme auf die charakteristischen Analogien (Mythos der »Ewigen Wiederkehr«, Antiliberalismus und -marxismus) von Jungkonservatismus und restlichen konservativ-revolutionären Strömungen. Dem Vorwort des Spann-Kenners Hanns Pichler, der die von Maaß vorgenommene Fokussierung auf Gesellschafts- und Staatslehre Spanns als klugen Ansatz für eine einführende Darstellung bezeichnet und gerade den in dessen frühen Schriften ausgebreiteten »ganzheitlichen« gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Ansatz als erkenntnisleitend für diesen Rahmen betrachtet, folgt ein biographischer Überblick. Anschließend widmet sich Maaß den Spann-Schülern Jakob Baxa und Walter Heinrich, die maßgeblichen Anteil an der akademischen Verbreitung der universalistischen Lehre Spanns besaßen, Heinrich versuchte darüber hinaus die ganzheitliche Lehre Spanns in reale Politik (Heimwehrbewegung in Österreich; Kameradschaftsbund für volks- und sozialpolitische Bildung im Sudetenland; Institut für Ständewesen in Düsseldorf) umzusetzen.

 

Anschließend behandelt Maaß »Philosophie und Religion als Grundlagen der Ganzheitslehre«, um über die Darlegung der »Kategorienlehre« und der politischen Publizistik (Der wahre Staat; Vom Wesen des Volkstums) den Aufbau des Spannschen »organischen« Staatswesens zu rekonstruieren. Indem der Verfasser das Wirken des Wiener Kreises um Spann sowohl in Österreich als auch dem deutschsprachigen Kulturraum analysiert, wird die meta- und realpolitische Bedeutung dieses Dritten Weges deutlich, der mit seiner machtpolitischen Ausprägung in Österreich um 1930 eine ernsthafte historische Alternative zu den »dritten Wegen« des Nationalsozialismus und des Faschismus darstellte. Das im Untertitel verwandte Konstrukt »Ideengeber der Konservativen Revolution« stellt – aufgrund der überschaubaren Rezeption von Spanns Universalismus in der Weimarer Republik – einen einzelnen Kritikpunkt an dieser soliden Monographie dar.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sebastian Maaß M. A. (geb. 1981) studierte Politik, Geschichte und Erziehungswissenschaft an den Universitäten Konstanz und Tübingen, Studienschwerpunkte waren Neuere Ideen- und Philosophiegeschichte sowie Altertumswissenschaften, umfassende Forschungstätigkeit insbesondere zum Themenkomplex der Konservativen Revolution (KR). Maaß' Studie über Leben und Werk von Edgar Julius Jungist einer zentralen und wirkmächtigen Gestalt der KR gewidmet und erscheint nun als Monographie in der akademischen Reihe „Kieler ideengeschichtliche Studien“

Sebastian Maaß: Kämpfer um ein drittes ReicArthur Moeller van den Bruck und sein Kreis. — 176 Seiten, s/w. Abb., Englische Broschur. 18,95 Euro

 

 

 

 

 

Gerd-Klaus Kaltenbrunner is overleden

Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner is overleden

 

Ex: Deltanieuwsbrief nr. 47 - Mei 2011

“Conservatisme is een ‘elitaire’, men kan ook zeggen ‘esoterische’ aangelegenheid (…).  Het misverstand als zou de conservatief een theorielozen, een onfilosofische, ja, zelfs antifilosofische pragmaticus zijn, lijkt onuitroeibaar. Ik heb nochtans met veel kracht en overtuiging aangetoond dat het een misverstand is, toen ik het over die domeinen had, die man als ‘conservatieve mystiek’ zou kunnen omschrijven (…). Een zekere zin voor de onoplosbare complexiteit van de werkelijkheid, de erkenning van het feit dat men over het leven slechts brokstukgewijs rationeel kunnen spreken, de aandacht voor de tegenstelling, voor het tragische en voor het gedeeltelijk demonische dat door de geschiedenis waart, een constitutionele scepsis tegenover de ‘grote oplossingen’”. Woorden van Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner, een grote Oostenrijkse mijnheer, die bij menig jonge Europeaan de grondvesten van een degelijke conservatieve ideeënwereld heeft gelegd.

Kaltenbrunner werd in 1939 in Wenen geboren, maar na zijn studies in de Rechten in 1962 trok hij naar Duitsland en werkte er bij uitgeverijen als lektor. In 1972 publiceerde hij een verzamelwerk Rekonstruktion des Konservatismus, en ontwierp hiermee, enkele jaren na 1968, de basis voor een conservatieve tegenactie. Hij ging in het werk uit van de idee dat het conservatisme eerst de hegemonie op het geestelijke vlak moet veroveren, vooraleer politieke consequenties te trekken.

Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner wou niet zomaar ‘conserveren’: hij was er veeleer op uit het ‘moderne’ conservatieve denken mee gestalte te geven – met daarin natuurlijk dat wat eeuwig een Europese waarde had. De door hem opgezette en gepubliceerde Herderbücherei Initiative  - een reeks die liep van 1974 tot 1988 – bracht op een hoog niveau conservatieve auteurs, wetenschappers, onderzoekers en andere bijeen, die rond bepaalde thema’s (soms) baanbrekende bijdragen brachten.  Interessante titels waren (en zijn): Die Zukunft der Vergangenheid (1975), Plädoyer für die Vernunft: Signale einer Tendenzwende (1974).  Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner legde ook een bijzondere ijver aan de dag om de bronnen voor het conservatieve denken open en toegankelijk te houden. Hij publiceerde een driedelig werk Europa. Seine geistigen Quellen in Porträts aus zwei Jahrtausenden (1981-1985). Ook het werk Vom Geist Europas heeft niets van zijn waarde verloren en verdient het zeker op opnieuw gelezen te worden.

Hierna werd het stil rond Kaltenbrunner. Hij trok zich – na de ontgoocheling over het uitblijven van een échte conservatieve wende – terug als een lekenmonnik in Kandern, afgesneden van alle moderne communicatiemiddelen. Hij trok ook voorgoed een streep onder het metapolitieke werk. Nochtans loont het de moeite, zeker in deze tijden van ideeënarmoede ter linker en rechter zijde de moeite om de stijl en de onderwerpen die Gerd Klaus Kaltenbrunner nauw aan het hart lagen, te bestuderen.  Met TeKoS hebben wij in elk geval niet op het overlijden van deze bescheiden, overtuigdconservatieve intellectueel gewacht om bijdragen van hem te publiceren. In ons nummer 127 brachten wij een vertaling van Elite. Erziehung für den Ernstfall, in het Nederlands: Zonder Elite gaat het niet. Wij groeten u met bijzondere veel respect, meester Kaltenbrunner!

(Peter Logghe)

Robert Steuckers: Answers given to the Scandinavian Group "Oskorei"

Robert Steuckers:

Answers Given to the Scandinavian Group and Internet Forum “Oskorei / motpol.nu”)

 

Picture: Walking along Heidegger's path in Todtnauberg, Germany, July 2010 (Photo, copyright: AnaR).

 

Why did you found « Synergies Européennes » ?

 

Initially I had no intention to found any group or subgroup in the broad family of New Right clubs and caucuses. But as, for many reasons, cooperation with the French branch around Alain de Benoist seemed to be impossible to resume, I first decided to retire completely and to devote myself to other tasks, such as translations or private teaching. This transition period of disabused withdrawal lasted exactly one month and one week (from December 6^th, 1992 to begin January 1993). When friends from Provence phoned me during the first days of 1993 to express their best wishes for the New Year to come and when I told them what kind of decision I had taken, they protested heavily, saying that they preferred to rally under my supervision than under the one of the always mocked “Parisians”. I answered that I had no possibility to rent places or find accommodations in their part of France. One day after, they found a marvellous location to organise a summer course. Other people, such as Gilbert Sincyr, generously supported this initiative, which six months later was a success due to the tireless efforts of Christiane Pigacé, a university teacher in political sciences in Aix-en-Provence, and of a future lawyer in Marseille, Thierry Mudry, who both could obtain the patronage of Prof. Julien Freund. The summer course was a success. But no one had still the idea of founding a new independent think tank. It came only one year later when we had to organise several preparatory meetings in France and Belgium for a next summer course at the same location. Things were decided in April 1994 in Flanders, at least for the Belgians, Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese and French. A German-Austrian team joined in 1995 immediately after a summer course of the German weekly paper “Junge Freiheit”, that organized a short trip to Prague for the participants (including Sunic, the Russian writer Vladimir Wiedemann and myself); people of the initial French team, under the leading of Jean de Bussac, travelled to the Baltic countries, to try to make contacts there. In 1996, Sincyr, de Bussac and Sorel went to Moscow to meet a Russian team lead by Anatoly Ivanov, former Soviet dissident and excellent translator from French and German into Russian, Vladimir Avdeev and Pavel Tulaev. We had also the support of Croatians (Sunic, Martinovic, Vujic) and Serbs (late Dragos Kalajic) despite the war raging in the Balkans between these two peoples. In Latin America we’ve always had the support of Ancient Greek philosophy teacher Alberto Buela, who is also an Argentinian rancher leading a small ranch of 600 cows, and his old fellow Horacio Cagni, an excellent connoisseur of Oswald Spengler, who has been able to translate the heavy German sentences of Spengler himself into a limpid Spanish prose. The meetings and summer courses lasted till 2003 and the magazines were published till 2004. Of course, personal contacts are still held and new friends are starting new initiatives, better adapted to the tastes of younger people. In 2007 we started to blog on the net with “euro-synergies.hautetfort.com” in seven languages with new texts every day and with “vouloir.hautetfort.com” only in French with all the articles in our archives. This latest initiative is due to a rebuilt French section in Paris. These blogging activities bring us more readers and contacts than the old ways of working. Postage costs were in the end too high to let the printed stuff survive. The efforts of our American friend Greg Johnson, excellent translator from French into English, has opened us new horizons in the world, where English is more largely known than other European languages, except Spanish. The translations of Greg can be read on “counter-currents.com”. Tomislav Sunic with all his connections in the New World, in England and Scandinavia has played a key role in this step forward. He will force me to write in English in the next future, just as you do now, and to abandon my habit to write mainly in French and sometimes in German, languages that I master better that English. The next long interview in English will be the one that Pavel Tulaev submitted to me some days ago (January 2011). In fact, when I entered as a full member the New Right groups in September 1980, after having been drilled during a special summer course in Provence in July 1980 in the frame of the so-called “Temistoklès Savas Promotion” (T. Savas was a Greek friend who had just died in a motorbike accident in the Northern Greek mountains), I promised to Prof. Pierre Vial, who was at that time one of the main leaders of the celebrated GRECE-group, to lead a metapolitical battle till my last breath. So things are still going on as they ought to.

 

The marvellous water bridge of Rocquevafour were formerly the GRECE Summer Courses were given

Now the very purposes of “Synergies Européennes” or “Euro-Synergies” were to enable all people in Europe (and outside Europe) to exchange ideas, books, views, to start personal contacts, to stimulate the necessity of translating a maximum of texts or interviews, in order to accelerate the maturing process leading to the birth of a new European or European-based political think tank. Another purpose was to discover new authors, usually rejected by the dominant thoughts or neglected by old right groups or to interpret them in new perspectives.

 

“Synergy” means in the Ancient Greek language, “work together” (“syn” = “together” and “ergon” = “to work”); it has a stronger intellectual and political connotation than its Latin equivalent “cooperare” (“co” derived from “cum” = “with”, “together” - and “operare” = “to work”). Translations, meetings and all other ways of cooperating (for conferences, individual speeches or lectures, radio broadcasting or video clips on You Tube, etc.) are the very keys to a successful development of all possible metapolitical initiatives, be they individual, collegial or other. People must be on the move as often as possible, meet each other, eat and drink together, camp under poor soldierly conditions, walk together in beautiful landscapes, taste open-mindedly the local kitchen or liquors, remembering one simple but o so important thing, i. e. that joyfulness must be the core virtue of a good working metapolitical scene. When sometimes things have failed, it was mainly due to humourless, snooty or yellow-bellied guys, who thought they alone could grasp one day the “Truth” and that all others were gannets or cretins. Jean Mabire and Julien Freund, Guillaume Faye and Tomislav Sunic, Alberto Buela and Pavel Tulaev were or are joyful people, who can teach you a lot of very serious things or explain you the most complicated notions without forgetting that joy and gaiety must remain the core virtues of all intellectual work. If there is no joy, you will inevitably be labelled as dull and lose the metapolitical battle. Don’t forget that medieval born initiatives like the German “Burschenschaften” (Students’ Corporations) or the Flemish “Rederijkers Kamers” (“Chambers of Rhetoric”) or the Youth Movements in pre-Nazi Germany were all initiatives where the highest intellectual matters were discussed and, once the seminary closed, followed by joyful songs, drinking parties or dance (Arthur Koestler remembers his time spent at Vienna Jewish Burschenschaft “Unitas” as the best of his youth, despite the fact that the Jewish students of Vienna considered in petto that the habits of the Burschenschaften should be adopted by them as pure mimicking). Humour and irony are also keys to success. A good cartoonist can reach the bull’s eye better than a dry philosopher.

 

Provence village of Lourmarin where three Summer courses of "Synergies Européennes" were held

 

How do you view the proper relationship between the national state and the European Community?

 

Well, it depends which national state you are talking about. Some states have a strong political personality, born out of their own history. Others are remnants of former greater empires, like many states in Central Europe, which once upon a time were parts of the Austrian-Hungarian Habsburgs Empire. France, Britain and Sweden, for instance, have such a well-defined strong personality. Belgium, the country in which I was born, is a more or less artificial state, being a remnant entity of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and of the medieval German Holy Roman Empire but having been strongly under the influence of France due to the use of French language in the Southern part of the kingdom and among the elites, even in Flemish speaking provinces. Croatia has been part of the Hungarian Crown’s Lands within the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and still desires to have closer links with Austria, Germany and Italy. Bosnia cultivates both the nostalgia of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and of the Ottoman Empire. The Netherlands has certainly a stronger identity than Belgium or Croatia but this identity has the tendency to develop in two very different directions: a see-oriented direction towards Britain and the United States, or a land-oriented direction towards Germany and Flanders in Belgium. Countries with a weaker identity have the tendency to be more pro-European than the ones that have this strong history born personality I’ve just mentioned. But on the other hand Britain is experimenting nowadays a process of devolution, especially in Scotland and in a lesser extent in Wales. France is still theoretically the embodiment of a strongly centralised state but regional and local identities are flourishing as an alternative to the official universalistic ideology of the “République”, leading to a compelled acceptation of mass immigration imposed to the native populations, that, as a result, instinctively take up local or regional roots, which look more genuine and gentle, being seen as in complete accordance with one’s “deepest heart”.

 

To theorise the “proper relationship” between the national state and the European Union, you have to look out for a functioning model, in which several types of identities, be they linguistic or confessional, are overlapping and displaying a kind of mosaic patchwork on a smaller scale than Europe, which is obviously such a patchwork, especially in its central continental areas. The only functioning model we have is the Swiss model. This democratic model was born in an intersection area in the middle of the European continent, where three main European languages and one local language meet as well as two different Christian faiths, Protestantism and Catholicism, Swiss Protestantism being once more divided between Lutherans in German speaking Basle and Calvinist in French speaking Geneva, with remnants of Zwingli’s Protestantism around Zurich. Most German speaking Swiss are otherwise Roman Catholics, while most French speaking Swiss are Protestants except in the Canton of Jura. To coordinate optimally all these differences, what could lead to endless conflicts, the Swiss political system invented a form of federalism that allowed people to live in peace while keeping their differences alive. This could be a model for all European states and for regions within these states. The federal level in Switzerland is a “slim” and efficient level. Most matters are left in the hands of local politicians and officials. Moreover the Swiss system foresees the referendum as a decision making instrument at both federal and cantonal levels. The people can introduce a claim at local or national level, leading to the organisation of a referendum for all kind of matters: the building of a bridge, ecological problems, introduction or suppression of a railway or a bus connection, etc. In 2009 and in 2010, two referendums took place at federal level: the first one was introduced by a rightist populist party to forbid the building of minarets in Swiss cities and towns, in accordance to the very old ecological and town-planning laws of the Swiss Confederation, mostly accepted or introduced by leftist “progressive” political forces in former times. In November 2010, also very recently, people voted to expel all criminal foreigners out of the country, avoiding in this way the most painful effects of mass immigration. Such people’s initiatives would be impossible in other European countries, despite the fact that expelling criminals cannot be considered as “racist” (as non criminal foreigners cannot be expelled) or as hostile to particular religious faiths, as no religion tolerates crimes as acceptable patterns of behaviour.

 

Therefore, the possible adoption of this Swiss model, beyond its latest anti-immigration aspects, would allow other European peoples to vote in order to coin a policy-making decision about actual problems and so to avoid being arrogantly ordained by ukases imagined by the fertile fantasy of Eurocratic eggheads in Brussels. The adoption of the Swiss model implies of course to reduce most of the biggest states in Europe into smaller entities or to adopt a federal system like in Spain, Austria, Belgium or Germany, plus the possibility to organise referendums like in Switzerland, as this is not the case in the otherwise complete federal states I’ve just mentioned. This is a lack of democracy. The main problem would be France, where this kind of federalism and of democracy has never been introduced. Nevertheless, the demand for the referendum system is growing in France, as you can read it on www.polemia.com, where former New Right exponent Yvan Blot is currently resuming all his ideas, suggestions and critics about this topic.

 

Picture: The Splügenpass at the Italian-Swiss boarder where Synergon's Summer Course 1996 was held (Photo: RS)

 

The introducing of a general federal system in Europe with broad devolution within the existing states is not accepted everywhere. In Italy, where the federalist Lega Nord is continuously successful in the Northern provinces of the country, partisans of a strong state argue that a balkanization in the disguise of a general federalisation would weaken many state’s instruments that have been firmly settled in former times and enable the present-day state foundations or practices to avoid absorption by globalist American-lead agencies or concerns. This is of course an actual risk. So all the state institutions having been developed in Europe to enhance autarky (self-sufficiency) at whatever level possible must be kept out of any dissolution process implied by any form of devolution.

 

A policy consisting of introducing a referendum to avoid people being crushed by too centralised states or by eurocrats, of a devolution allowing this genuine form of democracy to be established everywhere and of keeping alive all institutions aiming at self-sufficiency was perhaps the hope of Solzhenitsyn for his dear old Russia. Such a policy ought to be made secure according to historical Russian and Swiss models, but cannot of course be implemented by the current political personnel. Needless to say that such a personnel is corrupt but not only that. It is brainwashed and duped by all kind of silly ready-made ideologies or blueprints, invented mostly in American think tanks, their European counter-parts and the main media agencies. To summarize it, these ideologies aim at weakening the societies by mocking their traditional patterns of behaviour, at generalizing the ideological assets of neo-liberalism in order to let globalization be thoroughly implemented in every corner of the world and at reducing Europe to remain once for ever a disguised colony of the United States.

 

Therefore, there is the need to replace such a deceiving personnel by new teams in every European country. These new teams cannot be the usual populist alternative parties as they are mostly unaware of the dangers of neo-liberalism, i.e. the new universalistic ideology suggested and imposed by the most dangerous think tanks of the left and of the establishment: from the camouflaged Trotskites within the social-democratic parties to the “new philosophers” in France, who paved the way to a subtle mixture of “political correctness”, apparent libertarianism, an apparently vehement and staunch defence of the human rights, avowed antifascism and anticommunism (communism being the result of a worship of mostly German “thought masters” (“maîtres-à-penser”) like Hegel  or Marx). The usual populist parties never managed to develop a discourse about and against this real danger jeopardizing Europe’s future. They were each time trapped by one aspect or another of this subtle mixture, especially all the anticommunist aspects.

 

A “new team” should give following answer to the now well-established official ideology of the main medias:

-          A defence of the social systems in Europe or of an adaptation/modernization of them, erasing the corruptions that deposited during several decades; the model would be of course the partnership existing since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany between workers and bosses; the investment model called the “Rhine Model” by the French thinker Michel Albert, where the capital is permanently invested in new technologies, in Research & Development, in academic think tanks, etc. The defence of the so-called socialist social systems in Europe aims essentially at preserving the families’ patrimony (especially modest working-class families because it gives them a safe security net in case of recession), at securing the future of the school and academic networks (now disintegrating under the iron heel of the banksters’ neoliberalism) and at securing a free and good functioning medical system in all European countries. It has often been said that the “non merchant sectors” were suffering due to all kind of imposed shortages (in the name of an alleged economic efficiency) and to the poor salaries earned by teaching or medical personnel. The “anti-shopkeeper” mentality of the so-called “right” or “new right” is an old heritage linking us to the ideals of the Scotsman Thomas Carlyle and the American poet Ezra Pound. If we want to translate these core ideas into a political programme, we’ll have to elaborate in each European country a specific defence of the “non merchant sectors”, as a civilization is measured not by material and transient productions but by the excellence of its medical and academic systems. We always were defenders of the primacy of culture against the iron heel of banks and economics.

The Varese Lake, Lombardia, where Synergon's Seminar 1995 and Synergon's Summer Course 2000 was held

 

-          The notion of human rights, as they are propagated by the mainstream medias and by the official American think tanks, is a would-be universalistic ideology, aiming at replacing all the old messianic faiths, be they a religious bias or a Hegelian or Marxist tinted ideology (“the main narratives” of Jean-François Lyotard). But the mainstream notion of human rights are not merely an ideology, it is an instrument fabricated by strategists at the time of President Jimmy Carter, in order to have a constant opportunity to meddle in the affairs of alien countries, in order to weaken them (a strategy already suggested by Sun Tzu). The Chinese could observe very early that drift from a pious reference to human rights towards manipulation and subversion and reacted in arguing that every civilization should be permitted to adapt the notion of human rights to its own core cultural patterns. If the Chinese have the right to adapt, why wouldn’t we Europeans not be entitled to give our own interpretation of human rights within the frame of our own civilization? And above all to be allowed to make a clear distinction, when human rights are evoked, between what is genuine in the true defence of citizens’ rights and obligations and what is the result of an offensive attack perpetrated by an alien “soft power” in order to destabilize our countries’ policy in whatever matters. We should have the courage to denounce every abuse in the manipulating of the human rights’ topic when they are solemnly summoned up only in order to promote any American imperialist project in Europe, as, for instance, the war against Yugoslavia in 1999 was. The justification put forward to start this war was the so-called breach of human rights committed by the Serbian government against the Albanians composing the majority of Kosovo’s population. But in the end it brought to power an infamous gang in this American-backed secessionist province of Kosovo, currently accused of trafficking human organs, weapons and prostitutes. Where are the rights of the people having been bereft of their organs by force or of the poor girls attracted by seducing work contracts in Western Europe, then beaten, locked up in some dreary cellar and finally forced to be on the game? All the media orchestrated humbug about human rights promoted by Carter, Clinton and Albright ended exactly in the worst breaches in common law, that were deleterious for thousands and thousands of victims. The American discourse about human rights is deceitfulness and cant and nothing else. The real purpose was to establish a gigantic military base in Kosovo, namely “Camp Bondsteel”, in order to replace the abandoned bases in Germany after the Cold War and the German reunification and to occupy the Balkans, an area which, since Alexander the Great, allows every audacious conqueror to control Anatolia and all areas beyond it, namely Iraq and Persia. A “new team” in Europe should ceaselessly stigmatize and vilify these abuses and clearly tell the public opinion of their respective countries what are the real purposes behind each American human rights policy. The “new team” should work a bit like Noam Chomsky in the United States, who indefatigably reveals what is Washington’s hidden agenda in every part of the world.

 

To adopt a Swiss model with referendum at local and national level, to reject vehemently the anti-autarky policies induced by the neo-liberal ideology and economical theory, to reject also the mainstream bias of “political correctness” and to perceive the real geopolitical and strategic intentions hidden behind each American step are not capabilities that the political personnel in Europe can currently display. Therefore you won’t have a proper relationship between the national states (and the people as an ethnic reality) and the highest institutions of the European Union, as long as a fooled political pseudo-elite is ruling these latest. You need “new teams” to induce a “proper relationship”.            

 

What is your analysis of the current European Union and it’s future and potential?

 

The answer to the question you ask here could be the stuff of a whole book. Indeed to answer it properly and in a complete way, you need to evoke the all story of the European integration process, starting with the founding act of the CECA/EGKS, i.e. the “European Community of Coal and Steel”, in 1951. After that you had the “Treaty of Rome” in 1957, launching the so-called “Common Market” and, later, the “Treaty of Maastricht” and the “Treaty of Lisbon”.  It seems useless to resume now the entire history of the European “Eurocratic” institutions, especially at a present time when they are totally degenerated by liberal and neo-liberal ideas that of course weaken them and make them in a certain way superfluous. The core idea at the very beginning was to create an “autonomous market”, leading to a certain autarky, which was absolutely possible when the six founding countries possessed large parts of Africa and could so exploit the most important industrial and mineral resources. The decolonization and the support that the United States provided to the independence movements in Africa bereft Europe of a direct access to the main resources. The core idea of an autarky within a certain “Eurafrican” commonwealth has no real significance anymore. This new situation could already have been foreseen in October 1956 when the United States tolerated (and indirectly supported) the Soviet invasion of Hungary despite the opinion of their main allies in Europe and condemned the French-British intervention in Egypt. The year 1956 announced the fate of Europe: the European powers had no right to intervene within Europe itself, as Hungary had freed itself from Soviet yoke and as the treaties signed after 1945 foresaw the withdrawal of all Soviet troops out of the country after some months. The European powers, including Britain, had no right anymore to intervene in Africa in order to keep order.

 

The decolonization process left Europe without a necessary “Ergänzungsraum”, i. e. a “complementary space”, that could be administrated from European capitals and give African people the efficiency of well drilled executives, what they lack since then, precipitating the whole Black continent into a terrible misery. But autarky doesn’t mean the direct access to mineral resources: it means first of all “food autarky”. Few European countries are (or were at the end of the 80s, just before the collapse of the Soviet block) really independent at food level or are now able to produce food excesses. Only Sweden, Hungary, France and Denmark were. For the excellent French demographist Gaston Bouthoul Denmark is the best example of a well-balanced agriculture. This small Scandinavian country is able to produce food excesses that make of it an “agricultural superpower” in Europe: one should simply remember that Danish peasants furnished 75% of the food for the German Wehrmacht during WW2. Without the Danish food excesses, Hitler’s armies wouldn’t have resisted so long in Russia, in Northern Africa and in the West (Italy).

Perugia, Umbria (Italy) where the common "New Right" Conference (with Dr. Marco Tarchi, Dr. Alessandro Campi, Alain de Benoist, Michael Walker and Robert Steuckers) was held in February 1991 and where Synergon's Summer Course 1999 took place

 

The core idea of autarky survived quite long within the European institutions. We should remember the last plan trying to materialise autarky, the so-called “Plan Delors”, proposing a policy of large scaled public works and of favouring telecommunications and public transports within the EU area. The EU has no future if it remains what American economists called “a penetrated system” at the time of the Weimar Republic in Germany when American big business tried a disguised colonisation of the defeated Reich through the Young and Dawes Plans. The EU is now a penetrated system where not only American multinationals are carving important segments of the inner European market but also the new Chinese State’s companies and where the textile industry is now entirely dependant from delocalized factories settled in Turkey or Pakistan. Unemployment reaches astronomical figures in Europe because of delocalisation.

 

Recently the German weekly magazine “Der Spiegel” has published figures showing that Europe is experimenting now a real decay. More and more European countries are leaving the hit parade of the 20 most important economies on the world. The results of the PISA inquiry about the levels reached by school systems reveals also a general decay of the European standards. University teacher and former student and translator of Carl Schmitt, Julien Freund, thought us in his important book “La fin de la Renaissance” (1981) that decay comes when you begin to hate yourself, to despise what you are and to abhor your own past. The whole “Vergangenheitsbewältigung” not only in Germany but in all European countries, where children and teenagers are subtly induced to loathe themselves and their fatherlands, has repercussions on the general economics of the entire continent. The EU can only survive when it finds its ideological roots again, i. e. the very notion of autarky. Otherwise the process of decay will amplify tremendously and lead to the complete disappearance of the European peoples and civilisation. In this process the EU area may become, as a kind of new “Eurabia” or Euro-Turkey or Afro-Europe, an appendix of a “Transatlantic Union” under US leadership. 

 

Well, let us now turn to the real question, the question that matters. Are we socialists or not? If we are, what’s the difference between us and the conventional socialists or social democrats?  What’s the difference between the synergist anti-liberal with his New Right background and the Marxist or Post-Marxist we find in all the parliaments in Europe and of course in the European Parliament where they constitute the second main group after the Christian Democrats of the EPP? Well, the conventional socialists would say that they get their inspiration from their holy icon Marx and from his followers of the 2^nd International, even if a born-again Marx would fiercely mock their liberal and permissive bias with the acidity he always used to lash verbally his foes. The problem is that the socialism of the direct heirs of the 2^nd International is a type of socialism without a frame, consisting mainly of irresponsible promises emitted by cynical politicians in order to grasp as many mandates or seats as possible. Long before Marx wrote his well-known communist manifesto, there was an economical genius in Germany called Friedrich List, who opposed the free trade ideology of Britain at that time. Free trade meant in the first half of the 19^th Century a generalized colonial system in the entire world, where Britain would have been the world only workshop or factory, while the rest would have remained underdeveloped only producing raw materials for the Sheffield or Manchester mills. Included all European countries of course. List asserted that every country had the genuine right to develop its own territorial assets. As the British fleet was the instrument enabling the British Crown to be ubiquitous and reach the harbours on all shores where it could get the raw materials and sell the products of England’s factories, List suggested an inner development of all countries in the world by inner colonization (fertilization and cultivation of all abandoned lands), building of railways and canals in order to boost communications. List inspired the German government under the leading of Bismarck, the small Belgian kingdom which was an economical power having experimented an actual industrial revolution immediately after Britain, the French positivists for the necessity of starting an inner agricultural colonization of the former Gallic mainland and above all the US government that had to face the huge problem of developing the gigantic land space between the Atlantic and the Pacific. List is the intellectual father of the Transcontinental Railway and of the canals linking the Lakes and the Saint Lawrence River. He is the real intellectual father of the industrial power of the United States. On the other hand he inspired anti-colonialists in the former Third World, especially India and China: Gandhi, who wanted the Indians to cultivate cotton and weave their own clothes with it, and Dr. Sun Ya Tsen, founder of the Chinese Republic in 1911, were more or less inspired by List’s theories and practical suggestions. The Chinese National-Republican economist Kai Sheng Chen, who theorized the very important notion of  “armed economy”, was a pupil of List and of Ludendorff, who adapted the peaceful ideas of List in the context of WW1. Taiwan and South Korea have proved that Kai Sheng Chen’s ideas can be successfully realized.

 

In the present-day United States the caucus around Lyndon LaRouche has produced an excellent analysis of the opposition between the Free Trade system and List’s practical views of a world of free autarkic areas. You can find a long documentary on the Internet about this dual interpretation given by the LaRouche’s group. Many Europeans would of course object that LaRouche’s vision of the economical history of the Western World during these two last centuries is quite over-simplified. Of course it is. But the core of this interpretation is correct and sound, whereas the over-simplification made of the all corpus a good didactical instrument. There is indeed an opposition between Free Trade (neo-liberalism, reaganomics, thatcherite economics, Chicago Boys, Hayek’s theories, etc.) and List’s idea of a harmonious juxtaposition of autarkies on the world map. The LaRouche caucus never quotes List (as far as I know) and says Lincoln and McKinley were opponents to the Free Trade, a position that, according to Lyndon LaRouche, explains their assassinations. Both were killed after a plot aiming at cancelling all political steps towards a North American autarkist system. Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were supporters of the Free Trade system and of a British-American alliance along the lines theorized by an almost forgotten proponent of geopolitics, Homer Lea, author of a key book, “The Day of the Saxons”. Lea, having got a degree in West Point, had been dismissed for medical reasons and turned to pure theory, advocating an eternal alliance of Britain and the United States. We can read in his book today the general principles of a control of the South Asian “rimlands” by both Anglo-Saxon sea powers, especially Afghanistan, and of a control of the Low Countries and Denmark to avoid any push forward of Germany in the direction of the North Sea or any push forward of France in the direction of the harbours of Antwerp and Rotterdam.

 

The LaRouche caucus aims obviously at emphasizing the role in history of some icon figures of America like Abraham Lincoln of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. Nevertheless Free Trade and Continental Autarky are truly a couple of opposites that you cannot deny, even if the binary antagonism isn’t certainly so sharp as explained by LaRouche’s team. For instance, it is true that F. D. Roosevelt started his career as a US President by launching the huge project of the “Tennessee Valley”, foreseeing the building of a series of colossal dams to tame the violent waters of the Tennessee, Mississippi and Missouri rivers. The New Deal and the “Tennessee Valley Project” were distinctly continental purposes but they were torpedoed by the proponents of Free Trade, who in the end imposed a new Free Trade policy, an alliance with Britain, despite the fact that Chamberlain tried to create an inner Commonwealth autarky. This shift in Roosevelt’s policy lead to war with Japan and Germany because the failure of the New Deal policy implied to choose for exportations and to abandon the project of developing the inner Northern American market. If you have to prevent other areas in the world to develop their own closed markets, you must destroy them, according to the good old colonial logics, and get them as exportation markets. So the United States were doomed to destroy the European system of the Germans and the “Co-Prosperity Sphere of East Asia” under the leadership of Japan.

 

To summarize our position, let us remember that Russia developed and came out of underdevelopment under the “Continental Project” of Serguei Witte and Arkady Stolypin, who were either dismissed after a gossip campaign or assassinated by a crazy revolutionist. China after its communist isolation under Mao turned to a form of autarkist model under Deng Xiao Ping, leading the country to an unchallenged economical success. Putin in Russia is trying, with less success, to adopt the same guidelines. But the “Continental Autarkists” are assembling nowadays under the direction of the informal Shanghai Group or of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China). Europe and the United States will have to adapt in order to avoid complete decay. The key idea to successfully perform this adaptation is the good old project of Friedrich List. And the American can refer to one of his most brilliant students: Lawrence Dennis, who coined a project for “continental autarky”, being influenced by the “continentalist” school of South America, where he lived for a quite long time as a diplomat.

 

The Flemish village of Munkzwalm where many technical meetings and several Spring Courses were held between 1989 and 1995

 

Q.: Is it important for the pro-European activist to be familiar with geopolitics?

 

Of course. If you are a pro-European activist, you should perceive Europe as a geopolitical entity, surrounded by possible foes and having to control militarily its periphery, for instance by preventing the North African states to become sea powers again or to prevent any alien power to provide them sea power tools or missiles able to strike the Mediterranean coasts of Europe. The whole history of Europe is the history of a long defence battle against Barbary Coast pirates and their Ottoman rulers. Once this danger eliminated, Europe could develop and prosper. Nowadays mass immigration within the boarders of European countries replace the external danger of Barbary Coast piracy or of Ottoman threat by introducing parallel economical circuits and mafia systems of drug bosses, the so-called “diaspora mafias”, who weaken the whole social system by literally milking money from the well established European social security system and by earning colossal fortunes from drug dealing (Moroccan cannabis which amounts to 70% of the entire European consumption or Central Asian heroin dispatched by Turkish mafias). The type of danger has changed but comes always from the very next periphery of Europe. Racialist as well as so-called anti-racist arguments are preposterous in such matters, as you don’t need to develop a “racialist argumentation” to criticize mass immigration: you simply have to stress the fact that international authorities like the UNESCO or the UNO have urged the EU to finance alternative crops in Morocco, in order to replace the huge fields of cannabis in the Northern parts of the country by useful plantations. But the money given by the EU has been used to triple the area where cannabis crops are cultivated! So Morocco, the Moroccan citizens or the European citizens of Moroccan origin who trust drugs from the Rif area are lawbreakers in front of the EU, UNESCO and UNO policy. Anti-racist arguments, caucuses and legislations, trying to crush all people criticizing mass immigration, are in fact tools in the hand of the secret lobbies and the drug bosses that try to weaken Europe and to maintain our homelands in a permanent state of debility and decrepitude.

 

For you Swedes, as fellow countrymen of Rudolf Kjellén and Sven Hedin, geopolitics is of course a genuine part of your political and cultural heritage. Moreover the Russian Yuri Semionov, author of a tremendously interesting book on Siberia, was a refugee in Sweden in the Thirties. In Swedish libraries you must find a lot about the first theories on geopolitics (as it was Kjellén who coined the word), about the travelogues of Hedin, explorer of Central Asia and Tibet, and maybe about Semionov’s works. At the very beginning of the so-called New Right project, geopolitics was still taboo. There was certainly an implicit geopolitics among diplomats or generals, which was not genuinely different from the former geopolitical endeavours of the previous decades, but the very word was taboo. You couldn’t talk about geopolitics without being accused of trying to resume Nazi geopolitics, which had been set once for all as “esoteric”. Karl Haushofer, the German pupil of Kjellén, had been depicted as a crazy mystical mage having disguised his belonging to a so-called secret society of the “Green Dragon” behind a weak discourse about history, geography and international affairs. When you read Haushofer and his excellent “Zeitschrift für Geopolitik” (which survived him under the name of “Geopolitik” in the Fifties), you find comments on current affairs, reasonable reflections about frontiers within and outside Europe, interviews of foreign diplomats and excellent analyses about the Pacific area but no pseudo-Chinese or neo-Teutonic esoteric humbug. At the end of the Seventies, things changed. In the United States, Colin S. Gray decided to break definitively the taboo on geopolitics. As an Anglo-Saxon proponent of geopolitics, Gray was of course a pupil of Sir Halford John MacKinder, of Homer Lea and of their pupil Spykman. But he explained that Haushofer’s geopolitics was a continental reaction against MacKinder’s sea power geopolitics. Haushofer was so rehabilitated and could be studied again as a normal proponent of geopolitics and not as a mystical crackpot.

 

In the group of students, who followed the works of the New Right groups in Brussels at the end of the Seventies and was lead by late Alain Derriks, we had of course purchased a copy of Gray’s book but, at the same time, we discovered the book of an Italian general, Guido Giannettini, “Dietro la Grande Muraglia” (“Beyond the Great (Chinese) Wall”). This book was extremely well written, offered simultaneously a historical approach and present-day analyses, and opened wide perspectives. Giannettini had observed how the whole international chessboard had been turned upside down in 1972, when Kissinger and Nixon had coined a new implicit alliance with communist China. Formerly, the American lead Western world had faced a giant Eurasian communist block, embracing China and the USSR, even when the relationship between Moscow and Beijing wasn’t optimal anymore or could even become sometimes frankly antagonist (with a clash between both armies along the River Amur in Far Eastern Siberia). After the defeat of Germany in 1945, Europe had been divided, according to the rules settled at Teheran and Yalta, into a Western part dominated by NATO and an Eastern part under the direction of the Warsaw Pact. At that time Euro-nationalists around my fellow countryman Jean Thiriart, rejected both systems and pleaded for an alliance with China and the Arab world (Egypt, Syria and Iraq) in order to loose the choking entanglement of both NATO and Warsaw Pact. In Thiriart’s clearly outlined strategy for his Europe-wide but tiny movement, Chinese and Arabs would have had for task to keep Americans and Soviets busy outside Europe, so that the pressure would be lighter to bear in Europe and lead, if possible, to a successful liberation movement, aiming at restoring Europe’s independence and sovereignty. When Americans and Chinese joined their forces to contain and encircle Soviet Russia, the wished Euro-Chinese alliance to disentangle Yalta’s yoke in Europe became a sheer impossibility. On the other side, the Arabs were too weak and not interested in a European revival, as they feared a come back of the colonial powers in their area, as during the Suez affair in October 1956. Giannettini’s option for a Euro-Russian block became the only possible choice. Thiriart agreed. So did we. But our views about a possible future Euro-Russian alliance were confused at the very beginning: we couldn’t accept the occupation of Eastern Europe and even less the partition of Germany that is, geographically speaking, the core of Europe. On the other hand, the American disguised occupation was also for us an unacceptable situation, especially after De Gaulle’s breach with NATO and the new independent course in international affairs that it induced, according to Dr. Armin Mohler. After the Israeli victory of June 1967 with the help of Mirage III fighters and bombers, France’s new world policy lead to the exportation of Dassault jet fighters in Latin America, South Africa, India and Australia. It could have generated a new European based aeronautical industry, as in 1975 the Scandinavian and Low Countries air forces had the choice between the Mirage IV, the Saab Viggen jet, a new model produced by a future common French-Swedish project, or the American F-16. European independence was only possible if Europe could build an independent aeronautical industry, based on merges between already existing aeronautical companies. The fact that after corruption affairs the Scandinavian and Low Countries armies opted for the American F-16 jet ruined the possibility of a jointed independent European aeronautical industry. It was the purchase of the F-16 jets and the subsequent ruin of a possible French-Swedish fighter project that induces our small group to reject definitively all forms of pendency in front of the Western hegemonic power. But what else if the Iron Curtain seemed to be not removable and if the inner European situation was apparently a stalemate, bound to remain as such eternally?

 

Other readings helped us to improve our views. I’ll quote here two key books that shifted unequivocally our viewpoints: Prof. Louis Dupeux’ doctor paper on German “national bolshevism” at the time of the Weimar Republic in the Twenties and Prof. Alexander Yanov’s UCLA paper on the Russian “New Right” in the last years of Soviet rule, at the end of Brezhnev’s era and just before Gorbachev’s perestroika. Dupeux helped us to understand the relevancy of the Soviet-German tandem in the Twenties, starting with the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 (between Rathenau and Chicherin). This relevancy could explain us the cause of the ephemeral Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 1939. A European-Russian tandem could therefore offer the possibility of independence and Continental-Eurasian strength. But such a tandem was impossible under communist rule. But was communism as monolithic as it was described in the Western press and medias? In his paper Yanov divided Soviet-Russian political thought into two categories and each of these two categories again in two others: the Zapadniki (the Westerners) and the Narodniki (the proponents of Russian identity). You could find dissident Zapadniki in the emigration and pro-regime Zapadniki within the Soviet institutions (i. e. Marxist of the old school as Marxism was a Western importation). You could also find dissident Narodniki in the emigration, such as Solzhenitsyn, and pro-regime Narodniki in the Soviet-Russian academic world, such as the writer Valentin Rasputin, who wrote “rural” novels criticizing the reckless industrialisation and “electrification” of old traditional Russian villages or areas. For Yanov the Russian New Right was incarnated in all the Narodniki, be they dissidents or not, and all Narodniki were of course dangerous compeers and rascals as they challenged dominant Western as well as Soviet principles. So our position, and the one staunchly defended in Germany by former Gulag prisoner Wolfgang Strauss (arrested during the East German riots of June 1953), was to hope for a Narodniki political or metapolitical revolution in Russia and in Eastern Europe, giving the possibility to create an International of Narodniki, from the Atlantic coasts to the Pacific Ocean, challenging the Western hemisphere and its liberal leftist ideology. Meanwhile after Reagan’s election in November 1981 the missile crisis swept all over Europe. The piling up of missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain risked in case of war to destroy definitively all European countries. The reaction was passionate especially in Germany: more and more puzzled voices required a new neutrality status, to avoid implication in a military system of warmongers, and pleaded for a withdrawal from NATO, as the Treaty’s Organisation was lead by an external hegemonic power, which didn’t care for the safety of Europe and was ready to unleash a horrible nuclear apocalypse upon our countries. A neutrality status, as suggested by General Jochen Löser in Germany (in “Neutralität für Mitteleuropa”), implied also to promote a kind of “Third Way” system, which would have been a synthesis between state socialism and market capitalism. “Wir Selbst” of Siegfried Bublies (Koblenz) was the leading magazine, which backed a policy of NATO withdrawal and Central European neutrality, a “Third Way” (for instance the one theorized by the Slovak economist Ota Sik), a reconciliation with Russia (according to Ernst Niekisch or Karl-Otto Paetel as dissidents both of the Weimar Republic and of the Third Reich), the devolution movements in Western and Eastern Europe, and the new dissidents in the Soviet dominated block. The magazine had been created in 1979 and remained till the very beginning of the 21^st Century the main forum for alternative thought with a humanist touch in all Europe. I mean “humanist” in the sense given to this word by the main non Westernized dissidents of Eastern Europe, being no Narodniki in the narrow sense of this expression. The years 1982 and 1983 were determined by the pacifist revolt throughout Europe, especially in Germany around an interesting thinker like air force Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Mechtersheimer, and in the Low Countries but also in Britain, where huge demonstrations were held to prevent the dispatch of American missiles. Our small group supported the pacifist movement against the conventional positions of many other Rightist or even New Right clubs (including de Benoist at that time, who accused us of being the “Trotskites” of the movement, positioning himself as a kind of Stalin-like Big Brother!). The new pacifism and neutralism ceased to thrive when Gorbachev declared he intended to launch a glasnost and perestroika policy to soften the Soviet rule. Once Gorbachev promised a new policy, we could only wait and see, without abandoning all necessary scepticism. 

 

During the second half of the Eighties, we hoped for a new world, in which the Iron Curtain would one day disappear and the dominant systems would gently evolve towards a “Third Way”. In 1989, when the Berlin Wall was suppressed, we all thought very naively that the liberation of Europe and of Russia was imminent. The Gulf War and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the invasion of Iraq and of Afghanistan proved that Europe was in fact totally unable to take an original decision in front of the world events, with the slight exception of the short French, German and Russian opposition to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, an opposition naively hailed as the new “Paris-Berlin-Moscow Axe” but an Axe that couldn’t of course prevent the unlawful invasion of Saddam Hussein’s country. So we still are in a desolate state of subjugation despite the fact that Europe now counts 27 states in full membership.

 

Let us come back to geopolitical theory. In 1979, when we discovered Giannettini’s book, I read General Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen’s book “Mut zur Macht”, which was a very good summary and actualisation of Kjellen’s ideas, as well as of all notions formerly defined by Haushofer and his broad team (Walter Pahl, Gustav Fochler-Hauke, Otto Maull, Walter Wüst, R. W.  von Keyserlingk, Erich Obst, etc.). I wrote a small paper for my end examination of “International Affairs”, which was read with interest by the teacher, who found Lohausen’s positions interesting but still “dangerous”. Geopolitics in June 1980, date when I passed the examination with brio (18/20! Thank you, dear General von Lohausen!), was still taboo in “poor little Belgium”. It wouldn’t last a long time before this “dangerousness” would definitively belong to the past. The French intellectual world produced successively many excellent geopolitical studies: I’ll only quote here Yves Lacoste’s journal “Hérodote”, the accurate maps of Michel Foucher, the encyclopaedic studies of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and the courses of Ayméric Chauprade (who, as a teacher in the French High Military Academy, was recently sacked by Sarközy because he couldn’t accept the coming back of France in the commanding structures of NATO as a full member state). In the Anglo-Saxon world, the best books on the matter are those produced by the British publishing house “I. B. Tauris” (London).

 

You cannot concentrate only on geopolitics as a mean strategic way of thinking. To use the tools properly you need an accurate knowledge in history that the shelves in Anglo-Saxon bookshops offer you in abundance. Then to be a good proponent of geopolitics you need to study lots of maps, especially historical maps. I therefore collect historical atlases since I got the first one in my life, the official one you had to buy when you reached the third year in the secondary school. When I was 15, I bought my very first German book, volume two of the “DTV-Atlas zur Weltgeschichte”, at Brussels’ flea market. The book lies now since about forty years on my desk! Indispensable tools are also the atlases of the British University teacher Colin McEvedy, which were translated into Dutch for Holland’s schools. McEvedy sees history as a regular succession of collisions between “core peoples” (Indo-Europeans, Turkish-Mongolic tribes, Semitic nomads of the Arabic peninsula, etc.), which he perceives as balls moving on a kind of huge billiard table, which is Eurasia with all its highways across the steppes. By reading McEvedy’s comments on the maps he draws we can understand history as permanent systolic and diastolic movements of “core peoples” (together with assimilated alien tribes or vanquished former foes) against each other, in order to control land, highways or sea accesses to them. And what is European history if not a long process of resisting more or less successfully Mongolic or Turkish assaults in the East and Hamito-Semitic incursions in the South? Next to McEvedy, the most interesting historical atlas in my collection is the one that a Swiss professor produced, namely Jacques Bertin’s “Atlas historique universel – Panorama de l’histoire du monde”, where you’ll find even more precise maps than the ones of McEvedy. Also, the German DTV-Atlas (which exists in an English version published at Penguin’s publishing house in Britain), McEvedy’s works and Bertin’s panorama are the tools that I use since many years. They have been my paper companions since I was a teenager.

 

What is your analysis of the actual and ideal relationship of Europe and Russia, Turkey and the United States?

 

To answer your question here in a complete and satisfying way, I should rather write a couple of thick books instead of babbling some insufficient explanations!  Indeed your question asks me in fact to summarize in some short sentences the whole history of mankind. I suppose that, for historical reasons, Swedes don’t perceive Russia and Turkey as citizens of Central or Western Europe would perceive these countries. Swedes must remember the attempt of King Charles XII to restore what was seen as the “Gothic Link” between the Baltic and the Black Sees by becoming the heir of the Polish-Lithuanian State in decay at his time: therefore he had to wage war against Russia and try to obtain the Turkish alliance. During the Soviet-Finnish war of winter 1939-40, Swedes were terribly worried because the move of Stalin’s Red Army to recuperate Finland as a former Tsarist province implied a future Soviet control of the Baltic See reducing simultaneously Swedish sovereignty and room for manoeuvre in these waters. It was also jeopardizing the fragile independence of the Baltic States.

 

Vlotho, Low Saxony (Germany) where a lot of meetings, conferences and Summer courses took place

 

Russia still wants to have access to the Atlantic via the Baltic see routes but in a less aggressive way than in Soviet times, when a messianic ideology was running the agenda. After the disappearing of the Iron Curtain, we are back to the situation we had in 1814. Once Napoleon Bonaparte had been eliminated and together with him the tone-downed Bolshevism of his time, i. e. the blood drenched French revolution ideology, Europe was a more or less united block nicknamed in Ancient Greek language the “Pentarchy” (The “Five Powers”), stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific coasts. We often forget nowadays that Europe was a strategic united block between 1814 and 1830, i. e. only during fifteen years. This unity allowed the pacification of Spain in 1822-23, the Greek independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1828 and later the crushing of Barbary Coast piracy by the landing of French troops in present-day Algeria in 1832. But the “Pentarchy” ceased to be a harmonious symphony of allied traditional powers when Belgium become independent from the King of Holland: indeed, Britain (in order to destroy the sea power of Holland, the industrial capacities in present-day Belgium’s Walloon provinces and the potentialities of the Indonesian colonial realm of the United Low Countries Kingdom) and France (aiming at recuperating Belgium and the harbour of Antwerp as well as a portion of the Mosel Valley in Luxemburg, leading to the very middle of German Rhineland in Koblenz) supported the rather incoherent Belgian independence movement while the other powers (Prussia, Austria and Russia) supported the Dutch King and his United Kingdom of the Low Countries. France, which started in the Thirties of the 19^th Century to carve its African Empire not only in Algeria but also in present-day Gabon and Senegal, and Britain, which was already a world empire whose cornerstone was India, became very soon Extra-European realms deriving their power from wealthy colonies and were therefore not more interested in the strategic unity of Europe, as the genuine civilisation area of all the people of our Caucasian kinship. The competition between European powers to get colonies implied that colonial rivalries could perhaps end in inner European conflicts, what happened indeed in 1914. The spirit of 1814 was kept alive by the “Drei Kaisersbund”, the “Alliance of the three Emperors” (United Germany after 1871, Austria-Hungary and Russia), which unfortunately started to disintegrate after Bismarck’s withdrawal in 1891 and due to the French-Russian economical-financial alliance under Tsar Alexander III (cf. the limpid book of Gordon Craig and Alexander L. George, “Zwischen Krieg und Frieden. Konfliktlösung in Geschichte und Gegenwart”, C. H. Beck, Munich, 1984; this book is a history of European diplomacy from the Treaty of Vienna in 1814 to WW1, where the authors describe the gradual disintegration of the “Pentarchy”, leading to the explosion of 1914; both authors remember also that Nixon and Kissinger tried to re-establish a kind of “Pentapolarity”, with China, Japan, the United States, Europe and Soviet Russia, but the attempt failed or was reduced to nought by the new human rights’ diplomacy of Carter. The only possible present-day “Pentapolarity” is represented by the “BRIC”-system, with Brazil, Russia, Iran, India, China and maybe, in a next future, post-Mandela South Africa).

 

Sababurg Castle, along the "Märchenstrasse" ("Fairy Tales Road"), Hessen (Germany), where the German friends usually held their regular meetings

 

In the first decade of the 20^th Century, the “Entente” was not an obvious option at the very beginning: Russia and Britain were still rivals in Central Asia and on the rimland of South Asia; Britain and France were rivals in Sudan as Britain couldn’t tolerate a French military settlement on the Nile River (the Fashoda incident in 1898), a situation which would have cut the British possessions in the Southern part of Africa from the Egyptian protectorate in the North; we should remember here that Cecil Rhodes’ project was to link Cape Town to Cairo by a British managed Trans-African railway, after the elimination of the German colony of Tanganyka or a possible occupation of Belgian Katanga. Even if already grossly decided in 1904, the French-British-Russian alliance, known as the Entente, was far to be a sure fact before the fatidic year of 1914. The Anglo-Russian dispute in Persia had still to be settled in 1907. Moreover the three Entente powers hadn’t yet shared their part of the pie on the rimlands, as France had to accept first the de facto English protectorate in Egypt. In return for this acceptation, Britain accepted to support France’s interests in Morocco against the will of the German Emperor, who wanted to extend the Reich’s influence to the Sherifan Kingdom in North Africa, threatening to close the Mediterranean and to reduce to nought the key strategic importance of Gibraltar. For all these reasons, it is obviously not sure that Russian efficient ministers as Witte or Stolypin would have waged a war, as Russia was still economically and industrially to weak to sustain a long term war against the so-called Central Powers, i.e. Austria, Germany and the Ottomans, especially as China and Japan could possibly take advantage in the Far East of a debilitated Russia on the European stage.

 

The problem is that we Europeans cannot escape the necessity of using the Siberian raw materials and the gas and oil of the Caucasian, Central Asian and Russian fields. The weakness of Europe lays in its lack of raw materials (nowadays 90% of the rare earths, indispensable for high tech electronic devices, have to be bought in China). Europe could save itself from the Ottoman entanglement by conquering America and by circumnavigating Africa and arriving in the Indian harbours without having to pass through Islam dominated areas. Europeans aren’t visceral colonialists: they carved colonial empires despite their will, simply to escape an Ottoman-Muslim invasion.

 

The European-Turkish relationship has always been conflictual and remains today as such. It is not a question of race or even of religion, although both factors ought of course to be taken reasonably into account. Religion played certainly a key role as the Seldjuks had turned Muslim before attacking and beating the Byzantine Empire in 1071 but one forgets too often that at the same time other Turkish tribes, known as the Cumans, attacked Southern Russia and moved in the direction of the Low Danube without having turned Muslim: their faith war still Pagan-Shamanic. They nevertheless coordinated their wide scale action with their Muslim cousins. Muslim and Pagan-Shamanic Turks took the Pontic area (Black Sea as Pontus Euxinus) in a tangle: the Pagan Cumans in the North, the Muslim Seldjuks in the South. It is neither a question of race as present-day Turkey is a mix of all possible neighbouring peoples, tribes and ethnic kinships. It isn’t a joke to say that you have now Turks of all colours, like on an advertisement panel of Benetton! The European Danubian, Balkanic (Bosnians, Greeks, Albanians) and Ukrainian contribution to the ethno-genesis of the present-day Turkish population is really important, as are the parts of converted local Byzantine Greeks or Armenians or as are also the Sunni Indo-European Kurds. The Arab-Syrian influence is also clear in the South. The Turkish danger is that the Turks, whatever their real origin may be, still see themselves as the heirs of all the Hun, Mongolic and Turkish tribes that moved westwards to the Atlantic. Sultan Mehmed, who took Constantinople in 1453, kept in his mind the idea of the general move of Turkish tribes westwards but added to his geopolitical vision the one that moved the Byzantine general Justinian, who wanted at the beginning of the 7^th Century to conquer again all the Mediterranean area till the shores of the Atlantic. Mehmed’s vision was also a merge of Turkish and Byzantine geopolitics. In his own eyes, he was the Sultan and the Byzantine Basileus at the same time and wanted to become also Pope and Emperor, once his armies would have taken both Rome (“the Red Apple”) and Vienna (“the Golden Apple”). Mehmed even thought that one day such a shift as a “translatio imperii ad Turcos” could happen, like there had been a “translatio imperii ad Francos” and “ad Germanos”, just after the definitive crumbling down of the Roman Empire.  

 

The idea of moving westwards is still alive among Turks. The strong Turkish desire to become a full member of the EU means the will to pour the Anatolian demographic overpopulation into the demographically declining European states and to transform them in Muslim Turkish dominated countries. This statement of mine is not a mean reflection of an incurable “Turkophobic” obsession but is purely and simply derived from an analysis of Erdogan’s speech in Cologne in February 2008. Erdogan urged the Turkish immigration in Germany and in other European countries not to assimilate, as “assimilation is a crime against mankind” because it would wipe out the “Turkishness” of Turkish people, and urged also to create autonomous Turkish communities within the European states, that would welcome the new immigrants by marriage of by so-called “family gathering”. Later Erdogan and Davutoglu threaten to back the Turkish mafias in Europe, would the authorities of the EU postpone once more the admission of Turkey as a full member state. Every serious political personality in Europe has to reject such a project and to struggle against its possible translation into the everyday European reality. A migration flood of totally uneducated workforces into Europe would lead to high joblessness and let the social security systems collapse definitively. It would mean the end of the European civilisation.

 

The Turks are plenty aware of the key position their country has on the world map. Would I be a Turk, I would of course staunchly support Erdogan and Davutoglu. But I am not and cannot identify myself to such an alien vision of geopolitics. I wouldn’t care if all the efforts of the new Turkish geopolitics would be directed towards the Near East, as the Near East needs a hegemonic regional power to get rid of the awful chaos in which it is now desperately squiggling. It wouldn’t perhaps not be so easy for the Turks to become again the hegemonic power in an Arab Near East as conflicts were frequent between Ottomans and Arab nationalists, especially since the end of the 19^th Century when Sultan Abdulhamid started a centralisation policy, which was achieved by the strongly nationalist Young Turks in power since 1908. Arab liberal nationalists contended this new Young Turkish nationalist rule, which was not more genuinely Islamic, universal and Imperial-Ottoman but strictly Turkish national, stressing the superiority of the Turks within the Ottoman Empire, reducing simultaneously the Arabs to second-class citizens. The challenging Arab nationalists were severely crushed at the eve of WW1 (public hangings of Arab liberal intellectuals were common in Syrian or Lebanese towns at that time). But a renewed Turkish policy in the Near East cannot in principle collide frontally with the vital and paramount European interests, except of course if it would dominate the Suez Canal zone and control this essential portion of the sea route leading from West Europe to the Far East: one should not forget that the Zionist idea, i. e. the idea of settling Jews in the area between Turkish Anatolia and Mehmet Ali’s successful Egypt of the first half of the 19^th Century, that was supported by France, was an idea shaped in the late 1830s in the English press and not in the mind of Rabbis in Eastern European ghettos. The idea had already been evoked by Prince Charles de Ligne during the war between the Ottoman Empire and the coalition of Russia and Austria in the 1780s as a means to weaken the Turks and to create a focal point of troubles on another front, far from the Balkans, Crimea and the Caucasus; Napoleon wanted also to settle Jews in Palestine in order to prevent a future Turkish domination in the Suez area, as the French at that time, by supporting the Mameluks of Egypt against their Turkish masters, already had the intention to dig a canal between the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Zionism is also not a genuine ideology born in Jewish ghettos but an idea forged artificially by the British to use the Jews as mere puppets. This role of Israel as a simple puppet state explains also why the relationship between Turkey and Israel are worsening now as the renewed Ottoman diplomacy of Davutoglu induces the Turkish state to resume his previous influences in the Arab Near East or Fertile Crescent. This could lead to a complete reverse of alliances in the region: voices in the United States are pleading for a new Iranian-American tandem between Mesopotamia and the Indus River which would fade or dim the usual alliance between Ankara, Washington and Tel Aviv. Such a shift would be as important as the Nixon-Kissinger renewed diplomacy of 1971-72, when suddenly China, the former “rogue state”, turned instantaneously to be the best ally of the States. It would also rule out many oversimplifying ideologists who have opted for cartoonlike pro-Zionist, pro-Palestinian (or pro-Hamas or pro-Hizbollah) or pro-Iranian positions in order to support either a Western Alliance or an Anti-Western/Anti-American coalition on the international chessboard. Things might or even may be completely turned upside down within a single decade. The Anti-American pro-Iranian ideologist of today may become a pro-Zionist Anti-American tomorrow if he wants to remain Anti-American and if he is not turned still crazier by the crumbling down of his too schematic worldview as many Western Maoists did in the 1970s, when their former anti-American anti-imperialist perorations coined on the Chinese model of Mao’s cultural revolution became totally outdated and preposterous once Kissinger had forged an alliance with communist China, that wasn’t ready anymore to support Maoist zealots and puppets in the Western world. Indeed, the United States would better than now contain Russia, China and India in case of a renewed alliance with Teheran. And using the quite wide influence sphere of the “Iranian civilization” (as the former Shah used to say), they could extend more easily their preponderance in Central Asia, in the Fertile Crescent, in Lebanon (with the Shiite minority armed by the Hizbollah) and in the Gulf where Shiite minorities are important. But Iran would then become a too powerful ally, exactly like China, the new ally of 1972, does. And before Iran would become a new China and develop naval capacities in the Gulf and in the Oman Sea, i. e. in one of the main areas of the Indian Ocean, like China wants to control entirely the Southern Chinese Sea in the Pacific, Europe would have to unite with Russia and India to contain a pro-American Iran! Stephen Kinzer, former “New York Times” bureau chief in Turkey, celebrated analyst of Iran’s turmoil in 1953 (the Mossadegh case) and International relations teacher at Boston University, pleads in his very recent book “Reset Middle East” for a general alliance on the Near East, Middle East and South Asian rimlands between Turks, Iranians and Americans (which would include also Pakistan and so re-establish the containing bolt that the Bagdad Treaty formerly was). When you are interested in geopolitics you should have fine observing skills and foresee all possible shifts in alliances that could occur in a very near future. It is also obvious that if Washington continues to treat Teheran as a “rogue state”, the Iranians will be compelled to play the game with Russia that remains nevertheless historically a foe of the Persians. Each Russian-Persian tandem would split in its very middle the rimland’s room that was organised by the Bagdad Treaty of the Fifties and give the Russians indirectly a broad “window” on the Indian Ocean, which is a state of things totally contrary to the principles settled by Homer Lea in 1912 and since then cardinal to all the Anglo-Saxon sea powers.  

 

The relationship with the United States is a quite complex one. Two main ideas must be kept in mind if you want to understand our position:

1)       Like the British historian Christopher Hill brilliantly demonstrated in his books “The World Turned Upside Down – Radical Ideas During the English Revolution” and “Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England”, the core ideas that lead to the foundation of the British Thirteen Colonies in the Northern part of the New World was “dissidence” in front of all the European political systems inherited from the past. Later Clifford Longley in “Chosen People – The Big idea that Shapes England and America” produced an very accurate historical analysis of this Biblical idea of a Chosen People that leads Britons and Americans to perceive themselves not as a particular people of the European Caucasian family but as a “lost tribe of Israel”. Longley explains us that state of affairs by writing that Britons and Americans don’t have an identity, as other European people have, but thinks that they have a particular destiny, i. e. to build an aloof “New Jerusalem” and not a concrete defensive Empire of the European people, that would be born out of the genuine historical traditions of the subcontinent and simultaneously the legitimate, syncretic, Continental and Insular (Britain, Ireland, Sicily, Crete, Cyprus, etc.) heir of the Roman Empire and of the medieval Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The very idea of incarnating a “New Jerusalem” leads to despise the “non chosen”, even if they are akin people having importantly contributed to the ethno-genesis of the English or American nation (Dutch, Flemings, Northern Germans as Hanovrian or Low Saxons, Danes and Norwegians). Kevin Phillips, former Republican strategist in the United States and political commentator in leading American papers, in his fascinating book “American Theocracy – The Peril and Politics of Radical Religion, Oil and Borrowed Money in the 21^st Century”, criticizes the new political theology induced by the several Bush’s Administrations between 2000 and 2008, that have bereft the Republicans from the last remnants of traditional diplomacy, leading to what he calls an “Erring Republican Majority”. Indeed each chosen people’s theology introduced in the events of the international chessboard destroys all the traditional ways of practising diplomacy, as surely as French Sans-Culottes’ Republicanism or Bolshevism did or Islam Fundamentalism does. Europe, as a continent that has a long memory, cannot admit a scheme that rejects vehemently all the heritages of the past to replace them by mere artificial myths, that were moreover imported from the Near East in Roman times and have received a still faker interpretation in the decades just after Reformation.

 

2)       The second main fact of history to keep in mind in order to understand the complex Euro-American relationship is the effect the Monroe Doctrine had on the international chessboard from the second quarter of the 19^th Century onwards. In principle the Monroe Doctrine aimed at preventing European interventions in the New World or the Western Hemisphere as the Spanish “creole” countries had rebelled against Madrid and gained their independence and as the British had burnt Washington in 1812, after having invaded the States from Canada, and the Russians were still formally in California and Alaska. Monroe feared a general intervention of the “Pentarchy” powers everywhere in the new World that would have prevented the former Thirteen Colonies to develop and would synchronously have choked any attempt to rise as a Northern American continental and bi-oceanic power. Indeed the young Northern American Republic faced at that time a huge Eurasian block that seemed definitively indomitable, with British room projections in India and Southern Africa. The American historian Dexter Perkins in his book “Hands off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine” (1955) explains us that President Monroe got the audacity to challenge the European/Eurasian block at a time when the United States couldn’t actually assert any well-grounded power on the international chessboard. Monroe’s bold affirmation created US power in the world, simply because a pure will, expressed in plain words, can really anticipate actual power, be the very first step towards it. It is not a simple matter of chance that Carl Schmitt stressed the uttermost importance of the Monroe Doctrine in the genesis of the geopolitical shape of present-day world. Jordis von Lohausen says in his book “Mut zur Macht” that if Monroe wanted to preserve the New World from any European intervention, he wanted simultaneously to keep this New World for the USA themselves as sole hegemonic power. But if the New World is united under the leadership of Washington, it must control the other banks of the Oceans in a way or another to prevent any concentration of power able to disturb US hegemony or to regain authority in Latin America, be it directly political (like during the attempt of Maximilian of Hapsburg to create a European-dominated Empire in Mexico in 1866-67 with the support of France, Belgium, Spain and Austria) or indirectly by trade and economical means (as Germany did just before the two World Wars). So in the end effect, the Monroe Doctrine implies that the United States have to control the shores of Western Europe and of Morocco and the ones of Japan, China, Indochina and the Philippines in order to survive a the main superpower in the world.

 

The critical attitude we always have developed in front of the US American fact derives from these two core ideas. We cannot accept a Biblical ideology refusing to take into account our real roots and reducing all the institutions generated by our history to worthless rubbish. We can neither accept an affirmation of power that denies us the right to be ourselves a power on political, military and cultural levels. Would America get rid of the former British dissident ideology and adopt the principles of continental autarky, as Lawrence Dennis taught to do, there wouldn’t be any problem anymore. It would even be of great benefit for the US American population itself.

 

In your many articles you have exhibited an impressive knowledge of European thinkers from Hamsun and Evola to Spengler and Schmitt. Do you consider some of them more important, and a good starting-point for the pro-European individual?

 

The study of our “classical” heritage of authors is a must if we want to create a real alternative worldview (“Weltanschauung”). Moreover, Evola, Spengler and Schmitt are more linked to each other than we would imagine at first glance. Evola is not only the celebrated traditional thinker who is worldwide known as such. He was an intrepid alpinist who climbed the Northern wall of the Lyskamm in the Alps. His ashes were buried in the Lyskamm glacier by his follower Renato del Ponte after he had been cremated in Spoleto (a town that remained true to Emperor Frederick Hohenstaufen) after his death in 1974. Evola was a Dadaist at the very beginning of his career as an artist, a thinker and a traditionalist. His was totally involved in the art avant-gardes of his time, as he himself declared during a very interesting television interview in French language that you can watch now on your internet screen via “you tube” or “daily motion”. This position of him was deduced from a thorough rejection of Western values as they had degenerated during the 18^th and 19^th Centuries. We have to get rid of them in order to be “reborn”: the Futurists thought we ought to perform promptly this rejection project in order to create a complete new world owing absolutely nothing to the past; the Dadaists thought the rejection process should happen by mocking the rationalist and positivist bigotry of the “stupid 19^th Century” (as Charles Maurras’ companion Léon Daudet said). Evola after about a decade thought such options, as throwing rotten tomatoes at scandalized bourgeois’ heads or as exhibiting an urinal as if it was a masterwork of sculpture, were a little childish and started to think about an exploration of “the World of Tradition” as it expressed itself in other religions such as Hinduism, the Chinese Tao Te King, the first manifestations of Indian Buddhism (“the Awakening Doctrine”), the Upanishads and Tantric Yoga. For the European tradition, Evola studied the manifestations and developed a cult of Solar Manly Tradition being inspired in this reasoning by Bachofen’s big essay on matriarchal myth (“Mutterrecht”). Thanks to the triumph of the Solar Tradition, a genuine Traditional Europe could awaken on the shores of the Mediterranean and especially in the Romanized part of the Italic peninsula, invaded by Indo-European tribes having crossed the Alps just before the Celts did after them. Besides, he was the translator of Spengler and reviewed a lot of German books written by authors belonging to what Armin Mohler called the “Konservative Revolution”. In Italy Evola is obviously very well known, even in groups or academic work teams that cannot be considered as “conservative-revolutionist”, but the role he played as a conveyer of German ideas into his own country is often neglected outside Italy. But still today people rediscover in Latin countries figures of the German “Konservative Revolution” through the well-balanced reviews Evola once published in a lot of intellectual journals from the 1920s to the 1960s. As his comments on these books and publications were very well displayed on didactical level, he can also be still very helpful to us today.

 

Evola was also a diplomat trying to link again to Italy the countries having belonged to the Austrian-Hungarian empire. He was active in Prague, in Vienna (a City he loved) and in Budapest. He also had contacts with the Romanian Iron Guard, which he admired as a kind of citizens’ militia controlling severely the bends of petty politics limping towards corruption and “kleptocracy”. Even if he was mobilized when he was still a very young man as an artillery officer in the Italian army during WW1, Evola disapproved the war waged against traditional Austria and didn’t agree with the Futurists, d’Annunzio and Mussolini who were hectic interventionist warmongers. He was aware that the destruction of the Holy Roman Imperial Tradition in the centre of Europe would be a catastrophe for European culture and civilization. And it was indeed a catastrophe that we still can grasp today: a contemporary author like Claudio Magris, born in Trieste, explains it very well in his books, especially in “Danube”, a kind of nostalgic travelogue, written during peregrinations from one place to another in this lost Empire of former times, now torn into many scattered pieces belonging to thirteen different countries.

 

Carl Schmitt in several books or articles expresses the nostalgia of a kind of “Empire’s secret Chamber” regulating the general policy of a “greater room” (“Grossraum”): for him the members of such a Chamber, if it ever becomes reality, would find inspiration from Bachofen’s ideas and their interpretations, from Spengler pessimistic decay philosophy and from the analyses of all possible teams devoted to geopolitics (Haushofer and others). Carl Schmitt just as Evola was also deeply interested in art avant-gardes.

 

My interest for Hamsun comes from the implicit anthropology you find in his works: the real man is a peasant running an estate. He is free: what he owns is his own production; he is never defined or bound by others, i. e. by alien capitalists or by State’s servants or by foreign rulers or by the eager members of a ruling and crushing party (Orwell’s pigs in “Animal Farm”). The general urbanization process that started in the historical cities of Europe (especially Paris, London and Berlin) and in the new hectic cities of the United States lead to the emerging of an enslaved mankind, unable to coin its own destiny with the only help of his own inner and physical forces. Spengler and Eliade both say also that true mankind is incarnated in the “eternal peasant”, who is the only type of man that can generate genuine religion. David Herbert Lawrence’s most important book for us is without any doubt “Apocalypse”: this English author laments the disappearing of “cosmic forces” in man’s life, due to the bias inaugurated by Reformation, Deism (mocked by Jonathan Swift), 18^th Century Enlightenment and political extremism derived from the blueprints (Burke) of the French Revolution. Man became gradually detached from the cosmic frame in which he was embedded since ever. He’s lost also all his links to the natural communities in which he was born, like the poor immigrant Hamsun was in Chicago or Detroit, limping from one miserable job to another, bereft of all youth friends and family members. The cosmic frame Lawrence was talking about receives a comprehensive and understandable translation for the humble in the aspect of a religious liturgy and calendar (or almanac), expressing symbolically the rhythms of nature in which each man or woman lives. Although Flanders has been urbanized since the Middle Ages and had important industrial cities like Bruges and Ghent, the anthropological ideal of the 19^th Century romantic or realist Flemish literature is the one of the independent peasant (“Baas Gansendonck” in Hendrik Conscience’s novel, the unfortunate and stubborn Father figure in Stijn Streuvels’ “Vlaschaard”, the heroes of Ernst Claes’ and Felix Timmermans’ rural novels and short stories, etc.). In Russian literature too, the rural element of the population is perceived as doomed under any communist or Westernized regime but simultaneously perceived as the only force able to redeem Russia from its horrible past. Solzhenitsyn pleaded for a general liberation of the Russian peasantry in order to restore the Ukrainian “Corn Belt” in the “Black Earth” area, giving Russia back the agricultural advantages it potentially had before the total destruction of the “Kulaks” by the Bolsheviks.

 

But we can talk for hours and hours, write full pages of interpretations of our common literary heritage; I cannot answer your question thoroughly as it would need writing a good pile of books. Let us conclude by saying Tradition or literary “ruralism” (be it Flemish, Scandinavian or Russian) are good things provided you don’t remain glued into it. Futurism is a dynamic necessity also, especially in societies like ours, where the countryside isn’t the only life frame anymore. Marinetti and more recently Guillaume Faye stressed the fact that in order to be able to compete on the international chessboard we have the imperious task to get rid of archaisms. But if Faye is obviously more futurist that “archaist”, I plead for a good balance between immemorial past and audacious future (like Claes did in his marvellously filmed novel “Mira”, in which a backward rural community refuses the building of a bridge that would link the village to the next important town; the young sensual prostitute Mira, treated as a witch by the village bigots, having just come back from Paris, where she was on the game, falls in love with the handsome engineer, the bridge is built and the village dwellers linked to the rest of the people’s community without abandoning their roots – the ideal balance between past and future, between demure morality and forgiven sin, is realised). To put it in realistic arguments: we need both a sound rural population (crushed nowadays by the EU-ukases) and a high tech engineering elite (able to create super-weapons) to become a re-born superpower, which would not be unnecessarily aggressive or feverish  “imperialist” (in the bad sense of the word), but calmly civilian (Zaki Laïdi) and simply powerful by its plain presence in the world. Mentally, we, as the forerunners of the needed “new teams” in present-day messy and derelict Europe, should be real and staunch “archeo-futurists”, mastering our roots and planning boldly our future. The rest is only mean and petty trifles.    

(Answers given in Forest-Flotzenberg, March 2011). 

Armin Mohler / Eine politische Biographie

Armin Mohler. Eine politische Biographie

Götz KUBITSCHEK

Ex: http://www.sezession.de/

 

Heute wäre Armin Mohler 91 Jahre alt geworden. Ich konnte ihn Mitte der neunziger Jahre noch kennenlernen und habe meinen Verlag nicht zuletzt gegründet, weil Ellen Kositza, Karlheinz Weißmann und ich im Jahre 2000 Mohler zum 80. eine Festschrift überreichen wollten. Es wird keinem Antaios-Leser unbemerkt geblieben sein, daß das Erbe Mohlers und sein besonderer Ton in Schnellroda auffindbar und virulent gehalten werden.

Nun hat Karlheinz Weißmann jahrelange Arbeiten in Form gebracht und legt Armin Mohler. Eine politische Biographie vor (hier subskribieren!). Weißmann ist der beste Kenner des Werks und der Denkweise Mohlers, hat auch Teile von dessen Nachlaß übernehmen können und in vielen persönlichen Gesprächen Details erfahren und Zusammenhänge notiert, die nirgends schriftlich niedergelegt sind.

Weißmanns Arbeit ist eine politische Biographie, weil Mohler ein politisch denkender, strategisch und taktisch im Sinne einer modernen deutschen Rechten agierender Kopf war. Man liest von der Nähe zur Macht (im Umfeld Josef Strauß‘), erfährt, was in den sechziger und siebziger Jahren an Debatten noch alles möglich war und verneigt sich vor der Prinzipientreue Mohlers, der Respekt nie mit Undeutlichkeit oder einer Schleimspur verwechselte.

Dies zeigt sich deutlich in den Großkapiteln über Mohlers Zeit als Sekretär von Ernst Jünger und über die Kontakte mit Carl Schmitt: In keinem Fall war er so etwas wie Goethes Eckermann (am Kaffeetisch sitzend und glühend vor Glück die Gespräche notierend), sondern ein Gesprächs- und Briefpartner auf Augenhöhe, der sich ja zuletzt nicht scheute, Jüngers Frühwerk gegen den Autor öffentlich zu verteidigen (was zum Bruch mit Jünger führte).

Dies alles breitet Weißmann in seiner Biographie aus, und natürlich auch all die anderen, für uns bis heute so wichtgen Aspekte: Mohler rettete das Erbe der Konservativen Revolution, sezierte die Mechanismen der Vergangenheitsbewältigung, verfaßte elektrisierende Essays – wir pflegen sein Erbe zurecht, und zurecht sind viele, die sich – dem Zeitgeist folgend – über ihn erhoben und über ihn urteilten heute so richtig und ganz und gar vergessen …

+ Weißmanns Mohler-Biographie kann man hier für 19 € subskribieren (bis zum 30. April). Später kostet sie 22 €, erscheinen wird sie Mitte, Ende Mai.
+ Von der dreibändigen Mohler-Ausgabe, die wir 2001 und 2002 aufgelegt haben, sind Reste der Bände 1 und 2 noch erhältlich. Wir bieten sie günstig im Doppelpack für 24 € an (in Einzelbänden: 44 €). Bestellen Sie hier.
+ Mohlers Essay Gegen die Liberalen (mit einem Nachwort von Martin Lichtmesz) wird derzeit in 2. Auflage gedruckt. Informationen und eine Bestellmöglichkeit gibts hier.

Thomas Mann: Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen - über die Wiedersprüche der demokratischen Gesinnungsethik

Thomas Mann: Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen - Über die Wiedersprüche der demokratischen Gesinnungsethik

Geschrieben von: Prof. Dr. Paul Gottfried (Gastautor)

Ex: http://www.blauenarzisse.de/   

Eine Vielfalt von bunten, einander verwandten Themen bilden Die Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen, die Thomas Mann zwischen 1915 und 1918 zusammentrug und vor Kriegsende herausbrachte. Der Erstteil des Werkes erwähnt, dass der Schriftsteller ein schon angesetztes „Künstlerwerk“ beiseite schob, nämlich den Zauberberg, um sich einem zeitdringlicheren Auftrag zuzuwenden. Eine Kontinuität erschliesst sich zwischen den letzten Szenen des Romans, als Hans Castorp sich kriegsmäßig gekleidet auf dem Schlachtfeld herumtummelt, und dem tragenden Thema der Betrachtungen, die eine Verteidigung des Deutschtums in einem folgenschweren Krieg darbieten.

Als Universitätsstudent wurde mir eingehämmert, dass beides dieselbe antidemokratische Streitlust bloßlegt, die den Krieg angestossen hatte. Obendrein ist ein gradliniger Verbindungsgang vermeintlich aufzuspüren, der von Manns Empfehlung des „deutschen Sonderwegs“ in den Betrachtungen bis auf die Nazi-Gewaltherrschaft hinüberleitet. Das wurde in den relativ beschaulichen und unparteiischen USA im Jahre 1963 gelehrt. Man kann sich vorstellen, wie dröhnend dieselbe Mahnung im heutigen antifaschistischen Deutschland ertönen muss.

Der deutsche Sonderweg gegen die jakobinisch-westliche Versuchung

Dazu gehören ein paar abgrenzende Bemerkungen. Wie andere Ehrenverteidiger auf beiden Seiten versuchte Mann im Verlauf der Kriegsaktion seine Heimat vor der Propaganda ihrer Opponenten zu bewahren. Da die auf der anderen Seite ausgerichteten Polemiker wie Lord Bryce und Henri Bergson, sich als Verfechter der westlichen Demokratie mit glänzendem Erfolg ausgegeben hatten, entschied sich Mann dafür, Widerstand zu leisten und Deutschland als eine konservative, volksgemeinschaftliche Kultur vorzustellen. Im Gegensatz zu ihren Widersachern kämpften die Deutschen und ihre Verbündeten nicht für eine zivilisatorische Sendung sondern gegen die Auslöschung ihrer Lebensweise und die Verdrängung „des deutschen Wesens“ durch ein eindringende Fremdlehre, sei es das Jakobinertum oder ein getarntes Römertum im revolutionären Gewand.

Vorrangig ist die deutsche Kriegssache als ein defensiver Einsatz auszulegen, auch wenn die Deutschen gezwungen wurden, gegen die Alliierten den ersten Schlag zu richten. Auf der internationalen Ebene war es schwer, einen anderen Kurs einzuschlagen. Schon vor den Ansätzen seines Kunstwerks scharten sich Manns verhasste „Zivilisationsliteraten“ in neutralen Ländern zusammen, den anderen voran, die spanischen Literaten, José Ortega y Gasset und Azorin, um für die „liberalen Streitmächte“ die Werbetrommel zu schlagen.

War das deutsche Kaiserreich fortschrittlich?

Wenngleich Hermann Cohen in seiner Kampfschrift Deutschtum und Judentum (1917) die Deutschen als Vehikel einer fortschrittlichen Weltzivilization schilderte, muss zugegeben werden, dass die Alliierten die Fortschrittsargumentation wirksamer für sich vereinnahmt hatten. Zum Ausgleich dieses propagandistischen Vorsprungs wäre den deutschen Eliten geboten gewesen, eine aufklärungsfreundlichere Miene vorzuzeigen. Bestimmt vermochten die Deutschen und Österreicher ihre modernisierenden und freiheitlichen Errungenschaften hervorzuheben. Es hätte gelohnt, diesen Vorzug auszuspielen, um den Deutschfeindlichen einen Strich durch die Rechnung zu machen. Mann und seine Mitkämpfer gerieten somit auf den Holzweg, als sie zum Glauben gelangten, dass die deutsche Rolle als Kulturhüter auf Entfernung von mehr als dreißig Meilen von Deutschland Anklang finden würde. Die Auseinandersetzung der Deutung von „Kultur“ und „Zivilisation“ fochten sie so in kultureller Abgeschlossenheit aus.

Auch bemerkbar sind Manns vielmalige Hinweise in den ersten sechzig Seiten auf Scheinpazifisten und auf die verachteten Kosmopoliten, die Deutschlands Geisteskräfte schwächen. Anvisiert ist vor allem Manns Bruder Heinrich, mit dem er damals zerstritten war. Anfang der Kriegsereignisse erklärte sich der linksgesinnte Heinrich für neutral, und wie der französische Romanautor Romain Rolland setzte er sich für eine Einstellung der Kriegshandlung von der Schweiz aus ein. Thomas Mann befand den „widersetzlichen“ Bruder als Fürsprecher für die Alliierten (nicht ganz grundlos). Die geringschätzenden Verweise sind nicht leicht zu kontextualisieren, ohne auf den biographischen Hintergrund Bezug zu nehmen.

Thomas Mann mit seinen Betrachtungen auf dem Holzweg: Er selbst schuf damit etwas Fremdartiges

Eine durchdringende Zwiespältigkeit zeigt auch der Text, die ebensostark auf die Befindlichkeit des Autors zurückverweist. Es bleibt im Schwanken, dass sein „Künstlerwerk“ dem deutschen Gemeinnutz dienen könnte. Mann grübelt vor sich hin, ob seine Wortkunst nicht eine unterwühlende Gabe darstellt, da sie kein wahrhaftiges Erzeugnis des „deutschen Geistes“ hergibt. Im Unterschied zu der deutschen Veranlagung zum Dichtwerk und zu musikalischen Leistungen befasst er sich mit einer „undeutschen“ Kunstform, der Schriftstellerei und erst recht mit französisch anmutenden Novellen und Romanen. Obwohl Mann deswegen nicht Abbitte tut, erscheint es (ihm vielleicht selbst zu jener Zeit), dass, was er schafft, fremdartig aussieht.

Als „Eideshelfer“, um seine patriotische Sache besser zu begründen, griff er zum Russen und Slavophil Dostojewski, der die Festigkeit und Rechtschaffenheit des deutschen Wesens pries. Angesichts dieser Hinweise wird es schwer, den Eindruck zu verfehlen, dass Mann den russischen Schriftsteller trotz seiner angegebenen Vorbehalte den Deutschen gegenüber zutiefst bewundert. Zu dem Dreigestirn von Nietzsche, Schopenhauer und Wagner, deren schöpferischer Ertrag Mann mitgeprägt hat und die er auch als Zeugen zur deutschen Größe zuzieht, kehrt er Dostojewski zum selben Zweck hervor.

Versteckte Slavo- und Frankophilie: Mann zwischen Faszination und Erschrecken über das Fremde

Es fällt ebenso in den Sinn, dass Mann von der französischen Schriftstellerei und besonders von Gustave Flaubert begeistert war. Den allerzwingendesten Beweis ergibt der lange Passus im Zauberberg, in welchem Mann die Zärtlichkeiten des Hans Castorp seiner Geliebten gegenüber en français zum Ausdruck bringt. Mann machte daraus keinen Hehl, dass er den französischen Autoren bis zum Gebrauch ihrer eigenartigen französischen Ausdrucksform Ehre zollte. Hinzu kommt, dass der Gro?teil der Betrachtungen das deutschpatriotische Leitmotiv nebensächlich berühren. Sie behandeln wahlweise das europäische Literatentum oder Manns’ Eigenschriften.

Die aufsehenerregendsten Seiten sind die ungefähr ersten dreißig, in denen Mann aus allen Rohren feuernd das Deutschtum gegen die Westernisierung hochhält. Der Verfasser hält sich für „unpolitisch“, indem er die Politisierung mit dem Aufmarsch des Kosmopolitanismus gleichsetzt. Im Gegensatz zu seinen deutschfeindlichen Gegnern verrät er keineswegs einen unweigerlich „politisierten Geist“. Er beschützt sein Vaterland nicht lediglich als Mittel, um eine demokratische „Weltbekehrung“ zu vervollständigen, sondern weil sie von außen bedroht ist.

Der Pazifismus der gesinnungsethischen Literaten

Zeitrelevanter ist die von Mann getroffene Unterscheidung von „Gesinnungsmilitarismus“ und „Zweckmilitarismus“. In Abgrenzung zu dem preußischen Dienstadel mit ihrer miltärstolzen Gesittung schlagen die bewaffneten Advokaten der Zivilisationsdemokratie empört auf ihre ideologischen Gegner los. Sie stürmen mit einfallenden Armeen nicht bloß, um den Feind zurückzustoßen, sondern gegen das Böse eine Weltmission durchzuführen: „Wir beobachten da eine Art von Irrationalismus, der in Wahrheit ein vergeistigter Rationalismus ist und darin besteht, dass man den Krieg für ein Gottesgericht erklärt.“ Die Zivilisationsliteraten, die für diese bevorzugte Kriegsart eintreten, sind keineswegs gegen das Vergießen des Blutes: Diese „Menschenliebe ist nicht blutscheu; so gut wie das literarische Wort gehört die Guillotine zu ihren Werkzeugen.“

Ebensowenig sind die erklärten Pazifisten in Deutschland grundsätzlich gegen die Gewalt: „Sein Verhältnis zu diesem Krieg schwankt zwischen humanitärem Abscheu und größter Bewunderung für die soldatischen Leistungen der Feinde.“ Umso kriegslustiger ist der Scheinpazifist, der der mit Deutschland im Widerstreit stehenden Seite beitrat. „Er ist entzückt von den Leistungen der Zivilisationsmächte, er bewundert ihr Kriegsgerät, ihre Stahlplatten, Betongräbern, Fliegerpfeile, Erkrasit- und Stickgasbomben, ohne sich zu fragen,wie sich das alles mit Edelschwäche verträgt, und während er dieselben Dinge auf der deutschen Seite ekelerregend findet. Eine französische Kanone scheint ihm verehrungswürdig, eine deutsche verbrecherisch, abstoßend und idiotisch.“ Wie die Entente-Minister und -Journalisten fühlt sich der antideutsche Gemütsdemokrat nicht bemüßigt zu fragen, warum die andere Seite „gerüstet, glänzend gerüstet“ sei, wenn er uns vormachen will, dass es nur die Deutschen sind, die mit ihrer soldatischen Überlieferung über Heerscharen und Kriegsmittel verfügen.

Der Krieg für die gute Sache, der auch heute noch geführt wird

Mann ging mit den Fahnenträgern des demokratischen Internationalismus ins Gericht, ehe die amerikanische Regierung das „Junkertum“ zu bekriegen anfing. Mann rückte das Scheinwerferlicht auf das Jakobinertum und die Freimauererei, denen der französischen Feind und seine ausländischen Schwärmer verschrieben seien. In seiner Schilderung weist er jedoch über das Nahziel hinaus und trifft die heutzutage allgegenwärtige menschenrechtliche Ideologie. Beim Kriegsausbruch musste es einem Unbefangenen dämmern, dass beide Seiten ihr Scherflein beitrugen, um die Lawine loszutreten. Jedoch deutete Mann auf ein Novum hin, als er eine Art Militarismus umschrieb, der mit traditonsverbundenen Gesellschaften nichts zu tun hat. Vielmehr haftet diese Haltung spätmodernen, ausgesprochen demokratischen Ländern an, die der ganzen Welt ihre menschenfreudige Gesinnung zurschaustellen wollen.

Im Vergleich mit den alten Monarchien steht das Neumodell im Aufwind. Von den geschlagenen Mittelmächten sich abhebend, gaben sich die siegreichen Demokraten als Humanisten aus, die im Zeichen einer weltweiten Friedensmission gekämpft haben. Aus ihrem Schlag stammen die Wilsonianer und noch zeitgeistiger die Neokonservativen, die militärische Einsätze verkünden, um wesensfremde Gesellschaften zu „vermenschlichen“. Mann erhob die Fragen, warum die Humanisten der Friedsamkeit wohlgerüstet auftreten und warum der vermutlich allerletzte Kampf für die demokratische Ruhe zu immer verbisseneren Kriegsaktionen hinüberführt. Und natürlich werden die Literaten aufgebracht, wenn versucht wird, die Stellung der Antidemokraten klarzukriegen. Man wittert bei solchen Klarmachungen den Hauch einer schandhaften Aufrechnung. Die wehrhaften Demokraten gereuen sich keineswegs, dass ein Bombenkrieg im Zweiten Weltkrieg gegen Zivilisten geführt wurde. Blutige Ungeheurlichkeiten sind hinzunehmen, wenn eine demokratische Weltverwandlung den Kämpfern vorschwebt. Thomas Mann traf in seinen (später von ihm bedauerten und zurückgezogenen) Betrachtungen den Nagel auf den Kopf, als er die harte Anwendung von Zwangsmitteln kurz- und mittelfristig als die zweckmilitäristischen Kosten darstellt, die eine friedlich-demokratische Weltordnung zustande bringen sollten.